# Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1982

Book Reviews

Romuald J. Misiunas
Cyril A. Zebot
Victor de Stankovich
Merle Goldman
Samuel S. Kim



## POLISH ECONOMY
Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl

## USSR and Poland
Richard D. Anderson, Jr.

## Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts
Richard F. Staar

## Checklist of "National Liberation Movement"
Wallace Spaulding

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# Problems of Communism

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**MARCH-APRIL 1982 VOL XXXI**

*Problems of Communism* (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

*On all editoral matters,* communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.
Telephone (202) 724-9801.

*On subscriptions,* communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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*An annual index* for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

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Cover: Polish miners near Katowice in the coalfields of Upper Silesia. Photo by Christian Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

# Problems of Communism

## Articles

**Poland's Economic Crisis**
Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl

Poland's economic crisis has assumed almost epic proportions since the appearance of its first symptoms in the late 1970's. Its causes lie deep in the Soviet-type economic system imposed on Poland, and half-measures will not solve it—not those suggested even when real reform seemed possible nor those forced through since the imposition of military rule in December 1981. On the contrary, the military solution may well lead to even greater economic difficulties.

**Soviet Decision-Making and Poland**
Richard D. Anderson, Jr.

Different perceptions of their best interests led Soviet Politburo members to advocate different options for resolving the Polish situation. As a consequence, the Politburo twice ordered preparations for external military intervention in Poland but then called off such an undertaking. Maneuverings by individual Politburo members also led to the replacement of those officers in high Soviet commands mostly likely to have pressed for a Polish intervention.

* * *

**Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts**
Richard F. Staar

This list, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982), identifies 96 Communist parties apparently recognized by Moscow today, plus 10 major Soviet international front organizations. Data provided concerning each party include the population of the country in which it exists, its estimated or claimed membership, its showing in the most recent national elections, its legal status, and its general orientation within the international Communist movement.

**Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"**
Wallace Spaulding

A listing of countries, parties, and movements that Moscow views as part of the world "national liberation movement"—which, next to the ruling and nonruling Communist and workers' parties, is the most significant factor in the world revolutionary process in Soviet eyes. Data provided include the participation of these elements in the congresses of certain Communist parties, in the work of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the official journal of Moscow-oriented Communist parties), and in the activities of the Moscow-sponsored World Peace Council.

* * *

Essay-reviews (over)

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## Essay-reviews

**Baltic Identity and Sovietization**
Romuald J. Misiunas

Resistance to Sovietization continues to characterize the societies of the Baltic republics of the USSR. It takes the form of efforts to nativize the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Communist parties and of cultivating a national culture and a Western life-style. While this resistance is at present muted, there is little doubt that the right catalyst could transform it into overt opposition to the Soviet system.

**Yugoslavia's "Self-Management" on Trial**
Cyril A. Zebot

Yugoslavia's serious economic problems stem from political-administrative meddling in what was supposed to be a truly autonomous "self-managing" economy and, more fundamentally, from distrust among Yugoslavia's national groups. There are indications that these problems will be given serious consideration at the party congress set for June 1982. The key, however, will be whether changes in economic self-management will be accompanied by political liberalization.

**Dissenting French Communists**
Victor de Stankovich

France affords a particularly interesting milieu in which to observe the process of involvement and then disillusionment with institutionalized communism. The experiences of a number of Frenchmen who have gone through this process suggest that, despite differences in age, background, and probably temperament, they have shared common impulses of idealism and realism and a very highly developed sense of liberty. The last, which reflects a sturdy reality of France for a long time, seems to have been the most powerful factor in their breaks with the party.

**Dissent in China**
Merle Goldman

Dissent exists in the People's Republic of China, just as it does in the West and in the Soviet Union. However, it takes forms that owe much to the Chinese tradition of dissent. It occurs primarily under official sanction. Dissenters establish alliances with political factions in the establishment or capitalize upon opportunities available when the leadership, for its own political purposes, countenances dissent.

**China's Place in World Politics**
Samuel S. Kim

There is a new "reality" to China's place in the world: its more active participation in the world state system and global organizations, and, correspondingly, its increasingly evident global outlook. Unfortunately, even recent works on Chinese foreign policy do not capture this reality, for they still bear the marks of the "Sinocentric" approach of an earlier era.

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# Poland's Economic Crisis

## By Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl

The imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, seems to have closed another chapter in the postwar history of Poland. Once again it has been demonstrated that it is impossible to create "communism with a human face." Whether the reforms come from within the Communist party, as in Czechoslovakia, or from the mass of workers and wide circles among the population, as in Poland after August 1980, they sooner or later stumble upon such problems as censorship, free elections, human rights, and the leading role of the party. Even when membership in the Soviet bloc is not openly questioned and alliance with the Soviet Union is accepted, there are certain boundaries no East European country is allowed to overstep.

The resort to a military solution, which General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the military junta had obviously prepared well in advance, instead of a political settlement, clearly demonstrates the bankruptcy of the regime in Poland. After 36 years with a monopoly of power, the regime has not been able to fulfill its economic promises. It has had to use security troops against workers, whom it is supposed to represent, and against young people, in whom it has made every effort to inculcate loyalty toward the official ideology. For all practical purposes, the Communist party (Polish United Workers' Party—PUWP) has ceased to function, except as a club of military and security leaders, top bureaucrats, and various party functionaries. Nonetheless, despite all the apparent gains achieved by Solidarity and the losses suffered by the party, despite economic disarray, administrative paralysis, negotiations, and promises of "renewal," the state security apparatus remained intact and untouched, carefully observing, preparing to strike at the right moment. After 16 months of hesitation and inaction, all liberal pretence was dropped, and a reign of terror of a new kind began.

The extent of martial-law violence is not yet fully known in the West. But even official sources give some indication of the scope of the security forces' actions. On December 17, according to official sources, the breaking of a strike at the Wujek coal mine near Katowice resulted in seven persons killed and 39 civilians and 40 security police wounded. On the same day, during disturbances in Gdansk, 164 civilians and 160 security police were wounded. At the end of December, a sit-in strike at the Piast coal mine near Katowice lasted two weeks, and many arrests were made after strikes were broken at the Institute of Nuclear Research (near Warsaw), in the Ziemowit coal mine (near Katowice), and in the Zeran automobile factory (near Warsaw). By January 12, again according to official sources, more than 4,900 persons had been interned. On January 30, six civilians and eight security police were wounded, and 205 persons were arrested, during attempted demonstrations in Gdansk. On February 13, 194 persons were arrested during attempted demonstrations in Poznan. At the end of February, during a massive operation conducted over two days by the security forces and militia, some 51,000 stores and warehouses, 60,000 trucks and cars, and 3,500 private residences were searched. Obviously, many other incidents went unreported, especially in the smaller cities and countryside.[1]

It is perhaps too early to see the full implications of martial law and the crackdown on Solidarity. Clearly, though, it is preeminently in the economic sphere that

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[1] For events in Poland since the imposition of martial law, see generally *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post;* for official information on the events described above, see *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Nos. 2, 3, and 5, 1982; and *Przekroj* (Warsaw), Feb. 28, 1982, p. 2.



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the military solution does not promise satisfactory results. Highly trained and loyal professional security units can be used to break strikes and to take over factories and mines. Workers can be forced, under martial law, to report to work. The workweek can be extended by decree. It is impossible, however, to ensure that production tasks will be properly performed, especially in modern industry, where high-quality and technically complex goods can be produced only with the special attention, understanding, and cooperation of highly motivated and disciplined workers. It is impossible to increase labor productivity and to improve the overall efficiency of the economy—precisely the conditions for recovery from the present economic crisis.

These assumptions are confirmed by recent news from Poland. Poland's indebtedness to the West is still huge—now more than US$27 billion—and the military regime has made no progress toward reducing it. Production continues to decline. In 1982, it is estimated, industrial production will again show a negative rate of growth, farmers are reportedly holding agricultural produce off the market, and the economy as a whole is racked by shortages, particularly of intermediate goods and spare parts.[2] As usual, consumers are bearing the brunt, and long lines are commonplace, just as before December 13. Jaruzelski earlier manipulated the question of the economy for his own purposes—indeed, he used the economic crisis as the justification for imposing martial law[3]—but he is now, in a sense, a captive of the economy.

But what of the future? Observers, governments, and perhaps even factions in the Polish leadership differ over what will happen next. Is martial law only a temporary phenomenon, and will there be a return to something like the pre-December period? Or is it merely the beginning of a long period of stultifying repression, much as has been the case in Czechoslovakia since 1968? All observers agree, however, that the economy remains the regime's most intractable problem. Indeed, when the real causes of the current economic crisis are examined, it becomes apparent that neither the present military regine, nor any likely successor regime, can provide a viable solution to Poland's profound economic difficulties.

## The Nature of the Crisis

It is necessary first to reject the notion that Poland's economic crisis was brought on simply by muddled policies, by the mistakes, incompetence, and corruption of the leadership and its planners and administrators

[2] See "January 1982—An Information Guide by the Central Statistical Office," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 5, 1982.

[3] For the text of Jaruzelski's declaration, see *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1982



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

*Symptomatic of economic dislocation in Poland, customers queue up in the rain outside a butcher shop in Warsaw in September 1981. The signs read: "Meat products" and "Meat."*

**—Jean Pierre Laffont/SYGMA.**

Some such explanation has always been the official line after an economic catastrophe. After the collapse of the Six-Year Plan (1950–55), the "Stalinists" were blamed. After Wladyslaw Gomulka fell from power in December 1970, his economic policies were criticized. Now, it is Edward Gierek and his advisers that are at fault. To be sure, all these leadership groups did in fact greatly contribute to the economic difficulties, through their arbitrary decisions, their unwillingness to listen to criticism, and their sheer incompetence. However, the real roots of the crisis go much deeper than mere failure of leadership.

Similarly, Solidarity cannot be held responsible for the crisis. The crisis was not caused by the strikers and labor unrest; on the contrary, the strikes and the establishment of free labor unions grew out of a rapidly accelerating economic crisis with which the government and party leaders were unable to cope.

The real causes of Poland's economic crisis lie in the system itself. This Soviet-type economic system has been implanted in Poland since the late 1940's and early 1950's, and its salient features are well known.

One feature has been the overcentralization inherent in the Soviet-type command economy. The command economy has many advantages. It can enforce a high degree of mobilization of resources, it can ensure full utilization of those resources, and it can direct the allocation of resources toward the fulfillment of selected quantitative targets. But it cannot ensure efficiency.[4]

Another feature has been the Soviet development model, with its strong element of autarkism. This development strategy concentrated on the expansion of industry, especially those branches that produced producer goods required for the domestic investment program. But these priority industries were all capital-, energy-, and material-intensive ones which required imports at a time when no viable export sector had been created. The development strategy played down agriculture, consumer goods, and the socioeconomic infrastructure (the so-called nonproductive sphere).[5] Thus, some traditional Polish exports produced by low-priority sectors were neglected, and several traditional markets were lost. A potential balance-of-payments crisis was inherent from the very beginning.[6]

A third feature has been the reorientation of Poland's foreign economic relations toward the Soviet Union. In

[4] The author has discussed the Soviet-type economic system in "How Does the Soviet Economy Function Without a Free Market?" *The Queen's Quarterly* (Kingston, Ontario), No. 4, 1964, reprinted in M. Bornstein and D. R. Fusfeld, Eds., *The Soviet Economy: A Book of Readings*, 4th Ed., Homewood, IL, Irwin, 1974, pp. 3–16; and (in an abbreviated version) in R. T. Gill, *Economics: A Text with Included Readings*, Pacific Palisades, CA, Goodyear, 1973, pp. 80–84.

[5] For a more detailed discussion of that strategy, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Communist Pattern of Industrialization," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 4, 1970, pp. 451–78.

[6] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Policy Alternatives in Polish Foreign Economic Relations," in M. D. Simon and R. E. Kanet, Eds., *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981, pp. 329–69.



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the late 1940's and early 1950's, Poland's trade with the West declined dramatically, both relatively and absolutely, and trade with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, with the other countries of Eastern Europe increased. The result was an added emphasis on producer goods, regardless of profitability, and a further deemphasis of consumer goods.[7] Under Soviet pressure, Poland had to withdraw from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD)—it was one of the original members—and to reject Marshall Plan aid. Thus, the capital required for postwar reconstruction and industrialization could not be obtained from abroad, at the very time there was a net outflow of capital from Poland and other East European countries to the Soviet Union.[8] Poland was increasingly isolated from the world economy.

During the first industrialization drive of the early 1950's, then, the combined impact of the overcentralized economic system, the development strategy, and the redirection of economic relations put a distinctive stamp on the Polish economy, much as was the case with the economies of the other East European countries. To use recent Soviet and East European terminology, an "extensive" pattern of development emerged, in which rates of growth depended primarily on increases in the quantity of inputs rather than on increases in the productivity of inputs.[9] A top-heavy industrial structure arose, geared to extensive development and a relatively high degree of autarky. Iron and steel, heavy machinery, metalworking, chemicals, transport equipment, and other branches typical of 19th-century industrialization were given priority, as Poland's economic planners tried to imitate the Soviet industrial structure.[10] Such "new branches of industry" as electronics and petrochemicals (including synthetic fibers and plastics) were neglected.[11] Much of Poland's industrial output consisted of goods which are profitable only if produced on a large scale and which are sensitive to technological progress and must therefore be continuously modernized.[12]

The result was high operating costs, which made many plants and entire industries unproductive. Although the distorted price system concealed the true picture, it is clear that a few profitable sectors, mainly consumer-goods industries, agriculture, and coal mining, had to subsidize unprofitable sectors. In this way, the amount of capital that the profitable sectors could have generated for their own expansion and modernization was reduced. This kind of inefficiency was perhaps the inevitable consequence of imposing a Soviet-type economic system and development strategy and forcing an unnatural reorientation of trade patterns on a country that differs greatly from the Soviet Union in terms of size, self-sufficiency, and political, social, and cultural traditions.

Serious disturbances in the Polish economy appeared within a few years, by the mid-1950's. They resulted in workers' riots in Poznan in June 1956 and a change in party leadership in October 1956. The new PUWP first secretary was Wladyslaw Gomulka, whose ascendancy led many Poles to hope for a more liberal regime.

In the economy, certain changes were pushed through straightaway. Grains and foodstuffs were imported on Western credits in order to improve the standard of living, which had fallen during the industrialization and collectivization drive. The rate of investment was reduced, and some investment was redirected toward agriculture, consumer-goods industries, and infrastructure. Some bold proposals for systemic modifications were discussed, but no significant and lasting reforms followed, other than the decollectivization of agriculture and some decentralization and rationalization of economic decision-making.

In the event, palliatives were not sufficient to improve the overall efficiency of the Polish economy. Moreover, after a temporary period of readjustment after 1956, the same development strategy was continued. A new industrialization drive started in 1961, which built on and extended the industrial structure created during the 1950's. Gomulka's plan was to restructure and modernize the economy on the basis of domestic accumulation (forced saving). But this approach failed badly. By the late 1960's, the economy was again caught in a vicious circle of stagnation.[13]

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[7] On the effect of the pattern of intrabloc trade, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Commodity Composition of Intra-Comecon Trade and the Industrial Structure of the Member Countries," in *Comecon: Program and Perspectives*, Brussels, NATO Directorate of Economic Affairs, 1977, pp. 103–34.

[8] P. Marer, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with East Europe: 1945 to the Present," in S. Rosen and J. Kurth, Eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath, 1974; and P. Marer, "Soviet Economic Policy in Eastern Europe," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 135–63.

[9] The author has discussed this pattern of development in "East European Integration: Comecon," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe*, pp. 79–134.

[10] J. Kleer, *ZSSR—pol-wieku przemian gospodarczych* (The USSR—A Half Century of Economic Transformations), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1969, pp. 26–27.

[11] J. Kleer, *Reformy gospodarcze w krajach socjalistycznych* (Economic Reforms in the Socialist Countries), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Zwiazkowe CRZZ, 1969, pp. 126–28.

[12] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Industrial Structure and the Intensive Pattern of Development in Poland," *Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas* (Munich), 1973, pp. 223–54.

[13] The author has discussed the situation at the end of the 1960's in "The Strategy of Development and Gierek's Economic Manoeuvre," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Nos. 1–2, 1973, reprinted in A. Bromke and J. W. Strong, Eds., *Gierek's Poland*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1973, pp. 52–70.



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After the riots of December 1970 forced a change in the party leadership, the new PUWP first secretary Edward Gierek and his advisers tried to achieve economic modernization through a "new development strategy." Its key was large-scale import of capital and technology from the West. Its essence was that an increase in investment was necessary to restructure and modernize the economy but that a simultaneous increase in consumption was necessary to create incentives, without which it would be difficult to expect improvements in labor productivity.

Gierek and his planners had high expectations. They hoped to increase the export of some high-quality manufactured goods, which would be produced in new or newly modernized plants with the help of Western machines and equipment and according to Western specifications, in some cases on the basis of Western licenses or even in cooperation with Western firms. The result would soon be an excess of exports over imports, and the debt would be repaid quickly. Moreover, exports to other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), to the less developed countries, and to the advanced countries of the West would increase the scale of production. This, together with a modernized capital stock and increased labor productivity, would ensure an intensive pattern of development.[14]

There were many flaws in the implementation of this ambitious strategy. The rates of investment were too high, and the investment front was too wide. Increases in personal income, badly needed after a prolonged period of stagnation at very low levels, were too large for the investment effort, even with large doses of imported capital. In industry, imports of investment goods and intermediate goods were excessive, and foreign licenses were purchased in numbers too big to be absorbed by the economy within a short period of time.[15] In agriculture, discrimination against the relatively more efficient private sector reduced agricultural exports, made imports of grain necessary, and thus contributed to balance-of-payments difficulties. In foreign trade, the way in which the planners tried to insulate the economy from the impact of the worldwide stagflation contributed to significant difficulties, primarily by increasing price distortions and inefficiency throughout the economy.[16]

Above all, the inflexible command system, only slightly modified by the WOG (large economic organizations) reform of 1973, made it too difficult to implement the "new development strategy."[17] Profitable exports to the nonsocialist countries proved very difficult to expand. Potential export items were selected from above by central planners who had no adequate information about world market conditions or even about real domestic production capacities. Price distortions made it impossible to calculate the profitability of various export alternatives. The inflexibility of the system rendered it difficult to make quick adjustments. The quality and prompt delivery of intermediate goods could not be ensured. At the same time, imports began to grow very rapidly, for arbitrary investment decisions and distorted prices had made the economy even more capital-, energy-, and material-intensive.[18]

When serious internal and external disequilibria appeared in the mid-1970's, Gierek and his advisers withdrew the limited systemic modifications of 1973 and returned to the old ways—to a high degree of centralization and a greater use of administrative commands. Instead of a gradual reduction of the trade deficit with nonsocialist countries in such a way that the transfer of Western technology would not be interrupted and investment projects could be completed at a slower pace, there were drastic cuts in imports from the West. The impact of the resulting bottlenecks was magnified by the operation of the supply multiplier.[19] Not only were the long-run prospects for further development damaged, but there was also a decline in the current level of output, including production for export. Attempts to export at any cost created losses and diverted some basic consumer goods and even producer goods from the domestic market, and shortages were further aggravated.[20]

[14] For a more detailed analysis of this policy, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970's," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 816–64.

[15] See Z. M. Fallenbuchl, *Technology Transfer in East-West Economic Relations: The Case of Poland, 1971–80*, DSTI/SPR/81.4, Paris, E/OECD, 1981.

[16] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Impact of External Economic Disturbances on Poland Since 1971," in E. Neuberger and L. Tyson, Eds., *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, Pergamon Press, 1980, pp. 280–304.

[17] For more details, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economic Assessment*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 33–71. For discussion of the WOG system, see also Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970's," loc. cit.; J. Staniszkis, "On Remodelling of the Polish Economic System," *Soviet Studies*, No. 4, 1978, pp. 547–52; and P. T. Wanless, "Economic Reform in Poland 1973–79," ibid., No. 1, 1980, pp. 28–57.

[18] W. Trzeciakowski, "Problems of Planning and Management in Polish Foreign Trade," *Handel zagraniczny* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1980, pp. 9–12; J. Soldaczuk, "Foreign Trade, Economic Growth, and Economic Efficiency," ibid., pp. 5–9; W. Rydygier, "Illusions and Reality," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 41, 1980, pp. 3–4; and A. Budnikowski and J. Misala, "Polish Export in the 1970's," *Handel zagraniczny*, No. 2, 1981, pp. 20–23.

[19] On the foreign trade–supply multiplier, see F. D. Holzman, *Foreign Trade Under Central Planning*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 126–35.

[20] For a more detailed discussion, see Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's."



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## Table 1: Selected Polish Economic Indicators, 1961–81, and 1982 Plan Variants

**(percent annual growth, in constant prices[a])**

| | 1961–1970 | 1971–1975 | 1976–1980 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 mod. plan | 1981, est. | 1982 plan variants[b] Min. | Prob. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic net material product:[c] | 6.1 | 9.9 | 1.4 | 6.8 | 5.0 | 3.0 | −2.3 | −5.4 | −15.1 | −14.5 | −8.3 | −1.4 | 2.1 |
| of which, by sector: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All industry | 8.3 | 10.8 | 3.0 | 9.3 | 7.7 | 2.5 | −1.7 | −3.0 | −20.4 | −18.7 | n.a. | −3.3 | n.a. |
| Socialist industry | 8.5 | 11.0 | 2.7 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 2.3 | −2.0 | −3.5 | −20.8 | −19.0 | n.a. | −3.5 | n.a. |
| Construction | 6.7 | 13.4 | −2.6 | 2.5 | 1.0 | −0.3 | −6.2 | −10.5 | −15.3 | −19.8 | n.a. | −2.9 | n.a. |
| Agriculture | 0.9 | 1.0 | −1.8 | 1.1 | −0.2 | 8.5 | −3.2 | −14.0 | −4.1 | −4.2 | n.a. | 4.3 | n.a. |
| National net material product:[d] | 5.8 | 12.0 | 0.2 | 7.0 | 2.7 | 0.7 | −3.4 | −5.9 | −14.0 | −13.4 | −15.5 | −4.5 | −1.1 |
| of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Expenditure on consumption from personal income | 4.8 | 8.5 | 5.2 | 8.7 | 6.6 | 1.0 | 3.2 | 6.4 | −14.4 | −6.0 | −12.2 | −4.8 | −3.4 |
| "Collective consumption" | 8.5 | 9.8 | 4.5 | 9.8 | 7.8 | 5.4 | 2.4 | −2.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 2.9 |
| Investment ("accumulation") | 7.4 | 19.0 | −11.6 | 3.7 | −5.3 | −1.4 | −18.0 | −37.0 | −26.0 | −56.0 | −72.3 | −13.2 | 12.0 |
| Foreign trade, total: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exports | 10.3 | 10.7 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 8.0 | 5.7 | 6.8 | −4.3 | −8.5 | −13.5 | −0.5 | 6.4 | 10.8 |
| Imports | 9.2 | 15.3 | 1.5 | 9.6 | −0.1 | 1.8 | −0.9 | −2.8 | −4.0 | −8.2 | −21.3 | −3.8 | 1.0 |
| Trade with socialist countries: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exports | 9.9[e] | 12.0 | 3.0 | −3.0 | 10.6 | 7.5 | 9.6 | −9.6 | −1.5 | −6.8 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Imports | 10.3[e] | 8.3 | 5.5 | 7.6 | 12.1 | 4.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 8.1 | 4.2 | −18.8 | −7.8 | −3.1 |
| Trade with all other countries: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Exports | 8.9[e] | 8.4 | 5.1 | 12.3 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 4.0 | −16.1 | −20.7 | −1.0 | 9.4 | 19.3 |
| Imports | 6.2[e] | 26.4 | −2.5 | 11.4 | −10.5 | −1.2 | −3.9 | −8.4 | −18.7 | −23.2 | −26.8 | 2.4 | 7.3 |
| Capital-labor ratio (net)[f] | 4.9 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 7.1 | 9.4 | 10.6 | 9.7 | 9.5 | 8.9 | 8.0 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Productivity of "productive" fixed capital stock[g] | 1.8 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 1.0 | −1.1 | −2.6 | −4.3 | −5.6 | −9.6 | −11.0 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Productivity of labor[h] | 6.9 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 5.0 | 3.3 | −1.5 | −4.0 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Difference between growth rates of labor productivity and of capital-labor ratio | 2.0 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 1.1 | −1.1 | −2.9 | −4.7 | −6.2 | −10.4 | −12.0 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Share of investment ("accumulation") in national net material product: | 25.0 | 33.0 | 28.0 | 34.1 | 31.5 | 30.8 | 26.2 | 17.5 | 14.0 | 8.7 | 2.9 | 10.2 | 10.0 |
| of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net fixed investment | 17.7 | 24.3 | 24.0 | 26.7 | 27.2 | 26.1 | 23.2 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 11.8 | n.a. | 9.0 | n.a. |
| Change in inventories | 7.3 | 8.7 | 4.0 | 7.4 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 2.2 | −2.2 | n.a. | 2.1 | n.a. |

[a] In the case of multiyear periods, average annual growth; in the case of the share of investment in national net material product, the figures are absolute percents of annual NNMP or of total NNMP for indicated period.
[b] Figures are from the original 1982 plan; the new figures of December 1981 were not fully available to the author.
[c] Or "produced national income"—for definition, see text.
[d] Or "distributed national income"—for definition, see text.
[e] Data are for 1966–1970 only.
[f] The value of "productive fixed assets" per person employed.
[g] Domestic net material product per unit value of "productive fixed assets."
[h] Domestic net material product per person employed in material production.

SOURCES: *Rzadowy raport o stanie gospodarki* (Government Report on the State of the Economy), Warsaw, July 1981, p. 120; Central Statistical Administration, *Rocznik statystyczny handlu zagranicznego 1980* (Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade, 1980), Warsaw, 1980; *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 41, 1980, p. 4, No. 38, 1981, p. 4, and No. 43, 1981, p. 2; and the author's own calculations (there are some differences as to the expected 1982 figures in various sources).



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**Table 2: Poland's Balance on Current Account and Indebtedness, Transactions with Nonsocialist Countries Only, 1971-82**

**(billions US$, current prices)**

| | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981, modified plan | 1981, est. | 1982, planned |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CURRENT ACCOUNT | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Export of goods and services | 2.3 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 8.4 | 9.8 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 9.3 |
| Import of goods and services | 2.0 | 2.7 | 4.8 | 7.2 | 8.7 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 8.9 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 8.7 | 8.8 |
| Balance | 0.3 | -0.1 | -1.4 | -2.1 | -3.0 | -2.8 | -1.8 | -1.5 | -1.9 | -0.4 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.5 |
| Net interest payments | -0.0 | -0.0 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.6 | -0.9 | -1.1 | -1.6 | -2.4 | -2.7 | -2.7 | -3.6 |
| Balance on current account | 0.3 | -0.1 | -1.5 | -2.4 | -3.5 | -3.4 | -2.7 | -2.6 | -3.5 | -2.8 | -2.9 | -2.8 | -4.1 |
| INDEBTEDNESS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| End-of-year debt | 1.2 | 1.5 | 2.8 | 4.8 | 7.6 | 11.2 | 14.3 | 16.9 | 23.1 | 27.0 | n.a. | 28.8 | 32.3 |
| Debt service | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 4.5 | 6.3 | 8.0 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| *Debt service ratio, in percent*[a] | *17.4* | *15.4* | *14.7* | *19.6* | *26.3* | *34.4* | *45.6* | *60.8* | *75.0* | *81.6* | *n.a.* | *n.a.* | *n.a.* |

[a] Debt service/exports.

SOURCES: *Rzadowy raport o stanie gospodarki* (Government Report on the State of the Economy), Warsaw, July 1981, p. 124; *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 18, 1981, p. 2, No. 28, 1981, p. 11, and No. 44, 1981, p. 2.

By the late 1970's, it was evident that the Polish economy was moving rapidly toward a major crisis. The rate of growth of national product fell to only 3.0 percent in 1978 and −2.3 percent in 1979. The pattern of development became not less but even more extensive (see Table 1, particularly the decline in capital productivity and the difference between labor productivity and capital-labor ratio). The net hard-currency indebtedness increased from US$14.3 billion in 1977 to US$16.9 billion in 1978 and US$20.5 billion at the end of 1979 (see Table 2). At the same time, the nominal net personal income grew rapidly—by 9.1 percent in 1978 and 9.9 percent in 1979—even as drastic shortages of consumer goods were being experienced.[21] By the second quarter of 1980, the crisis was severe, aggravated by difficulties in foreign trade and the resulting shortages of materials. The plan for the second half of 1980 had to be revised downward, and an attempt was made to enforce an improvement in the balance of trade, whatever the difficulties. The cost was even greater deterioration in the domestic consumer market.[22]

The leadership seemed helpless in the face of such a collapse. At the Eighth PUWP Congress, held in February 1980, it had been clear that the party and government leaders had no economic program. Instead, they had held to the same policy of attempting, through direct administrative command, to reallocate resources from investment to consumption, and to expand exports and severely restrict imports.[23]

Moreover, in the annual plan for 1980, prepared at the end of 1979, the planners had been unable to effect even a purely formal balance between the monetary demand and the supply of goods and services. Many material balances were achieved on the basis of unrealistic assumptions.[24] The "produced national income" (domestic net material product—DNMP—the value of all goods produced and of some services connected directly with their production) was expected to increase by 1.4–1.8 percent, trade with nonsocialist countries was to be balanced, and the "allocated national income" (national net material product—NNMP—which differs from DNMP by the balance of exports and imports) was expected to remain unchanged at the 1979 level. Industrial production was to rise by 3.0–4.0 percent, even though in 1979 "sold industrial production" (the value of industrial production actually sold to wholesale organizations or other enterprises, calculated at constant prices) had increased by only 1.9 percent and net in-

[21] *Rzadowy raport o stanie gospodarki* (Government Report on the State of the Economy), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, July 1981.

[22] "Problems and Tasks of the National Socioeconomic Plan for 1981," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1981, p. 61.

[23] Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's."

[24] "Problems and Tasks of the National Socioeconomic Plan for 1980," loc. cit., p. 61.



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dustrial production (industry's contribution to DNMP) had declined by 1.7 percent. Such an increase assumed—unrealistically—(1) a rise of 4.4 percent in labor productivity (in 1977, productivity measured in terms of gross production increased by only 2.7 percent, and that measured in terms of net production declined by 1.8 percent), and (2) a 1.2 percent reduction in material cost per unit of output. The planned targets for agriculture were based on the unrealistically optimistic assumption that after a decline in 1979, agricultural output would rise.[25]

Merely trying to muddle through, however, could not give satisfactory results this time. The efficiency of the economy could not be improved, and the country's indebtedness could not be reduced, without far-reaching economic reform and a carefully prepared stabilization plan.

## Proposals for Economic Reform

But the conditions for serious economic reform were created only by the events of the summer of 1980. The wave of strikes in August and September forced a change in party and government leadership. Gierek was ousted, and Stanislaw Kania replaced him, as PUWP first secretary. The strike movement also gave rise to the independent labor union Solidarity, which grew so rapidly that within months it could claim to represent more than 9 million of Poland's 13 million workers.[26] An air of liberalization prevailed, not only in society but also among many members of the party rank and file.

Under pressure from Solidarity, the Sejm (parliament), and public opinion in general, the new government agreed to prepare a proposal for economic reform, a report on the state of the economy, and a stabilization and recovery program. But it did not seem prepared to rush into a sweeping economic reform. PUWP leaders, preoccupied with reestablishing party unity and achieving some credibility, seemed more anxious to circumscribe and undermine Solidarity than to deal seriously with the economic crisis. In the meantime, as production continued to decline and the hard-currency debt continued to grow, the economy deteriorated even further. Almost a year would be wasted without the introduction of any viable policy for economic recovery and stabilization.

*Directions of Economic Reform: A Proposal.* This document, in which the new government offered its initial proposals for economic reform, was the first of the three documents to appear. It was drawn up by a Committee for Economic Reform, a large and cumbersome body of 500 members (with 11 specialized teams of experts), appointed in September 1980 by the PUWP Politburo and the Council of State. The initial version of the proposal came out in January 1981, in a shorter, milder, and vaguer form than one published in October 1980 by the Polish Economics Association.[27] After sharp criticism from several quarters—the free labor unions, the press, and the Polish Economics Association (at its general meeting in March 1981)—a revised version appeared in July 1981. This version, entitled *Directions of Economic Reform: A Proposal,*[28] was discussed at the PUWP Ninth Extraordinary Congress in July 1981, where Premier Jaruzelski promised that the government would act quickly to introduce it.[29]

A key question was the timing of reform. The reform proposal in its final version clearly stated that there was a great danger in introducing economic reform during a crisis with serious internal and external disequilibria, that there would be a considerable social cost in making all the necessary changes in the economic structure (including closing down unprofitable enterprises), and that the positive results of the reform would appear only gradually. Nevertheless, the document warned, the risks must be taken. On the one hand, "the discouragement, or even an incomplete introduction, of reform would burden society with far greater social costs, which could have tragic consequences." On the other hand, "the introduction of reform would contribute to the activation of a mechanism favoring the recovery and maintenance of economic stability." It would lead to "domestic market stability, to a stronger currency, and in the long run—together with increased overall economic efficiency and an improved balance-of-payments position—currency convertibility."[30]

The wording of the final version represented a defeat for the economic "conservatives." Many officials, although not opposing the reform (nobody seemed to be against it at the time), wished to postpone it, contending that reform should not be attempted until economic stability had been achieved through direct administrative measures. But by July 1981, the committee officially came around to the view that reform was a necessary condition for stabilization and recovery. The

[25] "The National Socioeconomic Plan for 1980," *Gospodarka planowa*, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1–5.

[26] See *The Washington Post*, Oct. 30, 1981.

[27] *Podstawowe zalozenia reformy gospodarczej* (Basic Principles of Economic Reform), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, January 1981; cf. "Meeting of the Economists," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 12, 1981, pp. 14–16.

[28] *Kierunki reformy gospodarczej—projekt* (Directions of Economic Reform—A Proposal), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, July 1981.

[29] *Express wieczorny* (Warsaw), July 20, 1981, p. 3; *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 30, 1981, p. 3.

[30] *Kierunki reformy*, pp. 5, 8.



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reform proposal clearly stated that "the reform will be carried out on a comprehensive scale in the shortest possible time," because "the traditional mechanism had ceased to work, the ability to control the economy had been considerably limited, and the effectiveness of the economy was rapidly declining."[31]

Could an immediate and comprehensive economic reform have had much chance for success? Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, it should be noted, was introduced on January 1, 1968, after careful preparation, when the pressure on the economy had been reduced, reserves had been accumulated, and personnel had been prepared. It would have been relatively easy to introduce a comprehensive reform in Poland at the beginning of the 1970's, when foreign capital could have been used to reduce disequilibrium, decrease pressures, and build reserves. Instead, foreign capital was used to stimulate investment in an attempt to achieve unrealistically high rates of industrial growth. At the time, the economy seemed to be developing very successfully, and Gierek was not prepared to admit that the success was due to the large inflow of foreign capital. Thus, there was no pressure to change the system. Why modify something when it gives impressive results?

In 1980–81, however, it was too late to wait until careful preparations for reform could be made. The old system had disintegrated under the impact of the rapidly deepening economic crisis. A "systemic vacuum" appeared, as nothing arose to take the old system's place. The organs of economic administration were virtually paralyzed. There were increasing difficulties of obtaining imported materials and other supplies. The well-established horizontal cooperation links among enterprises had been destroyed by attempts to restructure the economy through administrative measures and to change the enterprises' product mix in accordance with the changed priorities—i.e., toward export and domestic consumption and away from "production for produc-

[31] Ibid., p. 52.



*Inside the Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw on March 27, 1981, during a four-hour warning strike called by Solidarity. The Ursus plant was one of a number of facilities involved in the plans of the Edward Gierek regime to import technology from the West to produce goods for domestic and export markets.*

—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.



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*Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski, left, and Polish Premier and Minister of Defense Wojciech Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), at the July 1981 Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP, which discussed the regime's reform proposal and accepted the government's report on the state of the economy and its stabilization and recovery program.*

**—Interpress via EUPRA and Lehtikuva via Photoreporters.**

tion." The result had been discontinuation of the production of many intermediate goods.[32]

Nonetheless, the proposal of economic reform envisaged significant systemic modifications, to be introduced in stages. Society was to play a greater part at various levels of the planning process. The Planning Commission was to have a reduced role in the day-to-day operations of the enterprises. The "branch ministeries," which are generally recognized as the centers of vested interests of individual sectors, were to be reduced in number and stripped of some of their powers. The state enterprises and local authorities were to have greater autonomy, based on self-financing supplemented by credits from the banking system. The economy was to be controlled from the center indirectly, with the help of centrally determined "economic instruments," such as prices, interest rates, taxes, exchange rates, and various norms, whose role would gradually increase while that of direct administrative commands would decrease. In short, the system was to be decentralized, and "economic parameters" were to take the place of direct administrative commands, but market forces would not really be introduced.

It is doubtful that the fine tuning implied by the method of "parametric steering" would have given satisfactory results. In the 1970's, attempts to manipulate prices so as to control private agriculture—its overall output, product mix, and use of inputs—often brought confusion, unnecessary fluctuations in production, and dislocations, all of which greatly contributed to the agricultural crisis at the end of the decade. This same method could hardly be any more successful when applied to the whole economy.

In 1981, moreover, the economy was in disarray. There were catastrophic domestic and external disequilibria. There was an accumulation of purchasing power in the hands of the population, and a backlog of unsatisfied demand. Reserves were dangerously low throughout the economy, inflationary expectations were high, and the public had lost confidence in the ability of the central authorities to manage the economy.

Above all, the reform proposal did not seem to take into consideration the fact that as a result of heavy foreign indebtedness, the Polish economy had become an open economy. In order to expand exports to the West, repay the debt, and secure imports of needed materials, parts, and machines, the Polish economy would require greater flexibility throughout and better operating market signals than could be achieved with the proposed system.[33]

[32] W. Bojarski et al., *Kryzys gospodarki polskiej* (The Crisis in the Polish Economy), Warsaw, Instytut Wydawniczy Zwiazkow Zawodowych, 1981, p. 24.

[33] The author has discussed official and other proposals for economic reform in "Poland: Command Planning in Crisis," *Challenge* (New York, NY), July-August 1981, pp. 5–12; in "The Need for Radical Changes in Economic Policy and in the System of Planning and Management," *Odnowa* (London-Rome), January 1981, pp. 5–11; in "Comments on Proposals for Economic Reform," ibid., April 1981, pp. 75–85; and in "The Origins of the Present Economic Crisis in Poland and Various Proposals for Economic Reform," a paper presented at a Roundtable Conference on Poland, Glendon College, York University, Toronto, May 1981.



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*Government Report on the State of the Economy.*[34] The other two documents promised by the government—the report on the state of the economy and the stabilization and recovery program—appeared later and were of different bureaucratic provenance. Both were originally drawn up by the state's Planning Commission and, in April 1981, presented to the Sejm's Commission on the Economic Plan, Budget, and Finances. Criticized by the media and Solidarity, both were rejected as "unsatisfactory." After some revision by an ad hoc committee of experts appointed by the premier, the two documents were again submitted to the Sejm, this time successfully. In July 1981, they were officially accepted, by both the Sejm and the Ninth PUWP Congress, as the basis for Polish economic policy.

The government report on the state of the economy presented a gloomy picture of a continuing downward spiral in the Polish economy. Its main conclusion as to the nature of the economic crisis was:

*In 1980, these difficulties (the acceleration of inflation, rapid growth of indebtedness, increasing shortages of materials and parts, and production disproportions) reached such a scale and reinforced one another with such strength that a sharp deepening of the crisis became inevitable. A drastic reduction in 1980 agricultural production caused by adverse climatic conditions has had an additional negative impact. Current sociopolitical processes, which have begun to overcome the deformations in sociopolitical and economic life, have had negative economic consequences in the short run.*[35]

*Government Stabilization and Recovery Program.*[36] This document, 56 pages long, presented "the current position and intentions of the Government concerning actions toward a way out of the current economic crisis." Of the three documents, it seemed the most broadly conceived. Its "starting point" was the "diagnosis of the economic system given in the government report on the state of the economy." Unlike the reform proposal, it was concerned not only with economic reform but with the whole question of recovery. As a kind of synthesis of the other two documents, it should have been the most authoritative document of the three. In reality, though, the stabilization and recovery program was little more than a general outline. It was not meant to be an economic plan; rather, it was an "internally consistent compilation of the methods of economic policy." Its more concrete forms were to have been the annual economic plans for the years 1981–85, resolutions of the Council of Ministers, and enterprise plans.

On a general level, the government stabilization and recovery program outlined actions to be taken in six basic directions: (1) the reversal of production declines; (2) improved supply of consumer goods; (3) cuts in the state budget; (4) the normalization of investment and of the research and development base; (5) work-force relocations; (6) debt repayment and export stimulation.

It is significant that the question of foreign economic relations—the reestablishment of the external equilibrium of the economy and closely related pro-export structural changes—was relegated to last place. Yet the balance-of-payments disequilibrium still plays a key role in the present crisis. The national product has been declining mainly because Poland cannot get sufficient imports of raw materials, intermediate goods, components and spare parts, and complementary machines and equipment. As a result, the production facilities created, enlarged, or modernized during the investment drive of the first half of the 1970's are utilized only to a fraction of their capacity, either because they are excessively import-intensive or because the planners overestimated their potential role as exporters to the West. At the beginning of 1981, only 60 percent of the productive capacity in industry, and no more than 50 percent of new production facilities, were being utilized. Fifty billion zlotys worth of machinery, including 33 billion zlotys worth of imported machinery (US$1 billion and US$660 million, respectively, at the "foreign exchange coefficient" used by the Polish planners in 1980), had not been installed because of a lack of complementary machines and equipment or because investment projects remained unfinished.[37]

As Ryszard Karski, then Minister of Foreign Trade, pointed out at the Ninth PUWP Congress, "the lack of sufficient import can choke all industry . . . as the result of the creation of a highly import-intensive structure of economy during the last decade." Imported goods and materials now make up 23 percent of the total value of goods produced, and many enterprises depend on certain specific imports from the West that cannot be replaced by imports from socialist countries. This, according to Karski, explains why Poland's industrial production declined by 12 percent in the first half of 1981 despite an increase in imports from socialist countries by 6 percent.[38] It has been calculated that because production is so dependent on imports, a reduction of ex-

[34] *Rzadowy raport. . . .*

[35] Ibid., p. 17.

[36] *Rzadowy program przezwyciezania kryzysu oraz stabilizowania gospodarki kraju* (Government Program for Stabilization and Recovery), Warsaw, Trybuna Ludu, July 1981.

[37] "The Way out of the Crisis," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 6, 1981, p. 13.

[38] A. Lubowski, "Diplomacy and the Economy," ibid., No. 3, 1981, p. 4.



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ports by one zloty and a corresponding reduction in imports leads to a production decline of 2.0–2.5 zlotys.[39]

It can be argued, therefore, that in the summer of 1981, any viable stabilization and recovery program should have begun with the question of foreign trade. A determined attempt to secure sufficient imports should have been made in order to increase production. This, in turn, would have required the expansion of exports and the restructuring of production, especially when only relatively small investment outlays were involved. Thus, the government recovery program suffered from the same weakness as did the proposal for economic reform. Instead of regarding foreign indebtedness and the balance-of-payments deficit as Poland's key economic problem, the stabilization and recovery program discussed the question of reform as if the Polish economy were a closed economy; the question of foreign economic relations was treated as a special problem, almost as an afterthought.

On a more specific level, the stabilization and recovery program presented a series of measures designed to (1) expand agricultural production; (2) ensure more efficient use of raw materials; (3) increase the domestic production of raw materials and fuels, especially coal; (4) reduce imports, especially from nonsocialist countries, and encourage exports; (5) recover and recycle by-products, waste, and used materials; (6) encourage small producers, such as local industry, cooperatives, and handicrafts; and (7) improve transportation facilities, the lack of which was and still is a very serious bottleneck.[40]

Each measure reflected a policy mix of organizational changes, incentives, financial measures, and administrative directives. Some—for example, agricultural policy—were not only essential but seemed quite realistic. Others—for example, improvements in transportation—appeared to be little more than a list of desirable objectives. Still others—such as the recycling of used materials—could have been useful but were of only marginal importance.

Certain of these measures, however, may have been ineffective, or even harmful to economic recovery and further economic development. Once again, a prime example may be found in the question of foreign trade—namely, the reduction of imports and the expansion of exports.

First, the main instrument for export expansion was to be enterprise foreign exchange funds, which were to have been established, according to the program, in the second half of 1981 and which seem to be in operation in 1982. Enterprises producing for export to nonsocialist countries are authorized to form a fund by depositing a fixed percentage (but no more than 50 percent) of the hard currency they earn from their exports. They are able to draw on the fund to purchase imports necessary for production purposes, modernization, and replacement of productive capacities. They are also permitted to transfer part of their fund to other enterprises that supply them with materials, parts, and the like.

Such typically bureaucratic solutions were tried during the WOG reform in 1973–75. They failed then, and there is no reason to believe that they will succeed now. The belief that if only norms and incentives were properly calculated and this or that enterprise fund were established, exports would rise, costs would be cut, and efficiency would be improved was a central point of Soviet and East European proposals for systemic modifications during the late 1960's and the 1970's. But the situation in Poland is radically different now. The measures envisaged by the stabilization and recovery program tend to retain a high degree of bureaucratic control and interference. They will not increase the flexibility of the economy, which is now absolutely necessary for economic recovery and the repayment of Poland's huge foreign debt. As such, they will be not only ineffective but dangerous.

Second, the stabilization and recovery program envisaged the continuation of "central steering" of imports of raw materials and other producer goods, the use of administrative commands to halt the import of investment goods from capitalist countries, and the cancellation of contracts that had already been negotiated. As of January 1, 1982, excessively import-intensive production was to have been stopped, again by administrative command, unless its import content could be replaced by domestic production.

This "central steering" could lead to disaster. It has not been uncommon for Poland to lose important foreign markets because it attempted to save on scarce foreign exchange. For example, a good produced on an expensive foreign license and meeting all other necessary specifications has often failed to meet standards because of a relatively insignificant part made out of an inferior, domestically produced material.

Finally, the stabilization and recovery program stressed import substitution, "whenever economical." However, this is exactly the same policy that created the high-cost, inefficient industrial structure in Poland during the 1950's and early 1960's, it was one of the main weaknesses of the investment program during the 1970's, and it was a factor in the collapse of the "new development strategy." It is extremely doubtful that the results will be any different now. The pattern of devel-

[39] Ibid.

[40] *Rzadowy program . . .*, pp. 19–32.



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*Workers photographed in the autumn of 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, a major producer of foreign exchange for Poland's economy.*

**—Jean Gaumy/Magnum.**

opment will more likely become not less but more extensive, which will again seriously limit the possibility of improving the standard of living. Moreover, unless market signals (prices, costs, and the rate of exchange) are made meaningful, it will not be possible to calculate which import-substitution projects are economical and which are not.

As for the proposed actions in other directions, the stabilization and recovery program represented the same combination of desirable and rational measures and bureaucratic measures. The presence of the latter did not guarantee much improvement. Under the circumstances, bureaucratic measures might even have led to a further deterioration in the economic situation and, in consequence, to a political explosion. Optimists, however, could take some hope from the very fact that some desirable and rational measures had been officially accepted.

## Grounds for Optimism?

The party emerged from its Ninth Congress, therefore, with three basic economic documents: an unrealistic and internally inconsistent reform proposal, a reasonably accurate report on the state of the economy, and an unimaginative and unimpressive stabilization and recovery program. They were clearly not sufficient to deal with the economic crisis. Each had been prepared, discussed, modified, and rushed through the congress against continuous but only half-explicit opposition by party hard-liners, dogmatic economists, and some bureaucrats.[41] But the documents, and the measures they proposed, were meant to be only the first steps toward other, more far-reaching reforms. If conditions remained favorable for reform, there were perhaps some grounds for optimism.

[41] See, for example, reports on the meetings of the Committee for Economic Reform in *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 6, 1981, p. 12; No. 14, 1981, p. 3; No. 22, 1981, p. 4; and No. 28, 1981, p. 4; also M. Mieszczankowski, "Suggestions for the Proposal," ibid., No. 7, 1981, pp. 7–9, and No. 8, 1981, pp. 8–9.



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The leadership clearly did not encourage optimism. In contrast to the "propaganda of success" which dominated the 1970's, it began to paint a very bleak picture of not only the short-run but also the long-run future. In addition, the government stabilization and recovery program envisaged only slow improvements. In agriculture, the highest precrisis level was expected to be achieved in crop production in two to three years, and in animal production in three years at the earliest. In industry, the precrisis peak was to be reached in three to four years, and in national income (DNMP), in five to six years. Foreign indebtedness was to be reduced beginning only in six to seven years. By 1985, industrial production was expected to be only 5 percent above the 1980 level. However, the structure of industry would be changed to some extent. Production for the domestic consumer market was to exceed the 1980 level by 11 percent in 1985, and it was to be less fuel- and material-intensive. At the same time, income distribution was to be less differentiated, even though the stabilization and recovery program also envisaged "the strengthening of the principle of remuneration according to the quantity and quality of work."[42]

At the same time, according to the government program, several factors could significantly accelerate the pace of recovery: (1) increased output of coal and other raw materials, (2) more favorable conditions for agricultural production, (3) successful implementation of economic reform, (4) closer cooperation with the socialist countries, and (5) more favorable conditions for export expansion and more favorable terms of trade.[43] Another factor of great importance was the cooperation of society. According to the program, recovery, even a slow and modest recovery, would depend on social acceptance, because the level of economic activity was expected to fall before starting to rise again, and a considerable dose of austerity would be required. This last point should be noted, for the declaration of martial law has made social acceptance of the government's recovery program very problematic.

Before December 13, it appeared that the party and government leaders were finally prepared to move toward an effective stabilization and recovery policy. Jaruzelski's meeting with the leaders of the Catholic Church and Solidarity in early November seemed to be the first step toward cooperation between the authorities and society, including the workers. Poland's application for readmission to the IMF and World Bank also raised hopes. A stabilization loan would help strengthen Poland's position in relation to its Western creditors. Further rescheduling of the debt and the negotiation of new foreign and international credits, even in small quantities, would help to move workers from the lines in front of empty stores into factories, to supply materials and parts for fuller utilization of existing productive capacities in industry, and to secure certain essential production goods and services for individual farmers. A viable stabilization program could be prepared in cooperation with international experts, and austerity measures would have a better chance of acceptance when recommended by international organizations. It is important to remember that Solidarity always maintained that it would accept an austerity policy if that policy were an integral part of a viable stabilization and reform program.[44]

It was possible, at least, to outline an optimistic scenario. A solution to Poland's economic crisis would have depended, of course, not only on the goodwill and cooperation of international financial institutions, foreign governments, and foreign banks. It would also have had to rely on a high sense of responsibility on the part of government and Solidarity leaders and, above all, on a favorable domestic and international political climate.[45] In this scenario, there would have been further reforms, additional liberalization and opening of the economy, and establishment of a socialist market economy. Such changes could have led to greater overall economic efficiency and repayment of Western debts through the expansion of exports rather than through the continued limitation of imports. All this need not have endangered Soviet interests in Poland, or spelled the end of socialism in Poland, if the party and government leaders were able to muster the requisite political ability, flexibility, and vision. On the contrary, East-West economic relations might have been strengthened, and the political climate in Europe improved.

## Toward a Neo-Stalinist Economy

Nevertheless, even as discussion of economic reform and liberalization continued during the second half of 1981, there were also grounds for pessimism. The government reform program may not, after all, have been taken seriously by the inner circle within the leadership.

[42] *Rzadowy program . . .*, p. 53.

[43] Ibid.

[44] See, for example, "Economic Reform and the Conditions of Social Agreement," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 2, 1981, p. 2; and J. Osiatynski, "Solidarity's Position on Economic Reform," *Solidarnosc* (Warsaw), No. 7, May 17, 1981, p. 10.

[45] A scenario along these lines was set forth in Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Poland: A Way Out," a paper presented at the session organized by the Association for Comparative Economic Studies at the annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations, Washington, DC, December 1981.



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*Polish army majors Wojciech Mowoczyk and Marian Szady converse with farmers receiving coal, fertilizer, and feed in exchange for pigs in the Plock area near Warsaw in November 1981. The two officers were members of a "regional operational group" attempting to cope with a breakdown in the flow of supplies between the countryside and the cities.*

**—Interpress via Gamma-Liaison.**

The economic documents had been prepared under pressure from Solidarity and public opinion. The leadership may have thought it necessary to embrace reform publicly, even if they regarded the reform proposals as meaningless concessions, to be withdrawn at the first opportune moment. At the same time, various economic measures were introduced that indicated the leaders were searching for quite a different solution. Arbitrary cuts were made in imports and investments, production was modified by administrative fiat in accordance with new priorities, and materials were allocated directly. This policy, now combined with "administrative paralysis" and badly organized and inadequate rationing of basic foodstuffs, represented a continuation of basically "the same line as those which led . . . to the crisis."[46]

In early August, a special task force, the "Anticrisis Operational Staff," was formed to coordinate the activities of various central administration departments and agencies. Using direct administrative methods, it prepared new balances for fuels and electrical power and a new allocation of materials and foreign exchanges among enterprises. It selected six so-called protected areas—food, pharmaceuticals and health items, basic clothing and shoes for children, electric power and fuels, exports, and agriculture—as priority areas for which allocations had to be secured, no matter the cost.[47]

This approach came into immediate conflict with the very concept of economic reform, which was scheduled for introduction on January 1, 1982. First, it represented a strengthening of the administrative command system and a drastic limitation, instead of a broadening, of enterprise autonomy. Moreover, since the system of priorities did not cover the production of various intermediate goods, some serious problems immediately arose. A lack of some relatively insignificant materials or parts often halted the production of priority items, once again demonstrating that "the economy is not divisible, that priority production always collapses because of the lack of a small detail, a machine or an intermediate good, which is produced in the low-priority sector."[48] This was the lesson of the Stalinist Six-Year Plan (1950–55)[49] and of direct administrative allocation of resources at the end of the 1970's.[50] It is surprising that the experts from the Anticrisis Operational Staff had forgotten it.

Subsequently, nine "operational programs" were formulated to replace the six "protected areas." These programs were designed to ensure the supply of (1) fertilizers and pesticides, (2) machines, tools, and transport equipment (including spare parts) for agriculture and the food industry, (3) milk, (4) pharmaceutical and medical products and surgical equipment, (5) basic health items, (6) children's clothing and shoes, (7) coal, (8) rolled steel products, and to secure (9) the "dynamization of export." In order to obtain resources on a priority basis, enterprises would have to become involved in the production of goods and services singled out by the nine operational programs, as formulated in the Annual Central Plan for 1982. In all, some 85 groups of products were to be balanced, and 70 groups were to be centrally allocated in the plan.[51]

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[46] J. Pajestka, *Polski kryzys lat 1980–1981* (The Polish Crisis of 1980–81), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1981, p. 103.

[47] E. Bieniasz-Stepien and T. Kierczynski, "Protected Areas," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 44, 1981, pp. 1, 4.

[48] "Priorities and Reality," ibid., No. 38, 1981, p. 4.

[49] One of the first of many studies of the adverse effects of excessive allocation of resources for the priority sectors and shortages of goods originating in the low-priority sectors is A. Karpinski, *Zagadnienia socjalistycznej industrializacji Polski* (Problems of the Socialist Industrialization of Poland), Warsaw, Polskie Wydawnictwo Gospodarcze, 1958, pp. 71–105.

[50] Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's," pp. 49–50; R. Malinowski, "Who Should Be Responsible for Spare Parts?" *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 36, 1978, p. 8; and T. Wojciechowski, "Can Material Supply Be Less Troublesome?" ibid., No. 7, 1978, p. 3.

[51] *Zasady dzialalnosci przedsiebiorstw panstwowych w 1982 roku* (Principles of the Operation of State Enterprises in 1982), Warsaw, December 1981, pp. 2, 13, 15, 20.



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In this same period, various administrative reorganizations, expansion of the list of priorities, campaigns, and "operational programs" spread additional confusion throughout the economy. For example, some enterprises, unable to obtain materials needed for operation at capacity, decided to produce agricultural machines or equipment, even if inefficiently and at high cost, simply in order to participate in the "everything for agriculture" campaign. They got the materials they wanted, but in so doing they often wasted their productive capacities, which may not have been suited to this type of production and which could have otherwise been used to expand export production.[52]

Price distortions also led to inefficiency, particularly to a breakdown in interenterprise cooperation and to stoppages of production. A price reform for producer goods had originally been projected for July 1981. But the preparatory work took more than a year. The Central Price Commission had to publish about 200 price lists, several million pages in all. Before publication, each list had to be discussed with various administrative departments and agencies and, subsequently, with the enterprises. A change of even a single price sometimes required changes in several other price lists.[53] This gigantic, laborious, and time-consuming process was to be completed in time for the introduction of new prices on January 1, 1982.

Moreover, such price reform seemed ill conceived. As soon as new prices were established, they would gradually become obsolete, misleading to both producers and users. The inflexibility of the system would make frequent adjustments impossible. No economy subjected to such a burden could increase its efficiency and expand its world market exports. In accordance with the reform proposal, some prices would be centrally determined; others, controlled; and still others (those for less important goods), determined by the enterprises. Without introducing all elements of the reform, however, it was difficult to leave any part of the price-determination process to the enterprises.

[52] K. Fronczak, "A Thoughtful Enthusiasm," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 18, 1981, p. 5.

[53] *Z Czeslawem Bobrowskim o gospodarce* (Conversations with Czeslaw Bobrowski About the Economy), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1981, p. 32.

*Zbigniew Krasinski, left, Poland's Minister for Price Reform, and Marian Krzak, right, the Minister of Finance, discuss the issue of cigarette price increases with Lech Walesa, leader of the independent labor organization Solidarity, during Solidarity's autumn 1981 congress.*

**—Interpress via EUPRA.**



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Even in October 1981, Wladyslaw Baka, the minister responsible for economic reform, returned to the concept of "provisional systemic solutions" at a meeting of the Committee for Economic Reform. While reassuring the committee that the government would not abandon the reform, he pointed out that the catastrophic economic situation would necessitate the continuation of rationing and administrative allocation of resources, and that this would make the functioning of the new system impossible.[54]

All these developments in the fall of 1981 suggested that in practice, the Polish leadership would have maintained a high degree of centralization and extensive use of administrative controls and allocations—even in the absence of military action. But military rule was imposed, and the fate of economic reform became even more problematic.

## Under Martial Law

In the three months since December 13, it has become increasingly clear that martial law has made the solution of Poland's economic crisis even more difficult than before. The crackdown on Solidarity, the arrests and purges, and the brutality of the security forces have made it virtually impossible for the government to think of winning popular support and whole-hearted worker cooperation—on which, as the government's own program emphasized, a viable recovery program must depend. Military action has also created unfavorable conditions for economic decentralization, self-management, and market forces—all of which are essential to genuine economic reform. Martial law has thus had a highly adverse impact on the economy: as the first post-martial law figures indicate, current production is down, short-term projections of economic improvement are being scaled down, and the long-term fate of Poland's economic reform—which was officially promulgated on January 1, 1982—has been put into serious question.

As might have been expected, Poland's overall economic output declined significantly in December and January. In industry, the value (in constant prices) of production sold in December 1981 was 25.4 percent below that of December 1980. (The November 1981 figure was down 9.4 percent from November 1980 but up 4.2 percent over October 1981).[55] The January 1982 figure was down 13.6 percent from January 1981 and 17.5 percent from December 1981.[56] Such figures suggest that there had been some modest signs of recovery in industry before martial law, but that military action again destabilized industrial production for at least the first six weeks and perhaps longer.

In agriculture, there was a reported increase in the purchase of slaughter animals from December 1981 to January 1982—from 143,300 tons to 188,400 tons. However, the December 1981 level was 28.3 percent lower than the December 1980 level (232,300 tons), and purchases for the first 11 months of 1981 were 20.6 percent below those for the first 11 months of 1980. Taken together, purchases in the period December 1981–January 1982 were 27.0 percent lower than during the corresponding period in 1980–81. In absolute terms, this was a decline of 122,600 tons—a very serious shortage by any measure.[57]

To some extent, at least, agricultural shortfalls such as these reflect the Polish farmers' lack of confidence in the authorities. As early as December 20, the Military Council for National Salvation, which had been established as the de facto supreme authority a few hours before the imposition of martial law, declared that agricultural policy would not be changed.[58] But the farmers apparently do not believe that the authorities, who have dissolved Rural Solidarity, will accept the private sector as a permanent and legitimate feature of the agricultural economy and will not again discriminate against it in the future. Moreover, Polish farmers are not likely to sell their produce for money that cannot be used to buy consumer goods in any sufficient volume or even certain absolutely necessary agricultural inputs. In all probability, therefore, agricultural investment, yields, and output will fall. Furthermore, if the government reintroduces obligatory deliveries, it may have to use force. The result would undoubtedly be a complete disruption of agricultural production, with adverse repercussions lasting for years.

For the time being, the authorities have attempted to use the incentive of higher prices. On February 1, the prices for agricultural produce purchased by the state agencies were increased. On February 15, however, prices of agricultural machines and other equipment were raised, by an average of 119 percent. The Ministry of Agriculture announced that these price changes would increase the farmers' outlays from 160 billion to 324 billion zlotys and the value of agricultural sales from 449 billion to 632 billion zlotys—for a net increase of 23 billion. In reporting this information, however, *Zycie gospodarcze* commented that the ministry had

[54] K. S. "Consultation," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 43, 1981, p. 3.

[55] This calculation is based on data published in *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 2; No. 3, 1982, p. 1; and No. 4, 1982, p. 4.

[56] *Przekroj*, Feb. 28, 1982, p. 2.

[57] This calculation is based on data from the sources cited in fn. 55.

[58] *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 2.



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failed to explain how it had made its calculations, thus implying some skepticism as to their accuracy.[59]

In the meantime, a number of other agricultural problems have arisen. The newly established Council for the Food Economy has announced that there are drastic shortages of seeds, seed potatoes, and pesticides and that because of a lack of spare parts, only about 60–70 percent of Poland's agricultural equipment is usable.[60] This is where Western sanctions will undoubtedly hurt—in addition to the adverse effect they will have on meat and poultry production.

Martial law has also made any economic improvement improbable in the near future. In the face of passive resistance and widespread opposition and resentment, even Polish planners admit that it will now be difficult to avoid a further decline in production.

[59] Ibid., No. 5, 1982, p. 2.
[60] Ibid., No. 2, 1982, p. 2.

Originally, the central economic plan for 1982 was prepared in three variants: the minimum, the maximum, and the most probable. Each variant was based on a different assumption as to coal production. The minimum variant assumed a figure of only 155 million tons for 1982, as compared with 164 million for 1981 (the actual figure, as it turned out, was 163 million), 193 million for 1980, and 201 million for 1979. The maximum variant assumed 175 million tons, and the most probable variant, 168 million tons. Depending on the output of coal, the rate of growth of domestic net material product (DNMP) would range between −8.3 percent (the minimum variant) to 2.1 percent (the maximum variant), with −1.4 percent the most probable (see Table 1).

It was probably because of slight increases in both coal and industrial production that on December 11, the Planning Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers a revised central plan for 1982. The minimum vari-

*An impromptu memorial to seven miners killed by security forces in a clash in mid-December 1981 at the Wujek coal mine near Katowice—the heart of Poland's coal industry.*

**—Polfoto via Photoreporters.**



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ant, now regarded as too pessimistic, was dropped. The revised plan had only two variants. The lower variant projected an annual coal output of 170 million tons, a 1 percent growth in industrial production, and a 2 percent growth in gross agricultural production. The higher variant projected 175 million tons, 4 percent, and 3 percent, respectively. If the latter targets were met, national income would increase by 0.5 percent.[61]

Even before December 13, however, several factors made such projections seem overly optimistic. The miners were complaining bitterly about food shortages. Excessive exploitation and inadequate maintenance of the mines during the 1970's had led to various technical problems. Above all, the "flight from money" had discouraged work for money wages and made special high rates for Saturday work ineffective.

After the imposition of martial law, such projections were even more problematic. The authorities quickly moved to "militarize" the miners—i.e., they have temporarily enrolled the miners in the military and have put the mines under the direct command of military officers. Their strategy here is clear. As is consistent with the plan, they have recognized the key importance of the mining sector for economic stabilization and recovery. At the same time, they expect military-style methods to give good results, because the product is relatively homogeneous and therefore more easily managed.[62] But the forced liquidation of the protest strikes in the mines, the security troops' brutal treatment of the miners, and the ensuing casualties must have had far-reaching adverse effects on miners' attitudes.

The results of this strategy have so far been somewhat ambiguous. The Polish press has reported that coal production increased from 13.2 million tons in December 1981 to 13.4 million tons in January 1982. This figure was touted as a sign of progressing normalization. However, the average monthly output during the first 11 months of 1981 had been 13.6 million tons, and output in November 1981 had been 13.9 million.[63] In this sector, too, it appears that some stabilization had occurred during the three months preceding martial law, mainly because of an increase in the labor force, which expanded by 19,800 between January and October 1981 and by 7,300 in November 1981.[64]

[61] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Dec. 12/13, 1981, p. 1.

[62] J. Paszkiewicz, "What Has to Be Done Immediately?" ibid., No. 22, 1981, p. 3. It is important to remember here that the ambitious targets imposed by Gierek's planners earlier resulted in a high proportion of rocks and dirt mixed in with the coal, which often caused serious damage to furnaces and thus even brought interruptions in the supply of electricity.

[63] This calculation is based on data from the sources cited in fn. 55.

[64] *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 3, 1982, p. 1. The shortage of labor in recent years was an important factor in the difficulties experienced by coal mining. Other sectors of Poland's overheated economy exerted a strong pull on the labor force in mining.

*Polish Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski meets with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in early March 1982 to discuss means of coping with Poland's economic crisis.*

**—Novosti via Gamma-Liaison.**

Since the imposition of martial law, moreover, the annual plan has been discarded and replaced by a plan for only the first quarter of 1982 (but with certain implications for likely rates of growth during the second quarter). Quarterly plans are expected to be the rule for some time to come. Zbigniew Madej, the chairman of the Planning Commission, defended the new procedure on the grounds that any time horizon longer than one quarter was too uncertain.[65]

The new quarterly plan assumed a first-quarter coal output of 44.3 million tons and a decline of 8–10 percent in industrial production.[66] However, in early February, the plan was revised. In the new version, there are changes in the projected industrial production, which is now expected to decline by 10–11 percent, but no changes in the targets for coal. Nevertheless, the new version raises the target for oil refining from 2.8 million tons to 3.5 million tons—a step which probably reflects Poland's recent agreement with the Soviet Union—and increases the targets for slaughter animals from 410,000 tons to 432,000.[67]

In the final analysis, though, all these adjustments do not strike at the heart of the crisis. Even Madej himself, who apparently has been criticized for his "too simplistic model of economic growth, which was based mainly on the output of one raw material" (i.e., coal), clearly admits that the main barrier to recovery lies elsewhere:

[65] "In a New Situation: An Interview with the Chairman of the Planning Commission, Z. Madej," ibid., No. 1, 1982, p. 3.

[66] "Main Assumptions of the Proposed Plan for the First Quarter of 1982," ibid., No. 1, 1982, p. 3.

[67] "Changes in the Plan for the First Quarter of 1982," ibid., No. 3, 1982, p. 2.



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*Today the main limiting factor is something else. It is the availability of inputs from outside the economy, namely, raw materials, components, and other intermediate goods for production, which have to be imported from the capitalist countries. In other words, we have a lack of foreign exchanges. The inflow of foreign exchanges, which had declined in the second half of the 1970's, became very small last fall. And this very small stream has practically stopped in the last weeks.*[68]

Because of their lack of realism in dealing with the balance-of-payments deficit, the authorities have not been able to arrest the downswing brought on by drastic cuts in imports from the West. Their unwillingness, or inability, to communicate with Poland's creditors and their delay in approaching the IMF and the World Bank have resulted in a real catastrophe. Martial law cannot help here: on the contrary, it only makes a new approach to the West more difficult, especially as a result of Western sanctions.

Martial law has also had an adverse impact on the long-run prospects for economic reform—even though economic reform was officially introduced on January 1, 1982. The official declarations have emphasized the great significance of economic reform. Jaruzelski has stressed his commitment to reform, and the PUWP Central Committee, which met on February 24–25, emphasized that the introduction of socioeconomic reform is one of the most important tasks at present.[69] Even those economists skeptical of introducing reform during a period of serious economic disequilibrium now believe that reform is a necessary condition for recovery and must be introduced without delay.[70]

In practice, however, the government's actions have not been so reassuring, for the administrative measures introduced under martial law have tended to completely contradict the reform proposal officially accepted by the PUWP Congress in July 1981 and by the Sejm. On December 17, the Military Council for National Salvation confirmed its determination to implement "a deep and comprehensive economic reform in the direction approved by the Sejm." At the same time, however, it "instructed the government to adjust the economy quickly to the conditions of martial law."[71] On the following day, the Council of Ministers accordingly issued

[68] "In a New Situation . . . ," loc. cit., p. 1.

[69] *Przekroj*, Mar. 7, 1982, p. 2.

[70] See, for example, "From Yesterday to Tomorrow: An Interview with Professor C. Bobrowski," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 4.

[71] *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 1, 1982, p. 2.

*Polish armored vehicles that seized control of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk three days after martial law was declared in Poland on December 13, 1981.*

—SYGMA.



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"instructions for the management of the economy under martial law and for the implementation of those elements of economic reform which are not inconsistent with the state of martial law."[72]

At the enterprise level, these administrative measures have not left much of the original reform proposal intact. All forms of workers' self-management, even the old, purely decorative workers' committees, have been suspended. The principle of one-man management has been strengthened, with the managers subordinate only to the state. The central plan has also been made even more binding. All these measures are compatible neither with the "principles of the operation of the state enterprises in 1982," which the Council of Ministers had issued on November 30, 1981,[73] nor with the workers' participation agreement negotiated with Solidarity.

The picture is much the same above the enterprise level. To be sure, in accord with the proposed reform, industrial associations—the severely criticized intermediate level of management—have been abolished. But voluntary groupings of enterprises—envisaged by the reform proposal if approved by the workers' self-governing bodies involved—have not been allowed, on the grounds that there is now no workers' self-government. Instead, the ministers have been authorized to appoint commissioners (or plenipotentiaries) for groups of enterprises in areas where the reform proposal envisaged obligatory groupings (for example, in mining) as well as in those where only voluntary groupings were to be formed.[74]

This measure has been widely interpreted as an attempt to maintain the old associations but under a different name. Many former managers of associations have been appointed as commissioners and are again supervising the same enterprises. Moreover, the personnel previously in the associations' offices are now staffing the commissioners' offices. Apparently, old habits are difficult to break. In practice, it would seem, enterprise autonomy has been effectively limited, and the associations may be returning through the back door.[75]

At the central level, the "operational programs" (and the principle of direct administrative allocation of resources which they embody) are even more inimical to enterprise autonomy. The number of programs has now been increased from 9 to 14, each under the command of a special commissioner. They also involve large and important portions of the economy. In the plan for the first quarter of 1982, for example, more than 60 percent of all available coal was earmarked for the operational programs, and during revision of the plan, this figure was increased. Here, too, it is feared that in practice, direct administrative commands, only in a new guise, are covering a large and increasing part of the economy.[76]

Even at the planning level, enterprise autonomy has been circumscribed. An essential part of the proposed reform was to have been a lesser role for the annual plans—and their operative administrative commands—and a greater stress on five-year plans. But the introduction of quarterly plans represents a move in the opposite direction—quarterly plans have not been seen in Poland since the Stalinist era.

At all levels, therefore, it appears that the economic reform has not been introduced in practice—all official declarations to the contrary. Moreover, the administrative system that has been created under martial law does not seem compatible with economic reform in any meaningful sense.

## Conclusion

From all indications, then, it seems that from an economic point of view, Poland's present leaders have got themselves into a hopeless situation. The imposition of martial law and the return to a rule of terror will unavoidably lead to the resurrection of a neo-Stalinist economic system and thereby to dependence on extensive patterns of development. Far from helping to reduce the economic crisis, martial law will aggravate it and prevent recovery for some years to come.

In all likelihood, too, the political consequences of Poland's economic crisis will be apparent for some time to come. Unless there is a major change in Poland's party and government leadership and unless there is a complete reversal of policy, both political and economic, another decline in national product will be unavoidable in 1982, and a prolonged period of very low per capita income is likely to follow. Thus the political situation in Poland will remain potentially explosive. This, and Poland's inability to repay its hard-currency debts, will exert an adverse impact on East-West economic relations and on the world political situation in general. The military crackdown of December 13 may therefore continue to have very serious consequences, and not only for Poland.

[72] Ibid.

[73] "The Beginning of the Reform: An Interview with the Commissioner for Economic Reform, Professor W. Baka," ibid., No. 2, 1982, p. 1; and "The Next Few Months Will Decide: An Interview with Deputy Commissioner for Economic Reform, Professor Z. Sadowski," ibid., No. 5, p. 3.

[74] "The Next Few Months . . . ," loc. cit.

[75] S. Lipinski, "Attention to the Back Door," ibid., No. 5, 1982, p. 11.

[76] "The Next Few Months . . . ," loc. cit.



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# Soviet Decision-Making and Poland

**By Richard D. Anderson, Jr.**

The declaration of martial law in December 1981 by General Wojciech Jaruzelski culminated a 16-month search by the Soviet leadership for a way to restore control in Poland. While Jaruzelski's crackdown had Polish domestic roots—including his personal ambitions—it also accomplished the objective that the Soviet leadership had had in mind since the late summer of 1980.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Politburo ever considered allowing events in Poland to take their own course. At the same time, signs do point to differences within the Politburo over how to bring the situation in Poland under control. Initially, when strikes broke out in July 1980, Soviet leaders seemed confident that a firm stance by the Polish First Secretary, Edward Gierek, would end the labor unrest. But as the strikes spread throughout Poland, the prospects that Gierek could keep the lid on grew dimmer, especially since he also seemed no longer able to master the Polish Communist party apparatus. In these circumstances, by late August 1980 the Soviet Politburo was manifesting differences over how best to deal with the Polish problem.

Some advocated the abandonment of Gierek and the installation of Stanislaw Kania as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) in the hope that Kania could successfully carry out a more flexible policy toward the free trade union Solidarity, whose existence had been ratified by the Polish Communist authorities under the Gdansk agreement of August 31, 1980.[1] Kania's backers in Moscow clearly did not intend flexibility to result in a genuine accommodation with Solidarity. Rather, they viewed a confrontational policy as a temporarily unworkable option and thought that Kania might accomplish a gradual restoration of control. It seemed preferable to them for domestic Polish authorities to contain the situation rather than for the USSR to engage in a direct military intervention.

Nevertheless, it was not certain then—nor is it now—that the preferred strategy would work. Indeed, within months of Kania's installation, even his supporters in Moscow began to concede that he lacked the political strength to keep Solidarity effectively within the bounds to which the Soviet Politburo had agreed at the time of Gierek's ouster. There could be no turning back to Gierek or to one of his associates after his record had been publicly brought into disrepute. This also discredited the Polish Communist party apparatus, so that—no matter who headed it—it was incapable of acting as a reliable instrument of Soviet policy. Those Soviet leaders who were skeptical of Kania's conciliatory line had few options left. One option which they did retain was Soviet military intervention.

In fact, the Soviet Union undertook the costly preparatory process for intervention twice during the Polish

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[1] On Aug. 31, 1980, *Pravda* (Moscow) published a TASS dispatch on an article by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States. This dispatch contained not only the first mention in *Pravda* of "strikes" in Poland (as opposed to "unrhythmic labor"), but also the first statement blaming the existing leadership (i.e., Gierek) for the crisis. Thus, it implied that the Soviet leadership was giving up on Gierek.

But not all Soviet leaders agreed. A. P. Kirilenko headed a Soviet delegation that met Gierek in the border town of Bialowieza. (*The Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1980, and *The New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1980. The *Post* story came from Moscow, and the *Times* story from Warsaw; and their sources were different.) Kirilenko urged firmness on Gierek. On Sept. 6, however, Gierek was replaced by Kania, who was associated with the Gdansk agreements that Gierek had opposed. Kania, not Gierek, introduced the negotiators of the Gdansk agreements to the Polish Central Committee when it met to approve their work (*The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1980). In contrast to Kirilenko's actions, Brezhnev immediately endorsed Kania by sending a telegram congratulating him on his election as First Secretary.



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






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crisis. The USSR reached a state of near-readiness for intervention in December 1980 and again in March 1981. (In this context, it should be remembered that the USSR does not maintain a ready capability for military intervention on the scale needed to control Poland. Preparations for such an intervention therefore require extensive preliminary mobilization of reservists as well as deployment of military units.) Both times, however, the heightened state of readiness was called off.

To understand the motivations behind these decisions, it is essential to look closely at the actions of Leonid Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues. Such an investigation suggests that individual Soviet leaders maneuvered to bring about decisions which they preferred. Indeed, one gets the firm impression that in deciding what to do in Poland, the political leaders of the USSR were guided more by personal calculations about their own particular best interests—that is, by power relationships within the Politburo—than by considerations of international repercussions arising from their actions.

Moreover, when intervention became an issue on the Politburo agenda, a factor was introduced which had probably figured less directly in more exclusively political decision-making, such as that relating to the ouster of Gierek. This factor is the Soviet military high command. According to established procedure, the commanders of Soviet Ground Forces would be consulted on the feasibility of invading Poland and, in all probability, on its advisability.[2] From a careful reading of the Soviet press and a study of the unusual changes in high command assignments around the time when the Soviet Politburo was arriving at its decisions concerning Poland, it would appear that the Soviet military leadership played a complex role in the political decisions. This role differed in important respects from that which recent Western literature on civil-military relations in the USSR might lead one to expect.

## Reshuffling the High Command

The most telling evidence of conflict in the Politburo over the military intervention in Poland is the thoroughgoing reshuffle of the Soviet Ground Forces high command which took place in December 1980 and January 1981. Ground Forces divisions would have the chief role in any operation to subdue Poland. The divisions of this service are subordinated to 20 territorial commands—called "military districts" inside the USSR and "groups of forces" in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (see map on p. 23). Each district or group is led by a commander. Of his deputies, the senior one is not the first deputy for military operations but the deputy who bears the title of "member of the military council and chief of the political directorate." In the two months under discussion, six generals commanding districts or groups, four generals heading political directorates, and three higher-ranking generals of the Ground Forces were reassigned—a total of 13 command changes (see Table 1).

These changes were not routine. Soviet military regulations do not provide for periodic turnover at this top level of command. Furthermore, the reassigned generals had had quite varied tenures in their commands. The two with the longest tenure had served 13 years in their posts as of November 1980, while the two with the shortest tenure had served only two years.[3]

Location and timing connect the transfers to the Polish crisis. Of the 10 top posts in the five commands bordering on Poland, five changed hands. This rate of turnover in two months was three times the average annual turnover for all posts at the military district level or higher during 1970–76 (the most recent period for which statistics have been compiled).[4] The reassignments started as the mobilization of ground forces around Poland was nearing its peak. On December 7, the US government announced that Soviet mobilization had reached full readiness to invade (an announcement that was probably premature).[5] The first reassignment transfer became public knowledge on December 4.[6] The general in question was Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, trans-

[2] "Before taking this or that decision on questions of military development, the Central Committee of the Party [and] the Politburo thoroughly study the situation in the army and fleet, take counsel with the high command of the armed forces, with the most significant specialists." M. G. Sobolev et al., *Partiynopoliticheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhënnykh Silakh* (Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, p. 103.

On the high command's role in encouraging military intervention during other crises, see Jiri Valenta's *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

[3] I. G. Pavlovskiy and S. P. Vasyagin took their posts at the head of the Ground Forces in late 1967. V. I. Petrov went to the China frontier in December 1978, at which time he and two other generals were congratulated by Brezhnev on their promotions. D. T. Yazov took command in Czechoslovakia on Jan. 16, 1979. See US Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials*, CR 80-11888, Washington, DC, April 1980; and *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Dec. 29, 1978.

[4] The rate for 1970–76 is calculated from a table in Timothy Colton, *Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 182–83. Colton, it should be noted, includes posts above the military district level. These posts change hands less frequently. Thus, the comparison overstates the unusualness of the transfers around Poland in 1980–81. The overstatement is offset, however, by Colton's inclusion of turnover due to death and illness, which did not figure in the transfers near Poland in 1980–81.

[5] *The New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1980.

[6] East German party chief Erich Honecker held a reception for the departing commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy and his successor, General M. M. Zaytsev, on Dec. 4, 1980. See Petr Kruzhin and Bruce Porter, "New Soviet Commander Takes Over in East Germany," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 464/80, Dec. 5, 1980.



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**Table 1: Key Transfers in Soviet High Command, December 1980–January 1981**

| Officer | Post vacated (last mention in post)[a] | New post (first mention in post)[a] |
|---|---|---|
| Gen. of Army I. G. Pavlovskiy | Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces (Dec. 2, 1980) | Main Inspectorate (Dec. 9, 1980) |
| Gen. of Army S. P. Vasyagin | Chief, Political Directorate, Ground Forces (Dec. 12, 1980[b]) | Main Inspectorate (Dec. 18, 1980[b]) |
| Gen. of Army Ye. F. Ivanovskiy | Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany—GSFG (Dec. 4, 1980[c]) | Commander, Belorussian Military District (Dec. 14, 1980) |
| Col. Gen. D. T. Yazov | Commander, Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia) | Commander, Central Asian Military District (Jan 9, 1981) |
| Col. Gen. M. M. Zaytsev | Commander, Belorussian Military District | Commander, GSFG (Dec. 4, 1980[c]) |
| Gen. of Army V. I. Petrov | (China border command) | Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces (Dec. 2, 1980[b]) |
| Gen. of Army V. L. Govorov | Commander, Moscow Military District (Nov. 21, 1980) | (China border command) (Dec. 27, 1980[d]) |
| Col. Gen. P. G. Lushev | Commander, Central Asian Military District | Commander, Moscow Military District (Dec. 11, 1980) |
| Maj. Gen. V. F. Arapov | First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, North Caucasus Military District | Chief, Political Directorate, Central Asian Military District (Jan. 9, 1981) |
| Lt. Gen. G. Borisov | (Unknown) | Commander, Central Group of Forces (Jan. 14, 1981) |
| Col. Gen. M. D. Popkov | Chief, Political Directorate, Central Asian Military District | Chief, Political Directorate, Ground Forces (Jan. 15, 1981) |
| Col. Gen. I. A. Gubin | Chief, Political Directorate, Baltic Military District (Dec. 26, 1980) | Chief, Political Directorate, GSFG (Feb. 20, 1981) |
| Col. Gen. I. S. Mednikov | Chief, Political Directorate, GSFG (Jan. 16, 1981) | Chief, Political Directorate, Baltic Military District (Mar. 17, 1981) |

[a] Except where noted, the date given is the date of publication of information specifically identifying the officer in the post at an event on the preceding day.
[b] Occupancy of the post is to be inferred by the place of the officer in question among signers of an obituary published on the indicated date.
[c] The specific day on which GDR leader Erich Honecker met with the departing and succeeding commanders-in-chief of the GSFG.
[d] Govorov's post was to be inferred by his place among signers of an obituary on the indicated date. However, Lushev's appointment to Govorov's former post by at least Dec. 10, and Petrov's vacating by Dec. 11 of the post that Govorov was to occupy, strongly suggest that the latter's new assignment took place no later than Dec. 11.

SOURCES: Daily issues of *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow) for the period in question, plus ADN International Service in German (East Berlin), Dec. 5, 1980, as trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC), Dec. 5, 1980, p. E/1.

ferred from commander in East Germany to the headquarters of the Belorussian Military District. The highest-ranking officer involved in the transfers was General I. G. Pavlovskiy, commander of the Ground Forces and deputy minister of defense. His last public act was reported on December 2.[7] General V. I. Petrov replaced him and was already in Moscow on December 10. General V. L. Govorov succeeded Petrov in the command the latter had held on the China border, and General P. G. Lushev assumed Govorov's command in Moscow Military District.[8] Pavlovskiy's deputy for political affairs, General S. P. Vasyagin was relieved sometime between the 11th and the 18th of December, and other changes continued until late January 1981.[9]

Each of the five primary beneficiaries of these reassignments had a tie to Brezhnev. Petrov had enjoyed the unique honor of being received personally by Brezhnev, according to *Krasnaya zvezda*, on the occasion of his assignment to the new China frontier command in December 1978.[10] Govorov had spent the pre-

[7] Pavlovskiy was among the deputy defense ministers seeing off Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov at the airport for his trip to a Bucharest conference of Warsaw Pact defense ministers. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 2, 1980.

[8] Lushev attended the Moscow Military District party conference instead of Govorov on Dec. 10. Ibid., Dec. 11, 1980. Govorov had been transferred to Petrov's China border command, where his presence was first noted when he attended the party conference at Far East Military District headquarters—but not as the district commander. See ibid., Dec. 27, 1980. Petrov signed the obituary of General V. M. Mikhalkin (ibid., Dec. 12, 1980) in the spot reserved for the Ground Forces commander.

Although Petrov's assignment to a command covering at least part of the China border was never made public by the Soviets, his name appeared as author of an article on military service in the Far East and Transbaykal districts. Ibid., Mar. 9, 1979. Since the commander of a district normally signs such articles when they concern a single district, Petrov's signature indicated that he commanded both. His assignment to the China border was confirmed when he was elected as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet from Irkutsk. *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, devyatiy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ninth Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1979, p. 349.

Govorov's posting to this China border command was finally confirmed by the Soviets. See *XXVI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskiy otchët* (26th Congress of the CPSU: Stenographic Record), Vol. 3, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p. 332.

[9] Vasyagin signed the obituary of General Mikhalkin in the spot for the deputy commander of the Ground Forces. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 12, 1980. He signed the obituary of General S. A. Andryushenko after Pavlovskiy, probably indicating he had been made a "military consultant" to the Minister of Defense. Ibid., Dec. 18, 1980.

[10] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 29, 1978. To my knowledge, this is the only instance where Brezhnev figured publicly in the announcement of military appointments.



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*Some of the officers with ties to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev who benefited from an unusual reshuffling of Soviet commands in late 1980 and early 1981, clockwise, from lower left: General of the Army V. I. Petrov, who became Commander of Soviet Ground Forces; Col. Gen. V. L. Govorov, who succeeded Petrov in a major command along the Chinese border; Col. Gen. M. M. Zaytsev, who became Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany; and Col. Gen. P. G. Lushev, who became Commander of the Moscow Military District.*

**—Sovfoto, *Sovetskiy voin, Znamenonosets,* and *Sovetskiy voin.***

vious eight years in Moscow, where he would have developed close personal ties with the political general K. S. Grushevoy, who had been Brezhnev's family friend for at least 45 years—a friendship emphasized by *Krasnaya zvezda.*[11] General M. M. Zaytsev, who took over the plum of Soviet regional commands when he moved to East Germany, had first reached the level of military district commander in 1976, after Brezhnev's installation of D. F. Ustinov as the Minister of Defense.[12] Lushev, the new Moscow Military District commander, and General M. D. Popkov, the new Ground Forces political deputy, were plucked from the obscurity of the Central Asian Military District. The party *kharakteristika*, which, according to procedure, would be prepared in connection with their promotions, would thus have been signed by D. A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan and a Brezhnev protégé who runs Brezhnev's old political fief there.[13]

The most striking difference between the winners and the losers in the reshuffle was that the losers had not recently had a beneficial intervention by Brezhnev in their careers. Prominent losers were Pavlovskiy and Vasyagin, both in the same posts for 13 years; and, Ivanovskiy and his political deputy, General I. S. Mednikov, in Germany since 1972 and 1971, respectively. Ivanovskiy's loss of status equalled Zaytsev's gain when they exchanged Belorussia and East Germany, and Mednikov similarly lost ground to General I. S. Gubin,

[11] Ibid., Feb. 5, 1981. This article is interesting not only because it mentioned that Grushevoy had worked with Brezhnev's father but also because Grushevoy emphasized in it Brezhnev's readiness to forgive mistakes.

[12] Six of the 20 military districts and groups of forces changed hands in 1976, in the wake of Ustinov's appointment in April. Among the officers promoted at the time were Zaytsev, Petrov, and V. A. Belikov.

[13] Popkov missed the Ground Forces conference, where the deputy chief of the political directorate spoke instead. Ibid., Dec. 27, 1980. Popkov was first mentioned as being in his new post in an account of a party conference of the Kiev Military District. Ibid., Jan. 15, 1981. Kunayev's ties to Brezhnev are treated in Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin,* New York, Viking Press, 1970, pp. 514–15.



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with whom he exchanged the political directorate of East Germany for that of the Baltic Military District.[14]

These signs of patronage might not seem especially marked when compared to patronage for political posts. It must be remembered, however, that we know little or nothing about the assignments of military commanders before they reach the military district level. Also, political patronage in military promotions has to be different from patronage in civilian organizations, for politicians usually do not have the experience of heading military organizations. Thus, the chain of associations in posts from oblast to republic to all-Union level—so visible within the Soviet political elite—does not manifest itself in the same way between the political leaders and the military high command and possibly is not as important in military careers.

## Preparing for Intervention

That this pattern of winners and losers was not coincidental is strongly suggested by a combination of considerations. To begin with, postings at the military district level and above presumably are on the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee, so it would follow that the series of reassignments grew out of Politburo decisions. Moreover, there is at least circumstantial evidence that the personnel actions were related to decisions concerning Poland—specifically, to the decisions to mobilize for a military intervention and then to refrain from intervening.

The peak of readiness attained in December 1980 necessarily followed a period of preparations—calling up reservists, deploying their units out of garrison, assembling civilian trucks, providing refresher training, and bringing war reserve equipment to readiness for use. We have no way of knowing how long this process took, but American officials commenced briefing reporters about military preparations along the Polish frontier during the last week in November.[15] Logically,

[14] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 14, 1980. The command in East Germany is unique among the Soviet military districts and groups of forces in rating the title of "commander-in-chief" instead of plain "commander." It has been a stepping stone to higher posts for men such as Marshals Grechko and Kulikov.

Mednikov last appeared as chief of the political directorate of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany at a party conference of the group where he was severely criticized. Ibid., Jan. 16, 1981. However, his transfer to the Baltic Military District was not disclosed until the Mar. 17, 1981, issue of *Krasnaya zvezda*. Gubin first appeared in East Germany at a meeting celebrating ties with East Germany's National People's Army (NVA). See ibid., Feb. 20, 1981. However, Mednikov's transfer followed shortly or even immediately after the earlier party conference. *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 4, February 1981, p. 95, records that Mednikov's deputy gave the main report at a meeting of the military council sometime in January. This journal was sent to press on Feb. 1, so Mednikov's transfer must have occurred between the 16th and 31st of January.

[15] The first briefings came during the week of Nov. 23–30, 1980. *The New York Times* reported on Nov. 27 that "officials said that Soviet forces along the border with Poland had conducted maneuvers and that armored equipment had been fueled and kept more ready for operations than usual." However, at this time a press spokesman for the US Department of State said: "We don't see any evidence that any Soviet troop action is imminent." See also the *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 29, 1980, and *The Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1980. By Dec. 2, extensive preparations had been revealed. See *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Dec. 3, 1980.

*Apparent losers in the shake-up of Soviet military commands in late 1980 and early 1981, from left to right: General of the Army Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, who was transferred from the command of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany to the headquarters of the Belorussian Military District; General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskiy, removed as commander of the Ground Forces; and Col. Gen. S. P. Vasyagin, removed as chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces.*

**—*Neues Deutschland*, Sovfoto, and *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, vos'moy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Eighth Session), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1970.**



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the US government must have received evidence of the preparations before starting such briefings, and a Soviet decision to mobilize must have preceded the first observable signs of military preparations. By this reasoning, the date of the Soviet decision must have been no later than mid-November. This supposition is supported by signs in the Soviet press that intervention was being discussed and that the issue was causing conflict. On November 17, a *Pravda* article on the Russian civil war contained the following: "differences of opinion between the commander-in-chief and the commands of the fronts" had been resolved in favor of "mobilization . . . urgent measures for strengthening the army."[16] There are, of course, arguments for and against reading statements on historical matters as applicable to contemporary politics. However, it is undeniable that one advantage of historical material for political figures making an appeal for allies in a factional conflict is that the publication of an article on party history is hardly sufficient grounds for an accusation of factionalism. Furthermore, the November 17 article contained fairly obvious contemporary analogies: Brezhnev is commander-in-chief,[17] and "fronts" are what military district headquarters would become in a combat operation.[18]

The *Pravda* article, if it did indeed have relevance to the mobilization that soon became noticeable around Poland, did not intimate whether the commander-in-chief had overcome the opposition of the front commanders or they had overcome his. However, there were other signs. On November 14, an obituary for a deputy minister of defense appeared in *Pravda* without the signature of Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov. This was the first time in years that his name had not been affixed to the obituary of an officer of this rank.[19] Just as striking, the names of the heads of the two Central Committee departments most deeply involved in oversight of military affairs appeared among the deputy ministers of defense instead of immediately after the first deputy ministers and ahead of the other deputy ministers, as is usual.[20] It seemed that they and Suslov had suffered some kind of political setback.

On November 16, furthermore, D. D. Lelyushenko, a retired general of World War II fame, published an article in *Krasnaya zvezda* on the 1920 Polish-Soviet war. Normally, this war is mentioned only in passing in the Soviet press, since it is awkward to discuss past wars with countries whose present relations with the USSR are close. Consequently, the very publication of the article probably reflected a more somber assessment of the Polish situation by at least a part of the Soviet hierarchy. If the article did represent the views of just one faction, the author was a good choice as public spokesman. His prestige would tend to shield him from retribution if what he said turned out to be at odds with the eventual decision. His post was largely ceremonial; thus, little would be gained by bureaucratic retaliation against him. At any rate, Lelyushenko's comments on the 1920 situation were pertinent to the 1980 crisis in Poland. He summarized his point of view with a quotation from V. I. Lenin: "War with Poland is forced upon us."[21]

Lelyushenko's article did not contain internal evidence to reveal on whose behalf it had been written. Although experience suggests that a general writing in *Krasnaya zvezda* is a spokesman for other generals, this rule is not firm enough to exclude the possibility that in this instance General Lelyushenko might have been voicing Brezhnev's views. Brezhnev's activities in late November, however, seem inconsistent with his favoring intervention in Poland.

One of the classic uses of diplomacy is to influence a domestic debate by scheduling meetings with foreigners carefully chosen to supply information favorable to one side of the debate, and Brezhnev's diplomacy at this time tended to stress the potential costs of an intervention. On November 26, he met Senator Charles Percy, soon to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate, who intimated that the new Reagan administration had authorized him to convey its interest in reviving negotiations on arms control, suspended when President Jimmy Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from ratification procedures in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Percy explicitly warned that an invasion of Poland would shatter any hope for new agreements.[22] Also in late November, Brezhnev confirmed that he would visit India. The invasion of Afghanistan was creating internal and diplomatic difficulties for the Indians, and Brezhnev could count on them to complain about the continuing presence of Soviet troops there in preparatory discussions for his

[16] *Pravda,* Nov. 17, 1980.

[17] Brezhnev's title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was first disclosed by G. V. Sredin, then first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate, in *Voyenniy vestnik* (Moscow), No. 10, 1977, p. 10.

[18] A "front" in the Soviet military organization is the equivalent of an "army group" in the US Army, i.e., a headquarters commanding two or more armies.

[19] Obituary of General N. N. Alekseyev.

[20] The two were N. I. Savinkin and I. D. Serbin, heads respectively of the Administrative Organs and Defense Industries departments. Savinkin was in his regular place in the earlier obituary of General M. N. Chistyakov and recovered it in the obituary of General D. S. Leonov. Cf. *Krasnaya zvezda,* Sept. 17, 1980, and Jan. 14, 1981.

[21] Ibid., Nov. 16, 1980.

[22] Senator Percy traveled to Moscow on the pretext of a "personal invitation" from then US Ambassador Thomas J. Watson. The Soviet decision for Brezhnev to receive him was a sudden one. Percy had only two hours' notice. *The New York Times,* Nov. 27, 1980. The next day Percy met Defense Minister Ustinov and told him: "If, for instance, anything happened in Poland with the use of force, probably in our lifetime no major agreements would be possible." *The Washington Star,* Nov. 28, 1980.



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*Then First Secretary Stanislaw Kania addresses a December 1980 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw.*

**—De Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.**

visit.[23] Since Soviet military propaganda had referred to Afghanistan and Poland as part of a Western imperialist pincers movement, such complaints would have inevitable overtones regarding Poland in Soviet minds.

Diplomacy has been a touchy subject between Soviet political and military leaders over the years. For example, the late Marshal A. A. Grechko, as Defense Minister, regularly differed with Brezhnev over the relative weight of diplomacy and military power in bringing Western states to see the virtues of détente.[24] In the context of past disagreements over diplomacy, it is noteworthy that *Krasnaya zvezda* chose to warn of the risks of diplomacy while Brezhnev engaged in his round of meetings. The newspaper cited Friedrich Engels as the authority for the view that "military movements are not to be subordinated to the wishes and plans of diplomats, but to their own rules which cannot be violated without endangering the whole expedition."[25] *Krasnaya zvezda* also reported a speech by General M. M. Kozlov, a long-time associate of Marshal V. G. Kulikov, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. At a ceremony where Kulikov was the senior officer present, Kozlov denounced "fawning on foreign 'authorities.'"[26]

The juxtaposition of Brezhnev's meetings with military complaints about diplomacy is not meant to suggest that hopes for arms control negotiations or concern about Indian sensitivities were major issues in the Soviet deliberations over Poland. Rather, the argument is that diplomacy was Brezhnev's means of signaling his Politburo supporters to resist pressures for intervention. Such signals were necessary because of Brezhnev's style of leadership. He himself has not taken firm positions on controversial issues. It is reported that he hears out the views of other Politburo members and then sums up the consensus.[27] To achieve his wishes, given

[23] In fact, Indian concerns about Afghanistan were expressed at the banquet on the opening day of Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8). President Sanjiva Reddy asked for a Soviet withdrawal "without delay," but did not mention Afghanistan by name. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 9, 1980. When such state visits are held, diplomats prepare them thoroughly. Thus, it is likely that Reddy's tactful reticence had been negotiated beforehand.

[24] Grechko invariably credited the growth of Soviet military might with compelling the West to seek détente. In contrast, Brezhnev put military might lower on the list of factors that had influenced Western realists to accept détente. For instance, Brezhnev laid greater stress on the effectiveness of the peace program adopted at the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1971.

[25] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Nov. 27, 1980. The appearance of the article right after the Brezhnev-Percy meeting is particularly telling.

[26] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1980. The occasion was a commemoration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of the 18th-century Generalissimo A. Suvorov. Gen. Kozlov, who served as Kulikov's deputy in East Germany, was promoted to the key post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff when Kulikov was Chief of General Staff, a post he lost after Kulikov was reassigned to a less important position in 1977. Kozlov also was the only figure who failed to join in lauding Brezhnev for his role as Chairman of the Defense Council when this was an important element of Brezhnev's personality cult at the time when Ustinov rather than Kulikov was elevated to Minister of Defense in 1976.

[27] This description was provided in an interview by Valentin Falin, deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department, in *The Washington Star*, July 15, 1979.



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his low-profile manner, he needs some indirect method of communicating what he really wants.

Thus, the mid-November decision to mobilize may not have represented an outright defeat for Brezhnev. Instead, it may have been his way of satisfying the generals and worried Politburo members who were using Kania's evident weakness to make a case for a shift to a tougher policy, while Brezhnev mobilized a countervailing body of opinion.

## Reversing Course

Whatever the give and take inside the Politburo, the first days of December brought a series of concerted moves which defused the pressure for intervention. On December 1, a Polish party plenum which had been expected to install reform Communists on the Politburo wound up strengthening the hand of conservatives instead.[28] On the same day, Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov went to a meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Bucharest that lasted until December 3. The tenor of the discussions at the meeting was such that TASS reports about it used the standard formulas indicating discord: "in a businesslike atmosphere . . . in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding."[29] There is no way of determining whether Ustinov sided with the Czechoslovaks and East Germans, who were for intervention, or with the Hungarians and Romanians, who were not,[30] but it is suggestive that while the defense ministers argued in Bucharest, the Romanian foreign minister, Stefan Andrei, flew to Moscow for a meeting with Brezhnev on December 2. Brezhnev presumably heard the Romanian reiterate President Nicolae Ceausescu's long-standing objections to Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. Brezhnev was able to provide assurances sufficient at least to bring Ceausescu to Moscow for a Warsaw Pact summit that convened without prior announcement on December 5. Whether Brezhnev could already guarantee that the summit decision would be against intervention or whether he urged Ceausescu's attendance so that the anti-intervention case would be strongly represented is a matter of conjecture.[31]

Meanwhile, measures were being taken to assure the outcome of the Warsaw Pact summit. As indicated earlier, the reshuffle of military commanders had begun with Ivanovskiy's recall on December 4. The removal of Pavlovskiy and thus the other immediate changes (involving Petrov, Govorov, and Lushev) may have been decided at the same time—that is, about December 2.[32] Furthermore, the Soviet participants in the summit meeting were chosen from among the opponents of intervention. Party Secretary Suslov was included despite his setback at the time of the decision to mobilize. In contrast, Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko was excluded, even though he had been playing an active role in East European affairs. In early September, he had secretly met Polish leader Gierek in a last ditch effort to overturn the just-signed Gdansk agreement, which opened the way for establishment of Solidarity. In October he had visited Czechoslovakia, where officials were urging Soviet intervention in Poland.[33]

As a result of these efforts, the Moscow summit endorsed a political solution to the Polish crisis, encompassing support for the Polish Communist party. By implication, external military intervention was rejected.

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[28] ". . . Observers are watching to see if the reformist faction is strengthened by the inclusion of such men as Tadeusz Fiszbach, the party chief in Gdansk, or Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the editor of the weekly magazine *Polityka*." *The Washington Post*, Dec. 1, 1980. Instead, two conservatives, Mieczyslaw Moczar and Tadeusz Grabski, were added to the Politburo. Fiszbach received only nonvoting status, and Rakowski was not moved up at all. Kania disguised the import of these moves by ousting four former Gierek supporters who may have been hard-liners but were discredited in Soviet eyes.

[29] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 4, 1980.

[30] The Romanian attitude can be described as one of disapproval and anxiety over both the reform movement and the possibility of intervention in Poland. On a state visit to the Scandinavian countries in November 1980, President Ceausescu stated during press interviews that the Polish problems should be resolved by the Poles themselves and Polish political forces, primarily the PUWP. See *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Romania/17, Nov. 25, 1980. The Hungarians indicated that Polish problems should be solved by Poles and publicly merely praised the efficacy of their own economic reforms.

The Czechoslovak leadership was most vocal in condemning the Polish reform movement and early on drew parallels to 1968. A good example of the Czechoslovak attitude was Vasil Bilak's speech at the plenum of the Czechoslovak Central Committee on Oct. 9, 1980, in which he suggested that events in Poland had characteristics of a counterrevolution. Ibid., Czechoslovakia/247, Oct. 20, 1980. The East Germans strongly seconded the Czechoslovak line. Compare, for example, the *Pravda* report on Kania's speech at the Oct. 6, 1980, Polish plenum and Erich Honecker's article in the same issue. *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1980.

[31] There appears to have been some waffling on the part of the Romanian government with respect to the Polish crisis, but Ceausescu had boycotted similar summits before the intervention in Czechoslovakia, in which Romanian forces did not participate. Moreover, there are reports that Ceausescu agreed to attend the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow three days after Andrei's meeting with Brezhnev only on the assurance that the final communique would be mild. Certainly, Ceausescu at the summit joined Hungary and Bulgaria in arguing against military intervention, and Romania's opposition to intervention in Poland became firmer after the summit. See *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1980; *The Washington Star*, Dec. 18, 1980; and *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Dec. 15, 1980.

It would seem, however, that the issue of whether to intervene in Poland or not still remained open when Brezhnev met Andrei. On the same day that this meeting took place, the Czechoslovak and East German premiers met, presumably to coordinate the arguments for invasion that they presented at the Moscow summit. That such was the purpose of their meeting is reinforced by the timing of the announcement of their intention to confer. The announcement came on November 27, the day after Brezhnev's discussion with Percy. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1980.

[32] The likelihood that Pavlovskiy's ouster came during the first days of December, rather than after the Moscow summit on December 5, is suggested by a curious omission. When Ustinov left Moscow for Bucharest, the press listed by name Pavlovskiy and the other deputy ministers of defense who accompanied Ustinov to the airport. When Ustinov returned, the names of deputy ministers who met him were not given. Cf. *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 2 and 4, 1980.

[33] On Kirilenko's efforts in Poland, see fn. 1. His trip to Czechoslovakia is reported in *Pravda*, Oct. 23-26, 1980.



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It is obviously possible to argue that the decision at the Moscow summit did not represent a change of course. According to some analysts, the mobilization around Poland was never intended to be a preparation for an actual military intervention. Instead, the troop movements were part of a plan to increase political pressure on the Polish leadership.

While one cannot eliminate such a possibility entirely, a variety of considerations weigh against it. Before the Warsaw Pact summit on December 5, East German officials had been directed to brief Western journalist Tad Szulc to expect invasion by the end of December.[34] At that juncture, to be sure, the Szulc interview could have been a step in a pressure campaign, but East German officials repeated essentially the same information after the Moscow summit, when doing so would no longer have served such a purpose. Specifically, they told a Western correspondent that the Soviet leadership had considered intervention in late November only to reject it—exactly the timing suggested by the ouster of Pavlovskiy, Brezhnev's diplomacy, and the moves preparatory to the Moscow summit.[35] Furthermore, a Polish general who defected in August 1981 said that Soviet forces were ordered to be ready to move by December 15.[36] It has also been suggested that the Soviets were in fact not ready to move when the Moscow summit convened.[37] Yet the buildup around Poland would have been politically more convincing if the summit had been timed to coincide with completion of military preparations. Thus, the Moscow summit looks more like an effort to prevent a decision in favor of invasion than a concerted pressure campaign to exploit the military threat.

The signs of political disagreement likewise weaken the argument that the Soviets were attempting to build pressure on the Poles rather than actually getting ready for intervention. The supposition of disagreement is reinforced by the subsequent lukewarm endorsement of the Moscow summit decisions by the Soviet Politburo. This suggests that some members of the leadership thought that the decisions adopted there were inadequate.[38] If the idea had been to intimidate, why confuse the message? On the other hand, if the Soviets had some kind of "good cop, bad cop" strategy in mind, why be so indirect about it? Finally, the most telling flaw in the proposition that the Soviets intended to apply only political pressure is that it does not account for the sudden reassignment of top commanders.

A more plausible interpretation is that Brezhnev had indeed suffered a setback during the decision to mobilize; however, he may have camouflaged it by go-

[34] *The Washington Star*, Dec. 7, 1980.
[35] *The New York Times*, Dec. 24, 1980.
[36] *The Washington Post*, Dec. 28, 1981.

[37] *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1981, published stories based on a report from US Congressman Les Aspin. "Though Aspin did not say so publicly, it is known that one factor behind his analysis is the Soviet tendency to exercise its entire invasion force before using it." *The Times* further noted that "some analysts" inside the government "agree with Mr. Aspin. . . ."

[38] See *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1980. The usual formula is to approve the activity of delegations headed by Brezhnev "completely and in full" (*tselikom i polnost'yu*), a phrase absent from the Politburo endorsement of the Moscow summit.

*A summit meeting of leaders of Warsaw Pact countries convened in Moscow on December 5, 1980, to consider events in Poland. The Soviet delegation, including Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov, Premier N. A. Tikhonov, President and CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the late CPSU Secretary M. A. Suslov, and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko are seated along the rear wall. At the far right is Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, whose attendance may have lent weight to those opposing a military intervention in Poland at that time.*

**—TASS via Sovfoto.**



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ing along gracefully with the decision. As indicated earlier, the mobilization decision appears to have cost him some control over the press and the temporary downgrading of two officials (the party's defense overseers) long associated with him. It is hard to explain why Brezhnev would want these developments. Far more plausible is the proposition that Kirilenko backed generals pressing for intervention in Poland and that *Pravda*'s suggestion that they had overcome Brezhnev's opposition represented an effort to capitalize on a political victory.

## Mobilization Problems

The reason for Brezhnev's resurgence probably lies in a factor that was not known in the West until February 1981. A correspondent in Moscow received a report of extraordinary disorders accompanying the mobilization in the Carpathian Military District, one of three along the Polish frontier. Reservists called up for the crisis had supposedly deserted in numbers too large to punish, and units had moved back and forth in a disorganized fashion.[39] If true, this report explains much. The troubles would strengthen the hand of political leaders opposed to invasion, since the Soviet army's ability to defeat Polish resistance would be lowered if its troops were unreliable. The troubles would also discredit some advocates of invasion. Pavlovskiy was personally accountable for mobilization readiness of the Ground Forces. While various Politburo members might defend him if Brezhnev objected to his having counseled an invasion of Poland, he could not expect defenders if he was seen to have neglected the mobilization system.

Reports of mobilization problems in the Soviet armed forces should obviously be treated with some skepticism; nevertheless, there is adequate confirmation from official Soviet sources that something went wrong. In late December, *Krasnaya zvezda* stepped up its attention to military readiness. While criticisms of readiness are routine in this military newspaper, the criticisms become directed at a higher rank of officers and more important institutions when something is particularly amiss. On January 7, 1981, an account was published of a conference at which the Minister of Defense made recommendations for improving the "quality of work of the General Staff and the whole central apparatus" of the armed forces. Although the report of the meeting was fairly bland, this kind of blandness often conceals quite sharp exchanges, and the Chief of the General Staff was quoted as conceding that "we will have to sharply raise the level of all organizational work, the efficiency and operativeness of all command echelons."[40]

A week later, *Krasnaya zvezda* carried a sharp critique of the top-level command in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The main speaker at the party conference there was reported to have blamed "serious deficiencies in the work of the military councils" for various shortcomings, including the failure of "half of the battalions and one third of the companies" to maintain top readiness.[41] Because military councils are found only at army, military district, and higher headquarters, this remark was in effect a personal attack on Ivanovskiy, who had been reassigned in December, and on Mednikov, the political officer and "member of the military council" whose reassignment followed within two weeks.

The criticisms in *Krasnaya zvezda* appeared mainly in reports on party conferences at military district headquarters, which are customarily held in December. This time, however, a second round of conferences took place in January, to prepare for the 26th Congress of the CPSU. Brezhnev's reassignment of command personnel had paved the way for the voicing of unusually sharp criticisms at these meetings. Normally, when party conferences at military headquarters reveal few shortcomings, Soviet sources tend to raise suspicion of collusion between commander and political deputy to conceal shortcomings for which both are answerable.[42] The series of reassignments had the effect of putting every operational commander around Poland in harness with a new political deputy.[43] Trust sufficient for collusion takes time to form. If Brezhnev wanted to un-

[39] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 13, 1981.

[40] *Krasnaya zvezda*, Jan. 7, 1981.

[41] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1981.

[42] See, e.g., Maj. Gen. A. Overchuk, "Party Conference," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil*, No. 21, November 1976, pp. 43–51. Collusion between commanders and political deputies is a major theme in Timothy Colton's *Commanders, Commissars and Civilian Authority*.

[43] Of the five Soviet commands bordering on Poland—the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian military districts—only the last escaped turnover in commander and/or chief of the political directorate. (A new chief of the political directorate had been installed there in August 1980.)

Exclusion of the Carpathian Military District from the shakeup, it should be noted, raises a problem for my interpretation that the mobilization disorders gave Brezhnev an opening to organize the ousters of Pavlovskiy and other generals. The Carpathian was the district from which the disorders were reported. Thus, the retention of its commander, General V. A. Belikov, may seem inconsistent.

One interpretation of Politburo decisions regarding top military appointments ascribes decisive weight to a general's performance. However, another explanation could be offered—namely, that politics makes the difference. Such an explanation seems to fit here.

Belikov had been among those, like Petrov and Zaytsev, advanced in 1976 (see fn. 12), and as the reshuffle progressed in December 1980, it seemed that he too would lose his post. Like the two losers Vasyagin and Mednikov, Belikov was represented by his deputy at a meeting that he should have attended, the party conference of his district headquarters.

(Continued on next page)



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*Engineer troops of the Warsaw Pact member forces accomplish a river crossing during maneuvers in Poland in late March 1981.*

**—François Lochon/Gamma-Liaison.**

cover evidence of military readiness problems, then shaking up the pairings of commander and political deputy was an adroit way of doing so.

From Brezhnev's point of view, it should be stressed, launching a military readiness campaign would have had several distinct advantages. First, it would encourage correction of whatever failings it uncovered. Intervention in Poland might still become necessary, and it would benefit no one in the Politburo if intervention failed. Second, the clear desirability of correcting any problems in the army would make it difficult for other Politburo members to oppose such a campaign. Third, if some military commanders had been pressing for intervention in Poland, the criticisms of readiness would serve to direct their attention to the defense of their own performance and away from attempts to influence the Politburo. Finally, continuing criticism of military readiness would help deflect pressure for a new mobilization around Poland, for it would tend to establish an awareness of the risk factors in an intervention. All these results did seem to flow from the readiness campaign of January and February 1981.

See *Krasnaya zvezda*, Dec. 26, 1980. But in Belikov's case, *Krasnaya zvezda* on Jan. 20, 1981, pointedly let it be known, without the justification of a scheduled ceremony, that Belikov had retained his post. Moreover, in short order, the theme of forgiveness of errors of military cadres was given modest play in army propaganda, arguably in order to justify Belikov's retention.

The forgiveness theme surfaced in the context of articles commemorating the centennial of Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov's birth. On Feb. 4, 1981, *Krasnaya zvezda* noted that Voroshilov had "temporarily joined 'the military opposition'" and had been "sharply and justly criticized. . . . Profoundly realizing his mistakes, Voroshilov knew how to draw the right conclusions from the party criticism and in the future actively struggled for the accomplishment of Lenin's instructions." On Feb. 5, 1981, Marshal K. S. Moskalenko (in *Pravda*) also mentioned Voroshilov's dissenting views (without linking him explicitly to the "military opposition"), and Brezhnev's friend General K. S. Grushevoy (in *Krasnaya zvezda*) recorded Brezhnev's forgiveness with respect to erring cadres.

That Voroshilov's "errors" (and redemption) were of more than historical interest and, indeed, were likely being manipulated for contemporary purposes is suggested by the absence of any mention of the late marshal's membership in the military opposition in a biography of him authored by Moskalenko and signed to press on Dec. 22, 1980 (i.e., before the conference that Belikov did not attend). See Moskalenko, "Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1981, pp. 53–54. This earlier biography of Voroshilov instead warned of the dangers of the military becoming "fenced off" from the party leadership—just as did two articles in *Krasnaya zvezda* the next day which mentioned party-military conflict. Thus in December, when Belikov's status was in doubt, the press emphasized troubles between the party and the armed forces; after Belikov's retention had become known, the line switched to forgiveness.



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## The Aftermath

When a new Soviet mobilization effort was made in March 1981, the link between criticism of readiness and the Polish crisis became visible again. For example, General A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate, which publishes *Krasnaya zvezda,* signed an article evidently intended to end criticisms of readiness. Although his own first deputy had earlier published a warning of the harm done by neglecting problems, Yepishev avoided mention of any flaws.[44]

The US government announced on March 26 that the Soviets were fully ready to intervene,[45] but in the interval, Yepishev's Main Political Directorate had been ordered to publish a decree demanding "further improvements in the methods of leading troops, and in assuring precise and coordinated working of all command echelons."[46] As is usual for decrees of the Main Political Directorate, this one triggered a new round of meetings at military district headquarters. The meetings disclosed flaws in troop training in Belorussia and East Germany, two commands vital to the success of any operation against Poland.[47]

Again, the Soviet leadership called off the mobilization. Subsequently, Brezhnev headed a delegation to the Czechoslovak party congress, and Suslov, to the East German congress. The choice of the leading Soviet advocates of restraint as representatives to the party congresses of the two major advocates of intervention cannot have been coincidence. It is also worth noting that these were the two countries from which the Soviet commanders had been recalled in the December reshuffle.

That readiness had been less than satisfactory was confirmed in July. The concluding section of a *Kommunist* article by Marshal N. Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, dwelt at length on the need to improve mobilization capability. Although mobilization is one of the responsibilities of the General Staff, attention to mobilization problems by the Chief of the General Staff in *Kommunist* is most unusual.[48] He called for better cooperation between military commanders and local civilian authorities. Lack of coordination between the two sets of officials would explain why deserting reservists might have been able to avoid punishment in the Carpathian Military District.

## Conclusion

Having examined in some detail the specifics of the decisions in late 1980 to move toward military readiness to intervene in Poland and then to refrain from intervening, it is worthwhile to look at the implications of this investigation. Analysis of Soviet policymaking has usually begun with the assumption that the interests of the Soviet regime determine Politburo decisions. The twists and turns of Soviet deliberations on military intervention in Poland, like other conflicts over policy in the Politburo, suggest that this commonly held assumption is too generalized for a satisfactory explanation of the Soviet decision-making process.

First, the Politburo cannot always, and perhaps even often, be in agreement about its collective best interests. For example, even when the mobilization revealed troubles in the armies near Poland, advocates of intervention could argue that the urgency of restoring control over events there outweighed the added risks stemming from inadequate military readiness. There is even some evidence that this argument was made. On December 8, already after the Moscow summit of the Warsaw Pact but while troops were still poised around Poland, TASS reported assaults by Solidarity members on loyal Communists in the Polish town of Kielce. The strike during which the assaults supposedly occurred had taken place months earlier. This dispatch must have been controversial. TASS canceled it on the next day, and it never ran in Soviet newspapers.[49] Then, on December 12, TASS picked up a dispatch from the Polish army newspaper, *Zolnierz wolnosci,* which stressed Poland's location athwart "the transit routes and lines of communication" to East Germany.[50] Although this formulation could have appeared in

[44] *Krasnaya zvezda,* Mar. 10, 1981. Contrast Yepishev's description of the Soviet soldier as "patriot, internationalist, ready to overcome any difficulty" with the view of his deputy, Gen. G. V. Sredin, that "a soothed, relaxed position is harmful" to readiness. Ibid., Jan. 21, 1981.

Yepishev's complicity in the advocacy of intervention in Poland is indicated by his descent in the order of obituary signers. In the Alekseyev obituary in November, Yepishev held his traditional place, third among the first deputy ministers of defense after Kulikov and before S. L. Sokolov. On Feb. 18, 1981, however, Yepishev signed the obituary of the former minister of the aviation industry after three deputy ministers of defense; he signed two other obituaries below Sokolov, last among the first deputy defense ministers. Ibid., Feb. 10 and Mar 24, 1981.

As head of the Main Political Directorate, Yepishev was accountable for Vasyagin, who was removed, and Mednikov, who was blamed for lack of readiness in East Germany. Yepishev could also have been blamed for "political errors" on the part of Pavlovskiy.

[45] *The New York Times,* Mar. 27, 1981.

[46] *Krasnaya zvezda,* Mar. 18, 1981.

[47] Ibid., Mar. 19, 1981.

[48] N. Ogarkov, "Safeguarding Peaceful Labor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91. Since becoming Chief of the General Staff in January 1977, Ogarkov had written one other *Kommunist* article, in issue No. 7, May 1978. The subject was introduction of new technology into the armed forces.

[49] *The New York Times,* Dec. 10, 1980.

[50] *Krasnaya zvezda,* Dec. 12, 1980. This item read: "Through Poland run the transit routes and lines of communication from the Soviet Union to the GDR. Poland is located in the immediate rear of the line dividing the two different military-political systems."



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*Zolnierz wolnosci* for any number of reasons, its editors had had visits from the Soviet Main Political Directorate, headed by Yepishev.[51] Both dispatches could have originated with advocates of intervention.

Second, even when benefits of a policy seem to be applicable to the entire Politburo, these benefits may be so unevenly distributed that powerful individuals may actually consider them to be costs instead. For instance, most specialists would agree that access to Western credits is of substantial value to the whole Soviet Politburo. From the perspective of the Politburo as a collective, the substantial risk of a sharp reduction in access to Western credits would be a cost associated with invading Poland. Yet, this represented a greater cost to Brezhnev than to some of his colleagues. The policy of attracting Western credit through *kompensatsionnyye sdelki* (barter deals), such as the pipe-for-gas swap with West Germany, has been associated with Brezhnev. Some members of the Politburo have opposed such barter deals in the past, basing their case on the risks inherent in mortgaging the Soviet patrimony to foreigners.[52] An invasion of Poland would have led to the cancellation or at least a delay in the pipeline deal. In this sense, it would have involved a setback for Brezhnev and a vindication of those who have opposed deals like the pipeline. Kirilenko might even have perceived such an outcome as an outright benefit, for it might have forced the Politburo to transfer energy investments from laying pipe for natural gas to building up the electrification sector, which Kirilenko controls.[53] Thus, whether the risk of cancellation of the West German pipeline agreement increased or decreased the attractiveness of military intervention in Poland depended on which Soviet leader was examining the option.

Third, Politburo members have a variety of instruments available to them with which to manipulate perceptions of what represents Soviet interest. They can, for example, exaggerate the benefits and minimize the costs of policies that they favor, and give a reverse twist to policies that they oppose. The Soviet press is valuable for assessing Soviet policy debates precisely because powerful figures use it in this fashion. For instance, in the midst of the Polish crisis, one *Pravda* author suggested that the Soviet Union could make do without importing American grain.[54] Since a reduction in American grain sales to the USSR had followed the invasion of Afghanistan and a total grain embargo could reasonably be expected after an invasion of Poland, the suggestion that American grain imports were not needed minimized the potential price of a Polish invasion. Another *Pravda* writer recommended that those who refused to work be dealt with by the time-tested methods of reduced food rations and assignment to manual labor.[55] At a time when Lech Walesa was advocating passive resistance in case of Soviet invasion, this article implied that Walesa's threats could be handled and thus need not deter Soviet action.

Fourth, participants on occasion manipulate decisions by engaging in activities only loosely connected, or even unconnected, to the substance of the issue at hand. In raising the issue of intervention, its advocates knew that routine procedure would obligate Brezhnev to consult with commanders in the relevant military headquarters who, the proponents of intervention confidently expected, would strongly urge an invasion. Brezhnev's countermove was to turn to an alternate group of military experts who, having benefited from his patronage in the past, had formed expectations of further benefits in return for their cooperation. By promoting such generals—Petrov, Zaytsev, Govorov, Popkov—Brezhnev converted the Ground Forces headquarters from a center of champions of intervention to a center of opposition to it. But the promotion of these generals, in itself, had little to do with the merits of intervention in Poland.

In sum, it would appear that in Soviet decision-making the benefits of a policy to the Politburo as a whole are less important than the advantages or disadvantages it brings to individual members. Moreover, the individuals tend to make up their minds on policy issues largely on the basis of personal calculations. While each of them must take into account the need to maintain the power of the Politburo as a whole, policy issues capable of significantly affecting the Politburo's collective standing must be rare. Furthermore, the collective interest is only one element, and apparently not the key one, in the calculations of individual members.

In Brezhnev's case, personal interests in the Polish crisis would consistently have favored delaying interven-

[51] Such a visit is described in ibid., Mar. 27, 1981. *Krasnaya zvezda* correspondents are officers of the Main Political Directorate. Contacts between them and the Polish Main Political Directorate, which publishes *Zolnierz wolnosci*, are mentioned in ibid., Mar. 14, 1981.

[52] See Christian Duevel, "Kosygin at Odds with Brezhnev on Economic Policy," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (Munich), RL 375/74, Nov. 6, 1974.

[53] Kirilenko gave the main speech at a meeting held at the Central Committee in June 1980 on problems of electrification. *Pravda*, June 4, 1980. In this speech and in an article in *Kommunist* (No. 12, August 1981, pp. 3–16), Kirilenko emphasized development of atomic power for the European USSR and of coal from Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk for the rest of energy growth. His references to gas were limited to noting that expansion required special high-pressure, large-diameter pipe—which the Soviet Union cannot produce. In the same issue of *Kommunist*, Gosplan official A. A. Lalayants stressed that the electrical energy sector in the USSR is based wholly on the fatherland's (*otechestvennoye*) equipment. . . ." Lalayants also discussed the need to reduce the share of gas and fuel oil in electricity generation, a share that reached over 40 percent in 1970. Construction of the pipeline and commitment of gas supplies to Europe does nothing to solve problems Kirilenko is charged with and may make success more difficult.

[54] *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1980.

[55] Ibid., Dec. 5, 1980.



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tion as long as alternative methods showed any sign of working. Brezhnev's interest in delay can be deduced from reports that Brezhnev had given Kania until the summer of 1981 to restore order—reports which were lent credibility by the Soviet-sponsored coup attempt against Kania in mid-summer and the eventual transition to Jaruzelski.[56]

This is not to say that Brezhnev sympathized with the Polish reform process. His record hardly suggests ideological or personal proclivities toward reform communism. My argument is simply that permitting the Polish reform movement to go on for a time was preferable to intervention from Brezhnev's viewpoint.

Rumors circulated in earlier years that Brezhnev had opposed the invasions of both Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. There was justified skepticism about such reports. Yet perhaps we have overestimated Brezhnev's control over Soviet policy while underestimating his political skill, a vital feature of which is the ability to recognize the implications of issues for his personal authority and to maneuver for favorable outcomes. One reason why he might resist intervention as a policy tool is suggested by a study of American uses of military force for political ends:

*In one sense the fact that a discrete use of the armed forces has taken place in itself indicates a failure of policy. . . . In effect, a discrete use of the armed forces is a belated attempt to make clear a policy intent or military capability which . . . has come into question.*[57]

Having conducted policy toward Eastern Europe himself, through such devices as the annual Crimean summit meetings and the direct telephone line that links each Eastern European capital with Moscow party headquarters, Brezhnev would bear the principal responsibility for policy failure there. The effect of failure to maintain control over Poland became visible promptly in Brezhnev's inability to resist pressures for Soviet mobilization. But as long as he had a chance to resolve the crisis by other means—like Jaruzelski's crackdown—Brezhnev could shrug off the Polish unrest as a stumble in the steady advance of Soviet power. If a military occupation had been necessary, he would have had far more to answer for.

From the point of view of ambitious colleagues—such as Kirilenko, whose age is working against him—pushing for intervention made sense in several respects. Forcing Brezhnev into the position of having to explain to the Politburo why an invasion might be necessary to correct his conduct of policy in Poland might well justify taking even quite substantial international risks. The Polish crisis also presented an opportunity to attack Brezhnev by casting doubt on the wisdom of making détente a centerpiece of foreign and domestic policy. For instance, the Polish crisis had been blamed on overreliance on Western credits, and if that crisis could be dealt with only by military force, it would demonstrate the prescience of those who had argued from the beginning that détente carried with it grave risks. The Polish crisis made a powerful case against détente, for the difficulties in absorbing Western technology that had undermined the Polish economy existed in the USSR as well. It was no bar to criticism of Brezhnev's policies—as a first step on the road to succeeding him—that a new General Secretary would presumably later want to return to pursuit of Western credits.

Finally, my analysis of the decision-making process resulting in the rejection of military intervention as a solution to the Polish crisis leads to the conclusion that the role of the Soviet high command—both in relationship to Brezhnev specifically and to political activities generally—is not fully covered by the statement that "the marshals and generals are left to act as executants"[58] of policy decided above their heads. Rather, members of the high command appear to have a firm sense of what policies will further their interests, as well as the will and the opportunity to push policy in the direction they desire. Political leaders try to control the generals' advocacy of unwelcome policy by offering to other generals inducements for loyalty through the Central Committee's control over assignments. Members of the high command react by seeking attachments to individual politicians. Politicians welcome such ties because the military commanders can be of help in furthering their own political ambitions. Rivalries inside the Politburo thus offer scope for political maneuvers by the generals. At least some of the time, and even on issues as important as the Polish crisis, policy is a by-product of these maneuvers.

[56] "Some reports suggest that Mr. Brezhnev told Mr. Kania, when the two met in Moscow on Oct. 30, that the Soviet Union would give the Polish leadership until next summer to get its house in order." *The New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1980.

[57] Barry N. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1978, p. 11.

[58] William E. Odom, "The Party Connection," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1973, p. 25. See also his "Who Controls Whom in Moscow," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), No. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 109–23.



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# Books

# Baltic Identity and Sovietization

**By Romuald J. Misiunas**

TÖNU PARMING and ELMAR JÄRVESOO, Eds. *A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

THOMAS REMEIKIS. *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania, 1945–1980.* Chicago, IL, Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980.

ROLFS EKMANIS. *Latvian Literature under the Soviets, 1940–1975.* Belmont, MA, Nordland Publishing Co., 1978.

EDWARD C. THADEN, Ed. *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981.

SINCE THE 1970's, there has been a noticeable rise in general awareness of the multinational nature of the Soviet Union, and the three Baltic republics have received a share of this heightened attention. The books under review present recent major contributions to the body of scholarly literature on the Baltic region.

The collection of articles edited by Tönu Parming and Elmar Järvesoo is the widest in scope. Thirteen authors have contributed specialized articles on a broad spectrum of contemporary Estonian life. These include studies on the interaction of demography, nationalism, and politics; on economic and societal processes; and on several facets of the republic's cultural life and educational system. While some of the individual contributions might strike a reader as being overly narrow in focus, they collectively offer perhaps the most extensive survey available in a Western language of any of the 15 constituent republics of the USSR.

Thomas Remeikis studies national and political opposition in postwar Lithuania, from the period of underground armed resistance in the 1940's to the *samizdat* age of today. Nearly 400 pages of the book are devoted to documents relating to the national and religious opposition movements. On the basis of these documents, Remeikis categorizes the opposition along distinct lines of intellectual orientation, ranging from national Catholic to national leftist. Questions can be raised about this approach on two grounds. There is not enough information available about the precise origins of some of the documents, and it is unclear whether they represent the views of more than small groups. Nevertheless, the book is a comprehensive overview of the Lithuanian *samizdat* material—much of it nowhere else available in English translation—which has reached the West.

Rolfs Ekmanis limits his extensive and well-documented presentation to a survey of cultural policy as reflected in literature. But in view of the close interconnection in the USSR between cultural developments and national self-expression, his work can be taken as a study of postwar Latvian nationalism.

The scope of the book edited by Edward C. Thaden is somewhat different from the other three, for it covers a period when different territorial and political arrangements prevailed. The introductory essay by Thaden surveys the policies of the Tsarist government in the northwest region of the Russian empire. The four subsequent essays focus on the impact of these policies on each of four ethnic groups in the area: Baltic Germans, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns. As a study of the interaction between Russification and the development of national consciousness in Tsarist times, the volume provides historical perspective on the contemporary situation.

TODAY the three Baltic republics form a unique area within the Soviet state. Historic and recent developments have imparted qualities which clearly distinguish them from other areas of the USSR. All three have a strongly developed cultural



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identification with Europe. Their sense of modern statehood emerged as a result of successful movements for national independence, and it became entrenched during two decades of recognized membership in the world's community of independent states. This memory of political independence still remains quite vivid. The actual circumstances of their occupation and absorption into the USSR—made possible by Iosif Stalin's temporary rapprochement with Adolf Hitler—continue to be too widely known to permit the Soviet regime to distort them successfully. And the continuing nonrecognition of their incorporation into the USSR by the United States and other Western powers serves as an added reminder of those circumstances.

When the Baltic states were occupied and incorporated into the USSR in 1940, they were neither emerging nations nor underdeveloped societies. All three had predominantly literate populations with strongly developed national and cultural identities. Latvia and Estonia, moreover, had already significant industrial bases. Thus, a rapid expansion of the economic infrastructure could be undertaken with minimal investment in Latvia and Estonia and even in Lithuania, although the latter had not been greatly industrialized before the war. The three republics continue to maintain their position as the most developed region of the USSR.

Such historical and cultural distinction belies claims that the Soviet order is the only harbinger of economic and cultural modernization. It brings into question the official interpretation that the period of independence was a mistake because national survival as well as economic progress of the three peoples can be assured only through the reestablishment of their old connections with Russia. Thus, the task of gaining legitimacy and acceptance from the Baltic peoples is a difficult one for the Communist authorities.

From the perspective of the first three works under review, resistance to Sovietization forms a major element in the history of postwar Baltic society. In the immediate postwar years, as Remeikis details, armed guerrilla activity was especially pronounced in Lithuania. After the death of Stalin, however, resistance in all three republics became more passive. It can be described as a constant struggle to preserve a distinct national identity in the face of Soviet policies of social and cultural integration of all non-Russian areas of the USSR with its Russian core.

ON THE POLITICAL level, this resistance has largely consisted of efforts to nativize the ruling party *apparats* in the republics. Until the 1950's, not joining the Communist party was an expression of resistance to the Soviet government, but after Stalin's death, political perceptions began to change. Membership in the party became more attractive to the younger generation, as a means both of furthering personal ambition and of wielding some real power on the local level.

Nevertheless, even to this day, the percentage of ethnic Balts in the three parties remains considerably lower than their percentage of the population in each respective republic. While there seems to be a positive correlation throughout the USSR between technological and educational advancement and membership in the party, this is not the case in the Baltic republics.[1]

Of the three, Lithuania has been the most successful in nativizing its party. Even in Stalin's time, its leadership was home-born. The long tenure of Antanas Snieckus as First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party from prewar days in the underground to his death in office in 1974, and his reputedly close

[1] Rein Taagepera, "Dissimilarities between the Northwestern Soviet Republics," in A. Ziedonis, R. Taagepera, and M. Valgamäe, Eds., *Problems of Mininations,* San Jose, CA, Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1973, p. 82.

## Reviewers in this Issue

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CYRIL A. ZEBOT—Professor Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer, Department of Economics, Georgetown University (Washington, DC); commentator and author of many works on Yugoslavia, most recently as a contributor to Aloysius Balawyder, ed., *Cooperative Movements in Eastern Europe,* 1980.

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personal friendship with Mikhail Suslov, contributed to the effective metamorphosis of the Lithuanian party into his personal fief. During the relative decentralization of the Khrushchev *sovnarkhoz* period, the Lithuanian party machine was able to exercise considerable local autonomy. By the time of his death in 1974, Snieckus had acquired a measure of genuine acceptance from Lithuanians as a successful mediator and defender of Lithuania's interests in the Kremlin. His successor, Petras Griskevicius, however, has not proven as capable of playing this role.

Nativizing the Estonian and Latvian parties has been considerably more difficult because a preponderant number of the leading party personnel came from the Russian republic during the 1940's. Although they were ethnically Latvian or Estonian, they had not lived in their republics before the coming of the Soviets. Furthermore, in both Estonia and Latvia the contingents of Russian immigrants were much larger than in Lithuania, and they contributed disproportionately to the party memberships. Nevertheless, the proportion of natives in the parties of both republics continues to grow.

Moreover, as Rein Taagepera shows in his essay in the Parming-Järvesoo volume, Johannes Käbin, who immigrated from Russia and was First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party from 1950 until his retirement in 1978, managed to achieve a stature in Estonia similar to that of Snieckus in Lithuania. He also came to be regarded by local society as a successful mediator between the pressures of the Kremlin and those of the republic. (However, his successor, Karl Vaino, like his colleague Griskevicius in Lithuania, does not as yet perform the same role.) In addition, a quiet re-Estonianization seems to occur among much of this immigrant element. Their pride in their republic's being at the forefront of modernity in the USSR apparently leads them to seek greater identification and reintegration with their ethnic origins.

The process has made least headway in Latvia, where the party has had a less stable leadership. The Latvian party suffered a heavy blow during the purges of 1959–60, which affected all levels of its membership. Apparently, several thousand members were expelled at the time. As a result, the nativization of its leadership and cadres, which had been quite marked during the late 1950's, received a setback, and the percentage of indigenous party membership has continued to be lower in Latvia than in the other two Baltic republics. Although Arvids Pelse, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, is a Latvian, he, like Käbin and Vaino, was a post-1940 immigrant into Latvia. So is August Voss, who took over as First Secretary of the Latvian CP upon Pelse's departure for Moscow in 1966.

THE CULTIVATION of a Western lifestyle constitutes a significant and popular aspect of the assertion of cultural distinctiveness by the Baltic nations. Estonia, the republic with the highest standard of living in the USSR, also seems to exhibit the most modernistic life-style. Its role in the Soviet system as a "laboratory republic" for experimenting with social and economic development has been used by the native population to pursue an imitation, insofar as possible, of the life-style of nearby Scandinavia. Even official party publications have a modernistic format which is absent elsewhere in the USSR. Similar trends are discernible in Latvia and Lithuania, though not to the same degree.

Development of a Western lifestyle is nurtured through foreign ties, which are, by Soviet standards, particularly extensive for the Baltic peoples. The existence of prosperous émigré communities in the West fosters such contacts on the individual level. There also are special summer programs for offspring of wartime émigrés as well as various academic exchanges.

Estonia is again in the forefront of the three. The large Estonian community in Sweden is geographically close. Furthermore, a ferry connection between Helsinki and Tallinn, severed in 1940, was reestablished in 1965. The stream of weekenders from Finland has created virtually a permanent presence of foreigners in the Estonian capital. Moreover, with some effort, Estonians can understand the Finnish language, and most of northern Estonia is reached by Finnish television programs.

Poland has played an analogous role for Lithuania. The stream of visits between Warsaw and Vilnius during the 1960's and 1970's brought Lithuania closer to Europe. The developments in Poland since 1980, however, appear to have virtually stopped such personal contacts. Nevertheless, Polish TV can be seen in two thirds of Lithuania, though one wonders whether the 1982 "normalization" in Poland will leave anything worth watching for its Lithuanian audience.

RESISTANCE to Sovietization and conscious attempts to preserve a national culture are especially marked in the domain of artistic expression. The Ekmanis book and the articles of George Kurman and Mardi Valgamäe in the Parming-Järvesoo volume underscore the close relationship between political and cultural developments in a Soviet national setting.

During the last years of Stalin's rule, the requirement that all previous cultural contacts with the West be negated and that all ties, historic



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as well as contemporary, with Russian culture be glorified, effectively put a stop to most artistic expression of any merit. But Stalin's death and the succession struggle which followed brought a general relaxation in not only the political sphere but the cultural as well, and the various policy shifts introduced in Moscow rendered it difficult for local Communist authorities to gauge what was permissible in the cultural domain. Such confusion made possible the publication of significant works of literature. More broadly, one may say that a cultural renaissance occurred in all three republics, for a much greater latitude in both content and style could be exercised and still pass the censorship. For example, the long poem "The Unfinished Song," by the Latvian Harijs Heislers, published in late 1956, was one of the first works in Soviet literature to be devoted to the theme of the Gulag.

In spite of periodic attacks, condemnations, recantations, and calls for renewed ideological vigilance, the cultural life of the three republics has not been set back to its moribund Stalinist state and serves as an effective vehicle in promoting national distinctiveness. Of the three republics, Lithuania enjoyed perhaps the widest limits of the permissible during the late 1960's—a fact no doubt related to that republic's successful nativization of its party apparatus. While these limits have contracted somewhat during the 1970's, there has been no return to the earlier requirement of total uniformity.

THE FEAR of demographic extinction or of being swamped by Russian immigrants, which had been particularly acute in Latvia and a shade less so in Estonia during the 1950's and 1960's, seems to have abated during the 1970's. Even though the 1979 census indicates a decrease in the percentage of the native population in all three Baltic republics, the rate of decrease has slowed. In 1959, Estonians made up 75 percent of the population of Estonia. In 1970, this had fallen to 68 percent, and in 1979, to 65 percent. In 1959, Latvians formed 62 percent of the population of their republic. The figure dropped to 57 percent in 1970 and to 54 percent in 1979. As for Lithuania, the proportion rose from 79 percent in 1959 to 80 percent in 1970; then it fell by a fraction in 1979, although it still is about 80 percent.[2]

The pool of potential Russian immigrants has contracted, and the capacity of the local economies to absorb more of them is also smaller. Moreover, the vast majority of recent immigrants into Estonia and Latvia are so-called "ruble immigrants," who seek lucrative jobs. It is estimated that by 1980, 90 out of every 100 did not stay permanently.[3]

WHILE THE BALTIC peoples have in the foregoing ways managed to preserve their national identities, the pressures of Russification have also increased in recent years. That the regime fosters Russification seems to be an indication of its continued inability to rely on the loyalty of the non-Russian population of the USSR. The mass media have been promoting ideas and practices intended to lead to a transfer of loyalties from the local to a wider Soviet entity. Efforts to wean the Baltic societies away from their native cultures and traditions and to inculcate "international" melting-pot values—often little more than vulgarized versions of Russian customs, or at least perceived as such by the Baltic population—have been continuous since 1940.

Imposition of the use of the Russian language in an increasing variety of official and private situations is perhaps the most evident aspect of this process, and resistance to its use has emerged as a sort of barometer of Baltic national consciousness. Latvia and Estonia, with their large urban populations of immigrants from Russia, are the primary targets. In the cities, the use of Russian has become a daily necessity, and it is consciously fostered in education, in public meetings, and in the media. During the 1960's, the local authorities managed to win some concessions on language. The maintenance in the three republics of an 11-year system of primary-secondary education (as opposed to 10 years elsewhere in the USSR) was justified by the need for more instruction in the local languages. Whether such an exception will be tolerated in the 1980's remains to be seen.

The latest wave of Russification, which began in the late 1970's, does not appear to be aimed at the Baltic area specifically; rather, it seems to be part of an all-Union effort designed both to elicit more support for the regime from the Russians and to cope with the effects of a population explosion in Central Asia on the Soviet manpower pool. Its pursuit, however, irritates local feeling and is constantly decried in Lithuania's extensive *samizdat* press. Evidently some activities, such as those of ethnographic preservation societies, which are significant from the point of view of nurturing national consciousness, have been circumscribed. Officials have begun to insist that the societies devote more attention to "Soviet" ethnography—for example, the study of revolutionary traditions

[2] See R. Taagepera, "Baltic Population Changes, 1950–1980," *Journal of Baltic Studies* (San Jose, CA), Spring 1981.

[3] According to Rein Taagepera, migration reported in the 1970 census yields an immigration-emigration ratio of 0.56 for Estonia, 0.69 for Latvia, and 0.91 for Lithuania. Indications are that the 1979 census is likely to show considerably higher ratios. Ibid., p. 45.



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of their Communist parties or the collection of wartime stories and songs celebrating the Red Army.

Teaching of Russian has been introduced at the kindergarten level, but it is too early to judge the precise effects of such a move. The 1979 census, however, did show one surprising development. While knowledge of the Russian language among ethnic Lithuanians rose from 45 percent to 57 percent and among ethnic Latvians from 36 percent to 53 percent, it unexpectedly dropped among Estonians from 29 to 24 percent. There is no ready explanation for this decline. It could be a demonstration of local resistance to the pressures of Russification, but it could also be related to variations in census methods. For example, Lithuanian *samizdat* has charged that census data collectors in Vilnius were instructed to ascribe knowledge of Russian to every one who had completed a secondary education in Soviet times, regardless of the respondent's actual answer. During the 1970 census, there had apparently been cases where some who claimed to have no knowledge of the Russian language were identified elsewhere in the questionnaire as instructors of Russian.[4]

To all appearances, efforts at Russification have not yielded the desired results. A Soviet, as opposed to a national, loyalty has not developed, nor has the primacy of the Russian language been accepted. Russians continue to be the butt of popular humor, and their interaction with the local populations is limited.

[4] See the Lithuanian underground publication *Ausra*, No. 15, 1979.

ON THE SURFACE, the Baltic nations, while continuing to resist Sovietization, appear to have resigned themselves to its reality. But it would be a mistake to think that accommodation to a reality imposed by force and circumspection in open opposition mean acceptance of that reality. The openly anti-Russian sentiments which reportedly were expressed during the disturbances in Kaunas in 1972 and in Tallinn in 1980 show a strong tendency to blame all shortcomings on the Russians and on the system which they have introduced. While the quality of life in all three republics is high by Soviet standards, shortcomings, especially in the availability of food products, have apparently become endemic since the late 1970's. Although expectations have been rising since the 1950's, their satisfaction seems to be beyond the regime's capacities.

In certain respects, the problems which the Kremlin faces today in the Baltic republics resemble those which confronted the prerevolutionary authorities. Then, as today, this strategically important part of the empire formed its most developed part. Then, as today, Russification was seen by some elements in the central government as the only way of cementing the area to Russia. And then, as today, such a policy has failed to yield the results expected of it.

As Toivo Raun, who contributed the study on Estonia in the Thaden book, notes, the paradoxical effect of Tsarist Russification efforts was not to transform Estonians into Russians but to heighten Estonian national identity. Taken collectively, the essays in the Parming-Järvesoo book point to a similar conclusion about the contemporary situation. The picture presented by Ekmanis of the resilience of Latvian letters in the face of varied pressures from local quislings as well as from the Kremlin indicates that even in this republic—which has perhaps experienced more severe Russification than the other two and where the indigenous ethnic population makes up just slightly over 53 percent of the total population—the spirit of national resistance remains a potentially significant force. The survey by Remeikis of Lithuanian *samizdat* literature, greater in volume per capita than among any other nationality of the USSR, underscores the continued vitality of Lithuanian resistance.

One of the questions naturally raised by the Polish events of the last two years is their possible impact on neighboring states. Many parallels with Poland can be found in the Baltic republics. They, too, have an imposed political system which has been transplanted from an alien cultural setting, which has failed to secure genuine support, which is widely perceived as culturally inimical to national well-being, and which has demonstrated marked ineptness in raising the standard of living. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, were a chance to present itself, the Baltic nations would seek to rid themselves of the system. A successful metamorphosis of a state or nation in the Soviet bloc into a pluralistic entity could be a catalyst for transforming the largely quiescent, though by no means moribund, national resistance among the Baltic nations into overt opposition.



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# Yugoslavia's "Self-Management" on Trial

**By Cyril A. Zebot**

EDVARD KARDELJ. *Smeri Razvoja Politicnega Sistema Socialisticnega Samoupravljanja* (Directions of Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-Management). Ljubljana, CZP Komunist, 1978.

MARTIN SCHRENK, CYRUS ARDALAN, and NAWAL A. EL TATAVY. *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism—Challenges of Development.* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

JOHN H. MOORE. *Growth with Self-Management: Yugoslav Industrialization, 1952–1975.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON. *The Yugoslav Economic System and Its Performance in the 1970's.* Berkeley, CA, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980.

LJUBO SIRC. *The Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

ELLEN TURKISH COMISSO. *Workers' Control Under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-Management.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1979.

BRANKO HORVAT, MIHAILO MARKOVIC, and RUDI SUPEK, Eds. *Self-Governing Socialism,* 2 Vols. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975.

JOSEPH OBRADOVIC and WILLIAM N. DUNN, Eds. *Workers' Self-Management and Organizational Power in Yugoslavia.* Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh, University Center for International Studies, 1978.

JOSIP Broz Tito, who passed away in May 1980, and his trusted philosophical mentor, Edvard Kardelj, who died in February 1979, left behind a complex and difficult legacy. The regime they created in Yugoslavia is Leninist in character, with the "leading role" reserved for the Communist party—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Party dominance, however, coexists with a decentralized and multitiered system of government and socio-economic institutions, all organized on a federal basis. This Tito-Kardelj system has customarily been referred to as "self-management socialism."

Under Tito, these decentralized structures were not tested seriously. Tito's unquestioned authority, exercised through the party apparatus within them, kept their pluralizing and democratic tendencies in check. But the party's new collective leadership—now the only feasible pinnacle of power in "self-managing" Yugoslavia—lacks that authority. Recent events, such as the massive demonstrations of April 1981 and later in Kosovo (in which the local Albanian ethnic majority has demanded a full-fledged republic equal in status to Yugoslavia's six other republics), indicate that the leadership may not be able to maintain as pervasive a control as in the past.

In addition, the Tito-Kardelj legacy is burdened by an interlocking set of grave economic problems. Yugoslavia's inflation rate is about 50 percent, the highest in Europe by far.[1] Unemployment is more than 16 percent and still rising; the current unemployment figure does not take account of a similar number of Yugoslav "guest workers" in Western Europe or overemployment in many Yugoslav factories, farms, and government institutions.[2] The foreign debt is more than US$18 billion, which, on a per capita basis, exceeds that of Poland.[3]

[1] Between 1970 and 1980, retail prices in Yugoslavia increased by 456 percent. In the first 10 months of 1981, they rose by another 58 percent—and this "under conditions of government control over prices." *Ekonomska Politika* (Belgrade), Dec. 28, 1981, p. 22.

[2] Ibid., Feb. 15, 1982, p. 16.

[3] See *The Economist* (London), Aug. 1, 1981, p. 52; and a dispatch from Belgrade by Elizabeth Pond, in the *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Dec. 15, 1981, p. 1.



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Post-Tito Yugoslavia is thus quite likely to see an increasing assertion of the diverse interests and pressures that have been contained within the decentralized structures created by Tito and Kardelj. Only an effective anticonstitutional recentralization, carried out by means of a surprise coup by a well-organized group of top party hard-liners from all the republics in connivance with the armed forces, could forestall such a development. But in a confederated, multinational Yugoslavia outside the Soviet sphere, any such coup would be improbable. It is much more likely that changes will be made in the "self-management" system to accommodate the rising pressures. As we shall see, the discussions preceding the coming LCY Congress, to be held in June 1982, indicate that the party leadership may be considering such steps.

THE ORIGINS of Yugoslav self-management go back as far as the Stalin-Tito split in the period 1947–49. After Stalin failed to either subdue or remove him, Tito moved to attenuate the Stalinist characteristics of Yugoslavia's Communist system. But the implementation of de-Stalinizing reforms was at best halting and uneven, both economically and politically.

In the economy, the first (1950) law on self-management remained purely declaratory, even with meager modifications, until the initial operational provisions were passed in 1952–53. Then followed an endless zigzag of constitutional, legislative, and other changes and reversals. The resulting economic "system" has been characterized more by deviations from its enshrined principles and changing procedures than by the observance of either.[4]

In government, by contrast, decentralization, although initiated even more slowly than economic self-management, made substantial progress through a series of constitutional amendments between 1967 and 1971. The jurisdiction of the central government, once virtually unlimited, has now been reduced to maintenance of the constitutional system and the conduct of national defense, foreign affairs, and certain limited economic policies. Even in the areas still under central jurisdiction, the advance participation or consent of Yugoslavia's constituent units is necessary. Yugoslavia's hierarchy of assemblies and executive organs, including the two presidencies (of the federal government and the party), is organized on a federal basis, with equal representation from each republic.[5]

It is important to understand why Yugoslavia's twin decentralizing reforms met such unequal fates. For one, the very concept of "workers' self-management" was an ideological improvisation, an attempt to counter the Stalinist model of the command economy.[6] Political decentralization, by contrast, was the result of persistent and mounting pressures from the multinational grass roots of Yugoslavia. Moreover, while autonomous economic self-management would be inconsistent with the "leading role" of the party, the decentralization of government only shifted the locus of the party's political domination. From its original all-encompassing center in Belgrade, political domination migrated to each of Yugoslavia's eight constituent units and from them, by way of "consensus," back to the center.

Since the incipient confederal reorganization of the late 1960's, then, the Yugoslav economy, formally "self-managed," has in fact been increasingly controlled politically within each individual republic. This change was obscured by the purge of republic leaders in 1971–72 and by Tito's ensuing attempt to recentralize the LCY.[7] But shortly

[4] The point was first dramatized in the Yugoslav media in "Practice Bypassing Law," *Ekonomska Politika,* Oct. 3, 1977. This new theme of the de facto vs. the de jure economy has since been belabored in a wealth of articles, speeches, and resolutions. By mid-1981, as the post-Tito "stabilization policy" was faltering, the controversy assumed broader proportions. Not only specific economic policies, but also "systemic" laws and regulations were attacked, including the 1976 Law on Associated Labor. Only the two constitutional principles of "social ownership" of and "self-management" of the means of production were spared. It was claimed that implementation had been inconsistent with the objective of creating a socialist market economy.

For examples of mounting party criticism of Tito's system after his death, see A. Bajt, "The Economic System and the Efficiency of Socialist Self-Management," *Socializam* (Belgrade), No. 6, 1981; a presentation by Kiro Gligorov (a top party political economist), at a meeting of the LCY Central Committee, published in *Ekonomska Politika,* Oct. 5, 1981; M. Korosic, "For a Return of Confidence," ibid., Nov. 2, 1981, pp. 25–27; idem, "Programmed Accumulation and Programmed Personal Incomes," ibid., Feb. 8, 1982; L. Madzar, "Expanded Reproduction and Regulation," ibid., Jan. 11, 1982; idem, "Associated Labor and Expanded Reproduction," ibid., Feb. 1, 1982; and idem, "Associated Labor, Self-Management, and Accumulation," ibid., Mar. 8, 1982, pp. 25–27. The editors of *Ekonomska Politika* contributed to the debate with several major articles of their own. See particularly the issues of June 8 and Dec. 28, 1981, and Jan. 18 and Feb. 15, 1982.

[5] "The Federation as a community of equal nations . . . and a self-managing community of working people and citizens . . . as a function of the statehood and sovereignty of each republic . . . should exercise only those rights and duties which the republics . . . transferred to it. The republics . . . must have a decisive influence . . . and responsibility for the Federation's policies." President Josip Broz Tito, proposing to the Federal Assembly a change in the constitution of Yugoslavia, on Dec. 14, 1970, quoted in *Yugoslav Assembly* (Belgrade), May 1980, p. 12.

[6] Milovan Djilas recalls that it was he who first came up with the idea of workers' self-management. See *The Unperfect Society,* New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969, pp. 220–23. Tito was skeptical but eventually came around, and Kardelj took it from there. In a personal conversation in 1968, Djilas told me that without Kardelj, the idea might not have become the trademark of Tito's socialism. That Tito's sudden espousal of "workers' self-management" was indeed an unexpected ideological about-face, which occurred when it became obvious that Stalin would not retract his condemnation of Tito, is amply confirmed in the most authoritative "official" history of postwar Yugoslavia. See Dusan Bilandzic, *Istorija socialisticke federativne republike Jugoslavije* (History of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Zagreb, Skolska knijiga, 1978, pp. 109–19 and 164.

[7] Claiming that the just-begun (June 1971) federal reorganization of Yugoslavia had already degenerated into "nationalistic" excesses in Croatia and "liberal" aberrations in other republics, Tito suddenly reversed the liberalizing trend that had evolved between 1965 and 1971. From December 1971 through 1972, sweeping purges of party leaders and party cadres were carried out in the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Macedonia. In 1972, the party apparatus was recentralized in Belgrade, and its modus operandi was re-Leninized. The party old guard, once largely on the sidelines, was back in control.



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after Tito's death, the true nature of things became clear—and with a vengeance—as we shall see.

It is against this background of Yugoslavia's postwar evolution that one has to view Tito—as founder and unquestioned ruler—and to examine the deep structural imbalances that have been revealed, with unexpected swiftness and intensity, since his death. It is against this background, too, that one must look at recent scholarship on Yugoslav "self-management."

THE BOOKS under review concentrate on the economy of Yugoslavia, especially its "self-management." All were written before Tito's death. In reviewing them, however, one has to judge them by their accuracy or inaccuracy not only about the functioning and performance of Yugoslavia's "system" while Tito was still alive, but also by their foresight, or lack of it, concerning the fate of post-Tito Yugoslavia.

The volume by Edvard Kardelj is an ideological tract, an official elaboration on a subject on which Kardelj was the regime's chief authority. Six years after Tito's crackdown in 1971–72, the 1978 LCY Congress was still preoccupied with the question of how to strengthen party dominance within the constitutional framework of expanded republic autonomy and decentralized self-management structures. To resolve the question, Kardelj wrote *Smeri Razvoja,* which was accepted as the basis of the congress's discussions and as the party's platform for the future.

The book describes an elaborate and all-encompassing "self-management" system, political as well as economic, within which the diverse interests in the Yugoslav economy and polity are to be increasingly asserted and harmonized. Kardelj stresses this "pluralism of self-management interests" as the central characteristic of an evolving "socialist self-management democracy." But in essence he glosses over the dilemma. Even in this putative system of the future, initiatives can come only through the "socio-political organizations," which are structured as transmission belts for the party. Yet, without an effective and equitable pluralism, one that allows independently organized initiatives and alternative proposals, there can be no democratic decision-making.

At least Kardelj admits that the "future development of democracy in our self-management socialist society . . . depends on . . . the assurance of the unquestioned leading role of the socialist forces. . . . A socialist society needs democracy in socialism, not democracy as a weapon against socialism" (p. 83). Later he adds, "For us the central question now is how to ensure that the activity of the League of Communists within the system of delegations and delegates [in the self-management and government structures] will be such as will make it a component part and moving force of this system" (p. 199). It is hard to see any great difference between Kardelj's party platform of 1978 and his frankly hard-line stance during and after the 1971–72 purges in the republics. Only the wording is softer.

*Growth with Self-Management,* by John H. Moore, and *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism,* by Martin Schrenk et al., are highly technical treatises on Yugoslavia's economic growth and development. Both draw heavily on statistical data and analysis, Schrenk's World Bank study having the extra advantage of access to privileged information from the Yugoslav government. Both authors sense weaknesses in the Yugoslav system, but Moore is more outspoken than the diplomatic proprieties of Schrenk et al.'s international institution permit them to be. Moore leaves no doubt about party control over Yugoslavia's self-management system. He also points out how the Tito government's relatively easy access to Western aid and capital eased the domestic burden of Yugoslavia's unnecessarily high development costs. In this, Moore presages what has since been revealed as a major problem in post-Tito Yugoslavia: heavy foreign indebtedness in the face of continuing balance-of-payments deficits.

Laura D'Andrea Tyson's short (112 pages) book on *The Yugoslav Economic System* is a more readable presentation on the same subject. It concentrates on the 1970's and therefore places more emphasis on the autarkic fragmentation of the economy. Yet, it leaves the impression that such fragmentation was a sinful aberration ("ethnic prejudices and suspicions") rather than a manifestation—under conditions of reversed liberalization—of Yugoslavia's irreducible multinational reality. Like Schrenk et al., Tyson takes the new (1976) method of comprehensive "self-management planning" too seriously. Even now, this method has yet to be applied, and, judging by its Kardeljian reliance on a plethora of institutions, it seemed reasonable from the outset to expect that it would be politically short-circuited into the familiar pattern of overblown government "plans" which have been honored more in the breach and from which actual performance has consistently deviated by wide margins.[8]

[8] "Not one of our social plans [five-year development plans] since 1961 has been realized. . . . evidently the philosophy of our planning is on the wrong track. . . ." *Ekonomska Politika,* Dec. 7, 1981, p. 30. On January 11, 1982, the Federal Executive Council adopted a proposal to amend the 1981–85 plan. "The proposal suggests a . . . narrower selection of development priorities because prospects are less favorable than . . . predicted. . . . [The change will be made] by the same procedure in



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The other books, too, make useful contributions. Ljubo Sirc's work on the *Yugoslav Economy Under Self-Management* is an interesting attempt to document the shortcomings and contradictions of the Yugoslav system on the basis of more critical Yugoslav sources, particularly the semiofficial *Ekonomska Politika*. In this sense, the book is almost a preview of the increasingly voluble Yugoslav self-criticism of 1981, which began seriously to question the very system of "self-management" as it had been repoliticized in the 1970's. However, Sirc tends to agree with Tyson that cost (wage) push was the chief culprit in Yugoslavia's high and chronic inflation—even though Yugoslav wages have remained low as a percentage of national income. In fact, since the publication of the books under review, real personal incomes in Yugoslavia have actually fallen by almost 15 percent, thus returning to their 1970 level.[9] This and other evidence suggest that other factors—high enterprise taxes and bail-out subsidies, excessive and misdirected investments, and extravagant political overhead costs—have been the main source of inflation.

*Workers' Control Under Plan and Market,* by Ellen Turkish Comisso, is primarily a study of self-management at the enterprise level (a machine-tool plant in Zagreb) as observed in a rare on-the-spot case study by a foreign scholar. Comisso makes several interesting points. One is that "firms, after paying a crushing tax burden and allocating required monies to the proper funds, had little left to distribute" (p. 65). This does not sound like a "wage push." Another is her attribution of the pressures for the 1965 economic reform and the 1971–74 political federalization to the situation in the early 1960's, when Yugoslavia's dwindling General Investment Fund could not accommodate multiplying regional investment priorities. Tracing the retreat of economic self-management through the halfhearted 1965 reform, the ensuing constitutional changes, and the 1971–72 reversal of political liberalization, Comisso points out that political-administrative intervention almost completely replaced self-management autonomy, with the republics gaining the upper hand in the process (p. 88). Increasingly, "the League proved unable to contain the fragmentation it brought about" (p. 135).

The remaining two books are collections of selected readings on self-management. *Self-Governing Socialism,* edited by Branko Horvat et al., traces the idea back to early Marxist thought, mainly in philosophical and theoretical writings. Only a few contributions deal with current Yugoslav practice. A. Bajt's article on "Social Ownership—Collective and Individual" (Vol. 2, pp. 151–63) is perhaps the best attempt to clarify the meaning of "social ownership," the vague concept on which Yugoslavia's self-management is ideologically based.[10]

*Workers' Self-Management and Organizational Power in Yugoslavia,* edited by Joseph Obradovic and William Dunn, is more pertinent to the actual Yugoslav system. It is a somewhat dated selection of articles (most of which were written in Yugoslavia before the 1972 crackdown), by Yugoslav authors and mainly on the sociological realities of Yugoslavia's self-management. What commends this collection is the expertise of most contributors as well as the outspokenly critical attitude of some. The essay by F. Bucar on "Participation of State and Political Organizations in Enterprise Decisions" (pp. 416–34) is particularly illuminating. It focuses on the practice of "self-management" as a triangular tug of war among the "self-managers" (workers), the "technostructure" (managers), and the "bureaustructure" (state and party), with the last remaining ultimately in control by virtue of its entrenched "vanguard" position. As Bucar's closely reasoned analysis reveals, Yugoslav "self-management" is more a veil of "legitimacy" than a reality.

Unfortunately, few of the authors represented here have managed to pierce the veil. After close examination, it must be concluded that none of the books under review really makes any concentrated effort to penetrate the welter of events, shifting policies, changing institutions, and technical analyses of the 30-year Yugoslav "experiment." This accounts for the lack of foresight concerning the difficulties that have accumulated in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Tyson, at least, could have arrived at critical conclusions similar to those that have since been pouring out from leading economists in Yugoslavia itself. However, even these recent, more incisive Yugoslav analyses stop short of the underlying root cause, which is fundamentally political and therefore off limits to the party-controlled domestic self-criticism. This is an added reason why independent foreign scholars who analyze a politically manipulated economy such as Yugoslavia's

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which the plan was adopted. The Federal Executive Council will send the proposal to the executive councils of the Republics and Provinces. Their proposals will then be submitted to the [Federal] Assembly." Belgrade TANJUG, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EE*), Jan. 12, 1981, p. I/50.

[9] The share of net personal incomes in national income shrank from about 50 percent in 1970 to less than 41 percent in 1980. Moreover, the largest part of the national income ended up in the budgets of governmental and quasi-governmental institutions. From 1976 to 1980, such budgets increased from 250 billion dinars to 627 billion dinars. *Ekonomska Politika*, Dec. 28, 1981, p. 21.

[10] For an official view, see Edvard Kardelj, *Les contradictions de la propriété sociale dans le systeme socialiste* (Contradictions of Social Property in the Socialist System), Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1976.



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should pay special attention to the impact of key political factors.

ONE KEY FACTOR has been administrative meddling in Yugoslavia's "self-managed" economy. According to the economic reform of 1965 and the constitutional changes of 1971–74, there was to have been a progressive expansion of market relations and self-managing economic integration. But the purges of 1971–72 and the ensuing reversal of liberalization brought increased political interference.[11] As noted, this Leninist retrogression was contained within the boundaries of the republics and autonomous provinces. Since the 1971 constitutional amendments had irreversibly confederalized the operative structure of government, the pervasive administrative interference with economic self-management became largely compartmentalized within each of Yugoslavia's eight constituent units. Even though the post-purge political leaders in the republics were more or less handpicked by the reestablished party old guard, they soon came under irresistible grass-roots pressures to pursue the autonomous economic development of their own individual republics.[12]

The economic consequences of such "federalism without liberalism" have been far-reaching. One major problem area has been investments. Because investment decisions involve local and republic politics, investments have often been misdirected into autarkic "white elephants" and the ubiquitous "political factories," primarily for local employment and tax purposes. Moreover, duplicative investments have soared, primarily in the processing industries (which account for more than 70 percent of Yugoslavia's total industrial output).[13] As a result, the investment component of Yugoslavia's "social product" has been around 35 percent for years—and will probably remain at comparable levels until investment decisions are made by individual enterprises on the basis of real savings and interest rates more reflective of the true scarcity of capital.

Yugoslavia's aggregate investment expenditures have systematically exceeded meager real domestic savings. They have been financed by domestic "credits" at negative real interest rates[14] and sustained by imports purchased with hard-currency foreign credits. These imports, it should be noted, include not only technologically advanced machinery but also semifinished goods, parts, raw materials, and even agricultural produce, many of which could have been produced competitively in Yugoslavia itself had not certain basic industries been held back for the sake of "faster" industrialization.

This, in turn, has had major implications for Yugoslavia's foreign trade, where deficits have piled up. In 1979, for example, as Yugoslavia's hard-currency imports soared, its exports fell to only about 30 percent of its imports—the result of low product quality, high production costs, an inflation rate several times that of Yugoslavia's Western trading partners, and a much overvalued currency to boot.[15] Such chronically high trade deficits are no longer tolerable, for the servicing of Yugoslavia's accumulated hard-currency debt is now approaching the "red zone" (25 percent of export earnings).[16]

The choices here are difficult. Yugoslavia cannot afford to sacrifice those hard-currency imports essential to continued domestic produc-

[11] Kiro Gligorov, the newly appointed (October 1981) chairman of the working group charged with preparing yet another "new stabilization program," characterized the 1981 Yugoslav economic system as "a hybrid half-market system, formally one of self-management, but essentially administered." *Ekonomska Politika*, Apr. 6, 1981, p. 10. Bogdan Crnobrnja, formerly the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington and now a leading member of the Federal Assembly, said that after 1971–72 "we constructed our federalism . . . and attempted to construct self-management. . . . [In fact, however] we established a federalist statism rather than self-managed federalism." Ibid., July 13, 1981, p. 18.

[12] "The League of Communists . . . the entire organization and its leaders place themselves . . . in the service of various partial . . . interests, becoming their arbiters. One should not wonder, therefore, why . . . there is . . . *so much localism, regionalism, republicanism and* nationalism." R. Komatina, at a meeting of the LCY Central Committee, Sept. 30, 1981, as reported in *FBIS-EE*, Oct. 2, 1981, p. I/14. But given the repoliticization of economic decision-making after 1971–72, this was to be expected. In his report to the 1974 LCY Congress, Tito pointedly reaffirmed the constitutional autonomy of the individual republics: "The fact that the worker in associated labor controls the resources and results of his labor permits each nation [republic] to make free use of the earned surplus . . . and to decide on the conditions of its economic, cultural, and social development. . . ." *Yugoslav Assembly*, May 1980, p. 9.

[13] Autarkic duplications of industrial capacities and the exclusionary fragmentation of Yugoslavia's "unified market" have occurred even in the technologically most demanding and expensive industries. For example, "all republics and provinces . . . push their own ambitions in electronics. They make such decisions by identifying themselves with those who have succeeded . . . but the real possibilities are not identical. It is because of this that [autarkic] tendencies and partitions of the Yugoslav market have developed—to make it easier to sell in one's 'own' market." A. Stipanic, president of the managing board of *Iskra* (Ljubljana), in an interview in *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 5, 1981, p. 22.

[14] "In conditions of the fastest inflation [ours] in Europe, we have not changed interest rates and have kept them the lowest in Europe." Milan Kovacevic, *Ekonomska Politika*, Oct. 19, 1981, p. 28. During the period 1976–80, the interest rate on credits amounted to only one third of the rate of inflation. See ibid., Jan. 25, 1982, p. 17. In February 1982, the National Bank doubled the symbolic rates on its direct credits. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1982, p. 9. But these rates were still far short of past and expected inflation rates.

[15] Mladen Kovacevic of the University of Belgrade has pointed out that the rate of growth of exports, which exceeded 16 percent in the period 1955–60, has been declining ever since. It registered only 3.9 percent in the period 1976–80, which "contrasts with . . . the norm whereby the share of exports grows with the level of development. . . . The Yugoslav system of investments *does not promote an export strategy. I know of no country* in the world at a similar level of development which has been investing as irrationally as Yugoslavia." Ibid., Nov. 9, 1981, p. 15. "Over the last 15 years the share of exports in the social product has been reduced by one half," that is, from 20 to 10 percent. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1981, p. 22.

[16] It is estimated that the annual payment of principal and interest on Yugoslavia's foreign credits in 1982 will be US$5 billion, which will absorb 50 percent of the country's export earnings. See ibid., Dec. 28, 1981, p. 21. *The Economist* puts the figure at US$5.5 billion (Feb. 20, 1982, p. 79).



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tion. The only rational option would seem to be to base foreign trade on a real (open-market) rate of exchange. Only then will Yugoslavia's potential exporters find it more profitable to develop sustainable hard-currency exports rather than gingerly sell high-cost and low-quality products at home or in inferior, clearing-type trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

Obviously, large trade deficits have had a severe impact on Yugoslavia's balance of payments. As a consequence of the unresolved structural disproportions among, and even within, the autarkically developing economies of Yugoslavia's republics, Yugoslavia has been sliding from one balance-of-payments deficit to another. In 1980, Yugoslavia's hard-currency indebtedness reached US$15 billion.

In a move of near desperation, the Yugoslav dinar was officially devalued by 30 percent a month after Tito's death. But rampant inflation followed—39 percent in 1980 and 49 percent in the first half of 1981—and has already offset the export-stimulating effects of devaluation.[17] By mid-1981, as noted above, Yugoslavia's hard-currency indebtedness had risen to US$18 billion, and—given the ongoing balance-of-payments deficit—it must now be approaching or even exceeding US$20 billion.[18]

Finally, the private sector has been so greatly affected by political meddling that it has been unable to supplement the socialized sector adequately. Private handicrafts and services are still subject to lingering ideological discrimination against independent work.[19] Until they are freed from it, it is unlikely that they can greatly reduce the mushrooming illegal "second job" sector ("gray economy"), which escapes taxes and operates at the expense of, and further impairs productivity in, the socialized sector. More than one half of all personal earnings originate outside the socialized sector, mostly in the "gray economy."[20]

Family farms—a particularly sore chapter in the history of postwar Yugoslavia—provide a similar example. Despite the Stalinist-type collectivization drive of 1949–50, the de facto political disenfranchisement of the peasant population, three decades of economic neglect and discrimination, and the massive outflow of younger generations, Yugoslavia's peasants (still more than 30 percent of the population) continue to hold on to about 83 percent of all arable land, and their tiny farms still manage to produce most of the country's agricultural output—some 63 percent of the wheat and 90 percent of the livestock. Unless these resilient family farms are rehabilitated and unless discredited ideological fictions are dropped, post-Tito Yugoslavia will continue to increase its agricultural imports and further aggravate its foreign trade deficits.[21]

In sum, post-Tito Yugoslavia is facing a number of deep-seated economic ills. The revised self-management system that came out of the 1971–74 constitutional changes and the 1976 codification of self-management rules is neither functionally effective nor operationally efficient. Ever-increasing administrative interventions and intensified political manipulation since 1971–72 have emasculated the autonomy of "self-managing" institutions, impaired their economic performance, and socialized the resulting losses while excessively nationalizing their earnings. If Yugoslavia is to overcome these ills , major changes are needed in the Tito-Kardelj legacy.

ULTIMATELY, Yugoslavia's economic troubles stem from an even more fundamental defect—which autarkic meddling has further aggravated—the visceral distrust among Yugoslavia's confederated republics and autonomous provinces.[22]

As is well known, Yugoslavia's various territorial units have diverse national histories and cultures. In inter-

[17] A crash increase in exports coupled with a severe restriction of imports in the second half of 1981 (just to stay out of the "red zone") was so heavily subsidized that it could not possibly be sustained for long. Just as the reimposition of administrative price controls in mid-1981 forced the statistical rate of inflation for 1981 to stop below 50 percent, so the emergency measures in foreign trade in the second half of 1981 prevented the 1981 hard-currency payments deficit from exceeding the already unsustainable level of US$1.4 billion. For the domestic economic consequences of these steps, see *Ekonomska Politika,* Feb. 8, 1982, p. 16.

[18] Ibid., Feb. 8, 1982, pp. 16–17, and Feb. 22, 1982, p. 14.

[19] In 1975, there were 191,295 independent artisans in Yugoslavia, but in 1979, only 115,477. *Delo* (Ljubljana), Oct. 10, 1981, p. 21. "Even today there is a strange fear of individual work which is perceived as endangering the socialist sector. This is but one more proof of the weakness of the socialized sector . . . not of the strength of the small peasant and artisan." Kiro Gligorov in *Ekonomska Politika,* Oct. 5, 1981, p. 20.

[20] Dusan Dragosavac, president of the LCY Presidium, at a foreign press conference in Belgrade, as reported in *FBIS-EE,* Mar. 12, 1982, p. I/6.

[21] There is an expert estimate that agriculture in Yugoslavia could feed from 80 to 100 million people (Yugoslavia's population is under 23 million). But "we have completely neglected agriculture." Todor Todorov in *Ekonomska Politika,* Nov. 9, 1981, p. 22.

[22] Judging by authoritative commentary in the fall of 1981, deep distrust among the republics remains unabated. For example, "We have . . . lived for a long time with considerable structural problems and have found no way of resolving them by joint efforts. . . ." V. Djuranovic, *President of the Federal Executive Council, in an address* to the Federal Assembly on Oct. 1, 1981, as reported by *FBIS-EE,* Oct. 5, 1981, p. I/12. "The only thing on which we have reached an agreement within the [1981–85] plan . . . was that we still have not reached an accord on solving the problems. There were five or six problems at the time of the adoption of the plan . . . [they] have now grown into many more problems." M. Ribicic, former President of the Federal Executive Council, in an interview with the daily *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Sept. 18, 1981, pp. 3–4. "The League of Communists has for some time lacked . . . the strength to oppose . . . attempts at jeopardizing our togetherness . . . the republics and provinces were closing within their borders more rapidly than ever. . . ." Radio Belgrade, Oct. 3, 1981, as reported in *FBIS-EE,* Oct. 6, 1981, p. I/12.



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war Yugoslavia, this diversity was turned into active antagonism by Serbian-dominated centralism. With Yugoslavia's disintegration in 1941, the romantic concept of a "South Slavic" ethnic affinity among greatly differing peoples, which had served as the country's tenuous political rationale, was all but buried. With the wartime occupation and civil war, some of the prewar antagonism was twisted into mutual hatred and killings, especially in the south-central mountain regions.

In postwar Yugoslavia, all the old antagonisms resurfaced. Instead of being reduced and contained by a prompt and honest federalization, as Tito had promised during the war, they were exacerbated by the 1945 imposition of a centralized Stalinist regime, with the slogan of a resurrected Yugoslavia as a new "socialist community of nations and nationalities." After the Tito-Stalin break, the new slogan was gradually transformed into an all-embracing myth of "self-management," reinterpreted so as to include the much-belated decentralization of government. Had federalization occurred at least simultaneously with the 1965 economic reform, the latter might have succeeded, and a realistic self-management system might have emerged within a politically decentralized framework with a rationally coordinated economic development program. Instead, the Tito legacy was burdened not only with a large shortfall from the inconsistent economic reform of 1965 but also with the consequences of the post-1971 political retrogression.

The consequences of this retrogression should not be underestimated. Given Yugoslavia's irreducibly multinational composition, a confederation of sovereign republics is the tightest political framework that will allow the peoples of Yugoslavia to live in cooperative coexistence, and even that will not function successfully without continuing trust among the confederated peoples. After many years of disappointment, Yugoslavia finally approached its natural confederal arrangement in June 1971. Yet, this hard-won beginning of mutual trust was shockingly shattered by Tito's sudden reversal of liberalization in December 1971.

Because of the relapse into Leninism, Yugoslavia's newly confederated republics (and two autonomous provinces), purged of their popular and respected younger leaders, have yet to agree on a joint, mutually beneficial program of development, based on economic complementarity, an unrestricted common Yugoslav market, and international trade at a realistic rate of exchange. Instead, with renewed political distrust, the republics embarked on largely autarkic courses of economic development. In the process, their economic complementarity has been administratively restricted, so that Yugoslavia's internal trade across the borders of individual republics has come to resemble international trade, frequently to the point where payment in foreign exchange is demanded. Unless the republics can break this pattern and truly agree on a mutually complementary development program, structural imbalances within and among their autonomous economies will not be corrected, autarkic practices will continue, self-management will remain essentially inoperative, and both interrepublic and international trade will continue to shrink toward barter proportions.

WILL THIS accumulation of difficulties provoke a showdown in 1982? Toward the end of 1981, when it had become apparent that the post-Tito regime's "stabilization policy" had failed to come to grips with Yugoslavia's grave economic problems, and while the problem of Kosovo also remained unresolved, the LCY leadership apprehensively began preparing for the coming party congress in June 1982, the first since Tito. In unprecedented self-criticism staged within party-controlled forums, two contrasting approaches have emerged.

An apparent majority in the LCY leadership, as well as among professional economists, seems to favor a thorough overhaul of the Tito-Kardelj "system." Specifically, they wish to eliminate the "systemic" elements that permit or facilitate the pervasive political-administrative distortions of what was supposed to be a self-managed market economy and to limit supplementary government economic policies to those that would make the system work as intended by the 1974 Constitution. An unidentified minority in the party, whose existence is revealed by the polemical overtones present in the post-Tito reform discussions, appears to want a "strong-arm" central government to suppress economic "nationalism" in the republics and to replace the "unworkable self-management."[23] The formal showdown between the two opposing currents may come at the 1982 LCY Congress.

But will the LCY Congress tackle the fundamental question of distrust among Yugoslavia's constituent na-

[23] Stane Dolanc, an influential member of the LCY Presidium, stated in an interview that "I can say that we are under pressure by certain dogmatic forces which are trying to exploit the present complex conditions to prove that only a bureaucratic centralist statist system can eliminate certain social contradictions; they are trying to prove that we can carry out economic stabilization only with a centralist policy, with statist decisions and administrative actions and not by developing the socialist self-managing relations and through accords and agreements. . . . Even some public information media have begun to negate the role of the republics and provinces. They see a solution for the present difficulties in centralization and consider the federal system a misfortune. I believe that reducing the republics to some kind of administrative units . . . would be the greatest misfortune and a direct attack on Yugoslavia's integrity. . . ." *Delo*, Dec. 31, 1981, p. 4. See also the sources mentioned in fn. 4.



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tions? Obviously, the key will be resumption of the liberalization that was reversed in 1971–72.[24] Analytically, liberalization within a Communist system may be viewed in reference to the Leninist principle of the "leading role" of the Communist party. The range of political liberalization would therefore extend from the given degree of control by the party to the outright elimination of the "leading role" principle, which would result in a multiparty democracy.

In the given Yugoslav context, resumed liberalization is not likely to bring such political democracy, in which non-Communist political parties would be free to compete with the ruling LCY in the electoral arena. But it might result in more extensive human rights, in reaffirmation of the confederal structure of government, in the reassertion of autonomy for the republic Communist parties, in a fuller implementation of the proclaimed autonomy of self-management institutions, in a stronger private economic sector, and perhaps in opening the way toward independent labor unions and farmers' auxiliary cooperatives (only hinted at so far).

Judging by past experience, even such a measured process of liberalization may have uncertain prospects. Yet, there is no Tito now to block or reverse it again.

Clearly, however, the stakes are enormous. On the one hand, a renewed liberalization, even limited in scope, would bring a more broadly based, self-confident, and respected leadership to power in the republics. This, in turn, would result in more willing economic cooperation among republics on the basis of mutually recognized complementary interests. On the other hand, the longer reliberalization takes, the worse Yugoslavia's troubles will get. Even in the short run, real interrepublic agreements are necessary to make Yugoslavia's foreign debt manageable until structural disproportions are corrected. Failing any liberalizing political change, the nations of Yugoslavia may soon come to a pervasive doubt as to whether the accumulating costs of their troublesome coexistence may not already exceed the benefits.

[24] It is important to have an analytically solid and realistic concept of "liberalization" in order to avoid unwarranted optimism or pessimism. The former is reflected, for example, in the latest report by the US Department of State on human rights in Yugoslavia. See *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, esp. pp. 916–17, on "Freedom to Participate in the Political Process." Much of the material in the State Department report is contradicted even by the recent semiofficial self-criticism in Yugoslavia itself. A more accurate assessment can be found in Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia,* London, 1982, esp. pp. 1–6.



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# Dissenting French Communists

## By Victor de Stankovich

PIERRE DAIX. *J'ai cru au matin* (I Believed in the Dawn). Paris, Laffont-Opera Mundi, 1976.

PHILIPPE ROBRIEUX. *Notre génération communiste, 1953–1963* (Our Communist Generation, 1953–1963). Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, 1977.

PAUL NOIROT. *La memoire ouverte* (The Open Memory). Paris, Editions Stock, 1976.

ROGER GARAUDY. *Le marxisme* (Marxism). Paris, Editions Seghers, Collections Clefs, 1977.

LOUIS ALTHUSSER. *Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans le parti communiste* (That Which Can No Longer Go on in the Communist Party). Paris, Librairie François Maspéro, 1978.

I BELIEVE it may be said, without running counter to cold statistics, that the year round not one minute of the day passes without someone somewhere leaving a Communist party in disappointment and bitterness. The two things tend to go hand in hand. Indeed, it is almost a routine feature of Communist defections that breaches of loyalty and comradeship, perpetrated at the behest of a dehumanized, bureaucratic party leadership, become unbearable when the faith in the intrinsic truth of the doctrine is no longer there.

At the same time, one must remember that disillusionment with communism is only the reverse side of the coin. Many millions of fairly intelligent individuals are still fanatic believers in "scientific socialism" as codified by Karl Marx and developed in theory and practice by his innumerable followers. Their collective faith is one of the major forces which must be taken into account to understand our contemporary world.

The sociological landscape of France makes it a particularly interesting country in which to observe the ebb and flow of the forces of communism. This is true essentially for two major reasons. First, the French mind—no matter how hackneyed the statement may appear in the eyes of the literati—is addicted to formalized, if not Cartesian, logic. Hence, Marxist theory has appeal as a self-contained, scientifically valid system of social salvation.

Second, there is the historically fascinating phenomenon of the unfinished revolution of 1789. This revolution, the most monumental one in modern European history, sought to emancipate man from the tyranny of his fellow humans under the banner of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," but it was not until after the outbreak of World War II 150 years later that the country began to translate into fact more than the first element of this triple slogan. And even liberty—liberty of thought and expression, liberty from arbitrary deprivation of freedom—had been realized only after multiple interruptions, such as the royal restoration and the two Bonapartist imperial adventures, and in an imperfect manner. Indeed, there was little recognition of the need to provide some equality of opportunities for economic and social betterment for those emancipated from the shackles of feudalism, and even that modicum of fraternity which had existed under the paternalistic ancien régime was eradicated by the juggernaut of the industrial revolution. That revolution's proud flower, the Third Republic, seemed to perpetuate a rigid class system, headed by and run for the benefit of a more or less wealthy bourgeoisie. This group's rule was slightly shaken only once before the outbreak of World War II—during the ephemeral government of the Popular Front in the middle 1930's. When the pendulum swung back to the right once more, the wealthy bourgeoisie could manage only to lift into the saddle a government which declared war on Adolf Hitler but thereafter proved incapable of protecting the country from the onslaught of his victorious hordes.

IT WAS during the period of the Popular Front that young Pierre Daix, on the threshold of his 17th year, entered upon the political scene. He had only just passed the first half of



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his *baccalaureat,* the matriculation exam from secondary school, when Edouard Daladier brought back "peace in our time" from Munich. To Daix, this development meant that he would soon have to go to war. And indeed, he writes in the book under review, "a year later, once the war had been declared, in order to fight it truly against Hitler, I joined the Communist Party, which the 'Munichois Government' had disbanded only a short while before." "Subconsciously also," he adds, "I was thus opposing my father, a former member of the constabulary [*gendarmerie*] who had emerged from the previous war, the Great One, a pacifist and a socialist, firmly believing that while there was peace, there was also hope."

According to a jaded wisecrack attributed to Franz Kafka, "eternity takes an awfully long time, but the worst of it is its terminal phase." Pierre Daix remained a militant intellectual member of the French Communist Party for 36 years; however, for nearly 24 years he was in the process of snapping out of it. As regards this exceedingly lengthy process of extricating himself from Stalinism, he has no apology to offer—only an explanation:

*Stalinism exceeds by far the influence of Stalin's sole person. It is a complex process of the labor movement running haywire. It is experienced as the logic, as the very rationality of the science of class warfare, whereas in truth it reveals itself as one of the most effective trickeries by which historic violence is able to mask its face from the sight of man.*

After many a nagging doubt, Daix suffered his first real shock on the occasion of the notorious trial of Rudolf Slansky et al. in 1952, when practically the entire Czechoslovak Communist leadership was charged with "conspiracy against the socialist state." Daix was particularly concerned about the trial, for one of the principal figures among the 14 accused—one of only three to escape hanging—was Arthur London. London, married to a French Communist girl, had, under his refugee cover name of Gérard, been Daix's elder-brotherly protector at the Nazi death camp of Mauthausen. But by 1952 it was no longer a good thing to have been Arthur London's close associate way back in 1942. Hence, Daix remembers watching and catching himself ruminating:

*Why am I trying to justify that period of which heretofore, in all my life as a militant communist, I had been most proud—the way I'd behaved at Mauthausen? Something is going to pieces within me!*

Further he dared not go in his soul-searching.

*For if the Slansky trial had its doubtful aspects, so must it have been in the other show trials—the Rajk, the Kostov, the Zinoviev, the Bukharin trials . . . and thus everything goes to pieces all along the line. No, one just has to stand firm and not yield to the songs of the bourgeois sirens.*

But it was not so much the "bourgeois sirens" that kept torturing Pierre Daix as the formidable challenge that learning about the Gulag system, as revealed by *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* presented to him. This book was published in the Soviet Union under the authority of Nikita Khrushchev, and Pierre Daix was authorized by his party leadership to write the foreword to the French edition. In this foreword, he spelled out the—to him—terrible truth: "to my mind there is no substantial difference between Ivan Denisovich's camp and the average Nazi concentration camp." Thus, he felt he had to conclude "that the Soviet Union is not a socialist country and nothing foretells that it will ever become one."

Yet Maurice Thorez, the old and venerated Stalinist party leader, sent Daix word that he agreed with Daix's foreword. Moreover, he made public his approval by sending Daix to the Marxist Book Fair in the fall of 1963 to autograph copies of the French edition of *Ivan Denisovich.* That sort of gesture made Daix hang on for many more years, against his better judgment. His motivation is likely to be familiar to many a disillusioned Communist:

*I shall stay on board the same old ship even if she is due to sink. After all, in her holds is all my family. I was born at Yvry [part of the "red belt" of the Paris suburbs]; I'm a chip off the old Commie bloc—desperate, yet faithful.*

The execution in 1958 of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter, head of government and chief of the armed forces respectively of Hungary's national uprising of 1956—a blatant repudiation of all promises that they would not be put to death—came as yet another dreadful shock. Hence Daix's outcry: "The Soviet revolution must have run aground; she cannot be made to float again. Everything has to be begun anew."

And what about all those who, like himself, had paid lip service to the "big lie" for so long? Had they been accomplices or idiots? "Accomplices because of your idiocy," a wise old Czech Communist told him. Therefore, as a warning to those of his compatriots who might feel tempted to fall for the same old idiocy in the future, Daix counsels:

*If you want to build socialism the French way, you must recognize that it will run up against merciless hostility from the Soviet party bu-*



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*reaucracy, just as did attempts in East Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague, where the people tried to debunk false "Gulag socialism." That is the logic of Russia as a paramount power, which has nothing to do with philosophy. It expresses itself in terms of thousands of tanks, airplanes, rockets, and megatons. Moreover, that formidable arsenal is not held by socialist hands. Such is the truth, faced with which the French Communist Party is wavering still.*

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE on the passage from Communist militant to disenchanted defector is provided by Philippe Robrieux. He was a card-carrying member of the French Communist Party between 1953 and 1968, during part of which period he also functioned as General Secretary of the very orthodox Union of the Communist Students of France (UECF).

Robrieux's political autobiography is, first of all, a fascinating exploration of the psychological springs that caused post–World War II youth in France to tick feverishly to the Communist rhythm—and still do so up to a point. The book is not wildly sensational. It describes how a Paris boy, coming from a decent middle-class home, got through a still largely traditional secondary education, continued at university, made a number of good pals among his male and female contemporaries, played football passionately, but finally got caught in the dazzling vortex of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist *Zeitgeist.* This last development was primarily, it seems, the result of the groundwork of some of his lycée masters (the French call them *professeurs*), who must have been remarkable Marxist thinkers. His exposure to such individuals was pretty typical of French secondary education throughout most of the Third and Fourth Republics.

Robrieux himself points to the outstandingly interesting facets of his story. He, as distinct from those French Communists who had lived through the heroic days of the resistance, knew practically nothing of the war and Nazi occupation, having barely been a toddler when it all began. His life as a schoolboy really commenced at the return of peace, "when I used to kick footballs on the Champ-de-Mars, living an adolescent's life that had every chance of being peaceful and happy." The "apparently prosaic circumstances of my enlisting," he suggests, "can therefore reveal, in a state of almost chemical purity, the mechanism involved in making a youngster from a thoroughly bourgeois environment join the Communist Party." What Robrieux wants to show the uninitiated, with great sincerity and in a lively manner, is "how a university student, a young intellectual of bourgeois origin becomes a Stalinist, thereafter a 'permanent,' that is, a paid full-time party political worker, and finally how he ceases to be both."

The whys and hows of Robrieux's ceasing to be first an apparatchik, then a simple party member, and finally a Communist altogether, provide the second remarkable feature of his story. Here again, as in Pierre Daix's case, "the terminal phase of eternity" was the longest and the most painful—seven years out of a total of 15 as a Communist. His fall from grace began with an article which the unsuspecting young zealot wrote in December 1960 to set the stage for the Fourth National Congress of his Union of Communist Students. Taking enthusiastic advantage of Nikita Khrushchev's open debunking of Stalinism at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress, Robrieux dwelt on the students' urge to learn the truth about the ways in which "in Stalin's time, and prior to the 20th Congress, the Soviet Communist Party could have been perverted." (Up till then, French Communists had not been told anything precise about the contents of Khrushchev's so-called "secret report" of 1956.) Robrieux then quoted Louis Aragon, the leading poet and editorialist of the French Communist Party, who had flamboyantly written:

*the radical and audacious extirpation, as with a red-hot poker, of the errors and crimes which were allowed to proliferate under the socialist flag, characterizes today the victory of the self-same socialism. It marks the radiant morrow of a new epoch which must be identified—without committing an act of the cult of personality—with the man who has initiated it: Nikita Khrushchev.*

At the time the article appeared, the pseudo-genial old tyrant of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, was still secretary general. As is well known, he had never been able to live down the fact that while the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was still in force, he and his deputy, Jacques Duclos, had deserted an embattled France to take shelter in tranquillity, if not in luxury, in the Soviet Union and had stayed there until the end of the war. One cannot be sure, but it would seem that Thorez's guilt complex sometimes made him turn—otherwise unaccountably—against faithful old party stalwarts and, in the course of a carefully engineered persecution campaign, crush them under a fake charge. Thus, two high-ranking members of the party leaderhip, the brilliant Laurent Casanova, member of the Political Bureau and supreme supervisor of the Communist Students' Union, and Marcel Servin, in charge of organization in the party Secretariat, were arraigned for one of French communism's mortal sins during that epoch—"fractionalist group conspiracy," alleged to have



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been aimed in this particular instance at a secret convenant with the arch-enemy, Gaullism. Thanks to the article that he had written and also because he had in a way been a subordinate of the two "culprits," Robrieux became entangled in their purge. Eventually, after a prolonged calvary, he was evicted from the party.

Reminiscing about these events, Robrieux makes two observations, both of them carrying tragic overtones. First, about the principal accused, Casanova and Servin, he musingly wonders:

*Who could guess the profound motives that made those men shoulder the role of scapegoat? Particularly considering that in France—the Communist Party not being in power—neither torture nor the sanction of capital punishment could be applied to them. How could those two men be compared with an Arthur London [one of the principals in the Slansky trial] or the Hungarian Laszlo Rajk [the one-time Foreign Affairs Minister hanged in the late 1940's], when the suffering of intolerable, though purely moral, pressure sufficed to cause them to collapse and make their fake confessions?*

The second observation emerges from the Epilogue of the book, in which Robrieux—who is quite obviously an affectionate person, capable of profound loyalties—bemoans the fate of former friends and party comrades whom the manifold, abject trickeries of the "apparatus" had driven into disillusionment and, alas, frequently suicide. In one of his concluding paragraphs, he quotes Karl Radek, once Lenin's Commissar for Education and Cultural Affairs (and later hanged by Stalin). When, in a conversation about the many deplorable misdeeds of the new revolutionary regime, somebody came up once more with the hackneyed cliché, "But you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs," Radek retorted: "Yeah, that may be so, but where is the omelet?"

THE PATH of Paul Noirot was traced for him by a peculiar convergence of circumstances surrounding his birth. His mother came from a Ukrainian family, all of whose children, he says, "had been involved in the adventure of revolution. My mother had preserved of the October Revolution madly romantic reminiscences, as well as a profoundly nostalgic yearning for her native Ukraine." France's defeat in 1941 and the ensuing German occupation, just when he was on the threshold of manhood, almost automatically pushed him toward Communist militancy as the most natural form of endogenous resistance. (Only an infinitesimal fraction of the French people, at home or abroad, chanced to hear General Charles de Gaulle's appeal of June 18, 1941, from London.) Hence, in 1943 at the age of 19, Noirot joined the clandestine French Communist Party, which the last government of the Third Republic had disbanded in 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. To Noirot and his like-minded contemporaries, this action meant "enrolling in the great international army of communism." Hence, the USSR—despite what was thought of its temporary tactical collaboration with Nazi Germany—remained, in the vision of Paul Noirot and his comrades-in-arms, "the first fortress conquered from the enemy, the land of the victorious workers and of socialism which now could begin being built." As Noirot observes,

*it is only too facile today to disavow that identification which we claimed and glorified for decades on end. To pretend that we have nothing to do with the Stalinist tragedy—as do the present leaders of the French Communist Party—makes the French Communists' own history inexplicable.*

Nevertheless, Noirot admits that he shared the reaction of Jean, the son of Maurice Thorez, when he learned at the family dining room table in 1956 the revelations made by Nikita Khrushchev in his "secret report." Jean exclaimed: "We are all murderers, all of us!" Noirot adds:

*The questions we asked ourselves about the crimes committed by "our people," combined with the resolve to turn back from the blind alleys into which we had stumbled, could give rise to two distinctly different attitudes. You could give up the fight and retire to cultivate your garden. Or you could carry on whilst trying to wrench from the bowels of history a minimum of its essential "why"'s and "what for"'s.*

Like so many others, Noirot was caught by the Gestapo and dumped at Buchenwald, one of the cruelest and deadliest Nazi concentration camps, set in the bucolic, sylvan proximity of Goethe's Weimar. He lived there from December 1943 until April 1945, "under conditions that others have described." During that period, he saw hundreds of his fellow inmates drop dead by his side from one moment to the next. He attributes his own survival to the arrival at the camp, only a few days after him, of one of his revered former party instructors, a certain comrade Château, "who confirmed my quality as a full-fledged party member to the clandestine authorities of the camp." For at Buchenwald, as at most of the other Nazi concentration camps, political prisoners had by that time gained ascendancy over the criminal de-



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tainees, who had previously made up the prison staff. Consequently, Communists enjoyed greater chances of survival. The secret organization of the camp, having acquired some measure of a hold even on the official agents of the internal administration, protected its militant elements.

The "most painful terminal phase" of Noirot's Communist Party membership began with the famous 20th Congress of the Soviet party in October 1956, at which Khrushchev's "secret report" created a tremendous sensation. It proved to be the starting point of a tug-of-war between, on the one hand, the protagonists of de-Stalinization, who were numerous in the French Communist Party as well as the Soviet one, and, on the other hand, the ruling clique of Maurice Thorez, the genial giant, the charismatic leader.

Despite a continuous show of boisterous self-assurance, Thorez had never been quite able to overcome the embarrassment of having deserted war-torn France for the relative safety of Stalin's hospitality. He therefore initially tried, with all the means at his disposal, to hide from his French followers the truth about Stalin's misrule and, particularly, the blood-curdling details of the dictator's end and the murderous scramble for his succession. Paul Noirot, however, on an official trip to Moscow, got an authentic eye-witness account of it all from his old and trusted friend, Giuseppe Boffa, Moscow correspondent of the Italian Communist Party's official daily *l'Unità*. Indeed, Boffa gave Noirot a most realistic rendering of what Noirot later came to dub "Shakespeare in the land of Peter the Great."

In these circumstances, two diametrically opposed lines evolved within the French Communist Party leadership. There was the line of those who, like Waldeck Rochet, Benoît Frachon, Laurent Casanova, and Marcel Servin, increasingly felt the need of settling accounts with Stalinism, and there was the line of Thorez, who opposed de-Stalinization with all his might because he felt personally involved in the underlying drama and was fearful of the consequences of "stirring the quagmire." Noirot, by now the deputy editor of the party monthly *Démocratie Nouvelle,* was by virtue of his personal experience and his entire intellectual baggage bound to drift into the de-Stalinization camp and thereby become the "objective" enemy, as the Communists would say, of the party leader. The final clash was touched off by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact powers in 1968. Although Noirot had been given to understand that he had the blessings of Jacques Duclos, the chief editor (*directeur*), in bringing out a special issue on Czechoslovakia that was strongly critical of "a grave event which means nothing less than the crushing of one socialist nation by a group of other socialist nations," the party leadership nevertheless decided to "suspend the publication" of *Démocratie Nouvelle*.

Noirot thereupon launched what looked to be a highly promising, Communist-but-nonparty, left-wing intellectual magazine christened *Politique Aujourd'hui* (Politics Today). Five of its issues survived the cross fire of a number of party cells. In his own cell, Noirot carried the day, obtaining a two-thirds majority in favor of continuing publication despite the menacing presence at the cell meetings of Henri Fiszbin, then chairman of the Paris Party Federation and member of the Central Committee and at present the leader of some 30 dissenters from the Communist Party who have joined forces with President François Mitterrand's Socialist majority. Thereupon, the Paris Federation, the section to which the "guilty" cell belonged, called an emergency meeting, resolved to dissolve Noirot's cell, and expelled him from the party "for having inveigled his cell into an act of resistance."

Despite the ignominy that he suffered at the hands of his fellow Communists after more than a quarter of a century of faithful militancy, Noirot remains what can best be called "a rogue Communist"—an outcast of the herd, but a Communist all the same. Still, he has hatched some unorthodox ideas of his own. Thus, he does not believe

*that it is possible to run a socialistic society in a developed country, subjected to the leadership and supervision of an apparatus endowed with a bureaucratic structure. . . . Direct democracy, of which so many are dreaming here and there, has so far demonstrated only its impotence, even at group level. But I am sure that if no attempts are made at associating by institutional means ever growing numbers in the decision-making process and if the delegation of powers is not reduced to a barest minimum, we shall never be able to get rid of the sterile antagonism between manipulating organization and impotent spontaneity.*

THERE CAN BE little doubt, particularly since the incarceration of Louis Althusser in a criminal lunatic asylum for having murdered his wife, that Roger Garaudy, although expelled from the party in 1969 and repeatedly rebuked at open party congresses, continues to be the profoundest philosophical thinker of contemporary French Marxism. His marvelous, though frighteningly dense, *Le Marxisme* radiates cantankerous self-assurance, as one of the happy few who have correctly understood Karl Marx down to his finest shades of meaning (the latter, by the way, is in Garaudy's opinion



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the founder *not* of Marxism but of futurism [*prospective*]—that is, the discipline concerned with exploring the future).

Garaudy feels that only by constructing a theoretical model of contemporary capitalism may the new strategy and tactics of socialism be hammered out in this final quarter of the 20th century. To him, political economy, of course, can never be neutral. That is, there can be no "economic science" independent of either the individualistic project of allowing free rein to the strivings for profit and power by a small number or, alternatively, the communal project subordinating production and distribution to the requirements of the development of *all,* in a manner worthy of human beings.

By combining political economy with historical materialism—the latter being construed not as a philosophy of history but as a method with which to impart a certain orientation to history in the making—Marx has powerfully contributed, in Garaudy's words, to the "defatalization" of history. From this follows—again according to Garaudy—that Marx, in his concept of socialism, places himself at the very antipode of all kinds of authoritarianism and centralization. Garaudy recalls that to Marx's mind "the form [i.e., the ideal organization] at long last found" was that of the Paris Commune of 1871, which Garaudy describes as "resolutely anti-Jacobin, oriented toward self-management [hark here to the anticipation of Titoism], direct democracy, and decentralization." And there follows a subordinate clause which adds to our understanding of why Garaudy has for a long time been so unpopular with the orthodox bureaucracy of the French Communist Party—indeed, with institutionalized communism in general. He speaks of "the state, which is there to serve revolution *only as a temporary expedient,* so long as there is need for it to fight counterrevolution."

Garaudy insists strongly that Marx was anything but a dogmatist. According to Garaudy, Marx never mistook the image of capitalism as presented by economic analysis at one or another phase of capitalism's development for the essence of capitalism *at all times.* He even foresaw that his followers would probably have to go beyond his teachings. To Garaudy, the problem is how to give fresh impulses to the movement inaugurated by Marx, "how to release the energy of its dialectics, stifled by long years of dogmatism. Marxism is not a doctrine crystallized once and for all: *Marxism is a task waiting to be accomplished."*

In Garaudy's eyes, Marx's ideas have so little in common with what is generally dubbed "Marxism" that Garaudy repeatedly quotes the Master's dictum to Monsieur Lafforgue in 1882: "If that is Marxism, then one thing is certain, namely, that I am *not* a Marxist." Garaudy emphasizes that Marx's thinking "is critical, historicist, and antidogmatic." Hence, it is nonsensical to regard Marxism either as the supreme academic exegesis of an immutable text written in the mid-19th century or as the motor of militant action for the creation of socialist society in the last quarter of the 20th century despite the fact that it is based on an analysis of 19th-century British capitalism. It is in this sense that Garaudy opposes his "evolutive Marxism" to the tragic Althusser's "determinist caricature of Marxism."

FOR THE BENEFIT of those who are not day-to-day observers of the French scene, let us briefly recall at this juncture that after a prolonged series of attacks of nervous depression, Louis Althusser has finally succumbed to what seems an incurable condition of paranoia after first killing his wife in their flat at the world-famous teachers' college of the Ecole Normale Supérieure on the rue d'Ulm in Paris. During the last years of his productive working life, however, Althusser found himself at odds with the leadership of the French Communist Party and, consequently, out of official favor. The volume under review, one of his last pamphlets, represents a slight rewrite of four articles that initially appeared in the daily *Le Monde.* The party's official daily newspaper, *l'Humanité,* was not allowed to accept the articles for publication, because of the party leadership's ban on any kind of free discussion of different, to say nothing of heterodox, political ideas in its "tribunes."

The pamphlet is, on the one hand, a post mortem on the catastrophic defeat of the French Union of the Left in the March 1978 parliamentary elections and, on the other hand, a flaming indictment of the French Communist Party leadership for the errors which brought about that defeat. Although a Central Committee meeting had reputedly discussed the issue, no verbatim or even summary report of the proceedings was issued. All that militant party members were allowed to take cognizance of was—as Althusser bitterly complains—a report by Secretary General Georges Marchais. Thus, they were reduced to the passive role of "studying the conclusions of a debate which had been concluded" without them.

Althusser's criticism of the Marchais report is devastating as regards both content and presentation. The terms in which the senior Communist philosopher of France tears to pieces the cheap trickery of Marchais's pamphleteering make astounding reading indeed—they might as well have been written by a



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rabid right-winger. Althusser particularly castigates Marchais's "hotch-potch techniques." This, Althusser fumes, consists of inventing fictitious arguments and criticisms, mixing them up with real objections raised against Communist policy, and then proceeding to discredit the latter ones by demolishing the former ones. These fictitious arguments, Althusser declares, "are so absurd and unthinkable coming from a Communist that one must ask oneself on what refuse dump he picked them up."

Genuine contempt for Marchais and rancor against the party "machine" permeate the entire pamphlet. Althusser profoundly disapproves of the way the party's organization is working. "The workers of France cannot be victorious in their class warfare without the Communist Party, but they are even less likely to win with *this* Communist Party as it is today." There is no percolation of ideas from base to top, only the other way round. Also, groups of members are hermetically separated from one another by what Althusser calls "perpendicular partitioning." Militant members of the base can have contact only with members of their particular cell, unless their cell delegates them to attend higher-echelon sectional or federal meetings. All attempts at establishing "horizontal" relations are branded as "fractionalism" and looked upon as grave offenses.

Althusser's critique comes within a hairline of calling the Directorate of the French Communist Party a downright dictatorship. He observes that gaps in its ranks are filled by co-optation, never by electoral process.

*This explains how the leadership is able to survive unharmed, through all sorts of strategic and tactical vicissitudes and errors. The reverse of the coin shows the constant leakages in the rank-and-file membership, that unceasing hemorrhage which necessitates that the reservoir be filled up with fresh blood all the time. With new generations who do not know the battles and turmoils of the preceding 5, 10, or 20 years and can therefore be thrust into the hand-to-hand fighting on the strength of untried theories or promises, to be burnt up in turn. From recruiting campaign to recruiting campaign, the party leaders get themselves new rank-and-file militants, but the leadership remains unchanged.*

The cliché of "collective leadership" does in fact, according to Althusser, disguise a secret pact which, on the one hand, binds its members to each other and, on the other hand, segregates them from the militant base and perpetuates their power.

*Differences or divergences are settled under the law of absolute discretion. Also, it is understood that he whose views remain in a minority will carry out the policies of the victorious majority without batting an eyelid. Which is of course hardly conducive to engendering a sense of personal responsibility in the leaders.*

A special category of stalwarts consists of a corps of long-term, professional, full-time functionaries. Althusser describes them as being "bound to the party by an iron law which demands of them unconditional loyalty, in return for a bread-winning job, the latter being all the more needed as the incumbent either never had a skilled trade or lost his ability to practice it in the course of all those years."

Coming to reflect on the crushing defeat suffered by the Union of the Left in March 1978 (which has now been offset by the victory of the Socialists in the May-June 1981 presidential and parliamentary elections and their offer of four portfolios in the government to senior members of the Communist Party), Althusser feels that instead of moaning about a mythical "buffer" which prevents the winning of support from more than a limited if faithful fraction of the working-class electorate, French Communists had better look for the fault in their own house. Not only is their image tarnished by the memory of the Soviet government's massacre and deportation of millions of recalcitrant peasants, dubbed "kulaks," and the camps and all the other repressive measures which still continue in the USSR more than a quarter of a century after Stalin's death, but there are also the conditions prevailing within the French party itself. Do its members really believe, asks Althusser,

*that the French people have such short memories as to have forgotten how the Communist leadership, scorning liberty and truth, crushed and morally ground to dust loyal party members under the weight of wholly fabricated charges, calculated to dishonor them? They were subjected to regular Moscow-type trials, except that the convicts could not be executed in the end. Albeit you can disgrace people by torturing them with faked accusations of being "police informers," "crooks," or "traitors," and by coercing their old comrades-in-arms unanimously to condemn them as such.*

All these misdeeds, and others galore, Althusser charges, were perpetrated in France during the last 30 years or so while the Communists were out of power, "yet not one word was ever said so as to recall, regret, or repair those abominations, for which the party leadership alone was responsible."



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French Communist psephologists need no longer search for the causes of the party's inability to conquer the allegiance of the entire working class in one fell swoop. In what now appears as Althusser's last will and testament, he has enlightened them more outspokenly than any of their adversaries could have done. Indeed, Althusser's pamphlet is so palpably replete with bitter disillusionment and violent recrimination that one is tempted to see these as at least a partial explanation of the author's subsequent mental derangement.

TO TRY to reduce to a common denominator the motivations, the inner turmoil that led to the falling out of such a random sample of intellectuals with institutionalized communism would—to say the least—be artificial, indeed strained. Nevertheless, because they are all Frenchmen, they have more than one thing in common, despite their differences in age, background, and probably temperament.

The first of the impulses most of them appear to share—strange as it may seem—is idealism. As mentioned at the outset, there is acute consciousness among French political thinkers that the second and third elements of the motto of the Revolution of 1789 are still unfulfilled. After nearly 200 years, it is felt, much remains to be done to achieve "equality" in economic terms. As for "fraternity"—which, of course, is practically impossible to institutionalize by rules and regulations—many an enthusiastic young man's prayers seemed to be answered by the readiness to sacrifice and the voluntary militancy that undoubtedly emanated from the rank and file of the Communist Party in earlier years.

At the same time, all demonstrate the opposite characteristic as well—namely, realism. This provided the mental catalyst that gradually corroded their faith, as they observed the Soviet and East European scene, that communism could keep its promises to better the condition of man.

Last but not least, they all have a very highly developed sense of liberty—that first element of the great revolutionary motto which has been a sturdy reality in France for a long time. This probably constituted the most powerful factor in their breaks with the party. For whoever is prepared to shoulder minor, or sometimes even major, inconveniences for the sake of speaking *his* or *her* truth will always find, at the end of no matter how long an evolutionary process, that they are unable to wear forever the straitjacket of the Communist way of life.



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# Dissent in China

## By Merle Goldman

JOHN BERNINGHAUSEN and TED HUTERS, Eds. *Revolutionary Literature in China: An Anthology.* White Plains, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1977.

HUALING NIEH. *Literature of the Hundred Flowers.* 2 vols. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.

ARNOLD CHANG. *Painting in the People's Republic of China: The Politics of Style.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980.

MARTIN EBON, Ed. *Five Chinese Communist Plays.* New York, NY, The John Day Co., 1975.

KAI-YU HSU, Ed. *Literature of the People's Republic of China.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980.

KAI-YU HSU. *The Chinese Literary Scene: A Writer's Visit to the People's Republic.* New York, NY, Vintage Books, 1975.

GEORGE KAO, Ed. *Two Writers and the Cultural Revolution: Lao She and Chen Jo-hsi.* Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 1980.

CHEN JO-HSI. *The Execution of Mayor Lin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978.

DAVID S. G. GOODMAN. *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China's Democracy Movement.* London, Marion Boyars, 1981.

THE BOOKS under consideration here reveal that political dissent, loyal opposition, nonconformity, and even the quest for individuality exist in China as they do in the West. Although such activities do not represent the mainstream and have evolved in a different context, their presence in China demonstrates that they are not unique to Western societies.

The dissent that has appeared periodically in the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, owes as much to the Chinese tradition of dissent as to the Western example. Semi-official opposition was inherent in Confucianism. The Confucian literati were obliged to criticize when the government deviated from Confucian ideals. It was not so much a right, as in the West, but a responsibility to point out government misdeeds—a responsibility to be carried out regardless of personal risk of punishment or even death. Although some literati did become martyrs, most criticized only when they had patrons and protection within the top leadership. Moreover, they could get a hearing only when they had allies in positions of power. This was most likely to happen during periods of factional conflict, when literati were used in the political struggle. In the process of articulating their patrons' positions, some literati inserted views and values that differed not only from the prevailing orthodoxy but sometimes from those of their political patrons. A similar process occurred in the PRC when intellectuals used the opportunity of political factionalism not only to espouse their patrons' causes but also to shape policies in ways the leadership did not intend.

For brief periods, then, intellectual groups in China have been able to express their own views. However, they have been stopped abruptly when their proposals diverged too far from the views of their political patrons and galvanized the opposing faction into action.

This mode of dissent has not been unique to China. It also appeared in the USSR after Iosif Stalin's death, when Nikita Khrushchev used dissident writers in his struggle with the Stalinists. The dissidents in turn used Khrushchev. Not only did they attack the Stalinists; they also demanded the right to express themselves on other political issues, a right Khrushchev soon denied them.

Nonetheless, the major way to express dissent in the Soviet Union has been to go outside the system, to the underground and the foreign press. While underground protests became important in the PRC in 1978–79, the chief approaches to



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the expression of dissent there have remained either forming alliances with political factions in the establishment or capitalizing upon opportunities available when the leadership itself has allowed dissent for its own political purposes. Dissent in present-day China, as in traditional times, occurs primarily under official sanction.

Not only the traditional model but also the traditional methods of intellectual dissent resonate in the PRC. Since in the post-1949 era as well as earlier there have been no institutional or legal safeguards, intellectuals have not spoken out directly. Because the appearance of consensus is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of a Chinese regime, as Lucian Pye has pointed out, controversial issues have been discussed obliquely and debated subtly, in order to mobilize support without ostensibly upsetting the consensus. Even with high-level protection, direct opposition has entailed enormous personal risks, for Mao, like the emperors of old, and the party, like the Confucian bureaucracy, had extraordinary charismatic appeal and political power.[1] Thus, in literature, poetry, art, theater, and discourses on history and philosophy, intellectuals have long used the indirect means of allusions, symbols, and allegory to discuss current political issues, and their modern representatives, with more pressure for subtlety, have employed these methods deftly.

DISSIDENTS in the People's Republic of China have also been heirs to the May Fourth movement of the early decades of the 20th century, which sought to create a new Western culture as a solution to China's social, political, and economic plight. Though the precise remedy was new, the method of cultural regeneration as a key to survival was traditional. The May Fourth writers regarded their writings as tools with which to fight social and political ills and shape political consciousness. However, these writers of the 1920's and 1930's differed from the traditional literati in that they expressed themselves with new styles, symbols, and concepts that helped prepare the way for revolution.

John Berninghausen and Ted Huters, in *Revolutionary Literature in China,* have selected some representative works of these May Fourth writers. As the editors note, the literary expression of protest against injustice had long been part of Chinese tradition, but in the May Fourth period it emerged as the *mainstream* of Chinese literature. It also became consciously revolutionary in style and content.

Despite its political thrust, this literature ranges from escapist froth to Mao Dun's description of the moral ambiguities of urban youth to Qu Qiubai's and Guo Moro's militant revolutionary treatises. Moreover, the collection shows the change in the May Fourth period itself from earlier romantic individualism and avant-garde experimentation to later preoccupation with rural poverty and Kuomintang bureaucracy.

This collection reflects the variety and diversity of the May Fourth era, when intellectuals were free to respond in their own individual ways to the events of the time. Though it contains a few stories that represent the May Fourth spirit after 1949, most May Fourth writers stopped writing when the party came to power and imposed political controls over intellectual and creative life.

The May Fourth spirit revived briefly in the Hundred Flowers period of 1956 and the first half of 1957. But the Hundred Flowers was more in the mold of the traditional, semi-official form of dissent than the more spontaneous, Westernized form of protest of the May Fourth era. Mao allowed and even encouraged intellectuals to criticize party officials in order to expose and rectify the officials' bureaucratic ways. He also granted intellectuals a relative degree of intellectual freedom in the expectation that they would help the regime in its modernization drive.

Hualing Nieh has collected, in the *Literature of the Hundred Flowers,* the major stories, poems, and literary debates that appeared in response to Mao's relative liberalization. Most writers accepted the framework of Marxism-Leninism, but they demanded a separation of intellectual and creative activity from political direction, and a lifting of bureaucratic controls over their work. Like the May Fourth writers, they wanted to express themselves in a style and with a content of their own choosing. Some participants went further than Mao had anticipated; they criticized not only the party's bureaucratic control but the party itself. Faced with this challenge, the regime launched the Anti-Rightist campaign in June 1957 against these critics.

Nieh's collection also includes some of the party's rebuttals to its critics. Among the rebutters were people like Yao Wenyuan, later to become one of the infamous "gang of four." His attack on famous writers in this campaign made possible his swift rise in the cultural hierarchy. Ideological campaigns, in short, were vehicles not only for political indoctrination but for political opportunism as well.

THE REGIME has tried but failed to separate intellectual areas of endeavor during such campaigns. Because scientists are crucial to China's modernization, they are the first to feel the benefits of a relaxa-

[1] Lucian Pye, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), March 1978, pp. 221–46.



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tion, yet the relaxation inevitably spreads to the nonscientists. Similarly, the nonscientists are the first to experience the harshness of a campaign, but most scientists are inevitably affected by the repression.

However, different areas are hit with different degrees of harshness. Because literary intellectuals more directly reach a wide audience and influence public opinion, they are treated the most harshly. Artists, perhaps because their medium is less directly political, are generally treated less severely. Whereas in literature from late 1957 until the early 1960's professional writers were denigrated and amateur, collective creativity was praised, many fairly traditional landscape paintings in traditional styles, as Arnold Chang observes in *Painting in the People's Republic of China: The Politics of Style,* appeared alongside the amateur artistic works of the masses after a brief suppression in 1957.

It could be that these landscapes were permitted because they expressed one's love for one's homeland. Moreover, some of them were untraditional in that they expressed not so much harmony with nature as man's efforts to change nature. Nonetheless, in a society so highly politicized as the PRC, nonpolitical art is a political statement. It is a protest against party direction of creative activity.

IN THE EARLY 1960's, there was another relaxation in all areas of China's intellectual life as the regime sought to win the cooperation of intellectuals in repairing the great damage to China's economy done in the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950's. However, this relaxation differed from the Hundred Flowers. Since the party leadership could not resolve its differences over what course China should take in the aftermath of the Great Leap debacle, the contending political factions, as in traditional times, used intellectual groups to argue their positions indirectly in the public arena. One group of Westernized intellectuals associated with the party bureaucracy contended—through historical discourse, literary criticism, and the Peking Opera—that Mao's methods of mass campaigns and ideological mobilization were no longer applicable to a modernizing Chinese society, and they advocated more conventional economic practices. A group of younger intellectuals under the patronage of Mao and his wife Jiang Qing countered these arguments and upheld Mao's policies by using similarly indirect methods. One of their ploys was to demand radical reform of the Peking Opera so that it could no longer be used as a vehicle to criticize Mao's policies. They also endeavored to revolutionize the creative arts completely in order to impose a new culture and destroy the old one.

Thus, in the first half of the 1960's, Jiang Qing and her associates began to devise revolutionary operas that would become the main, and at times the only, culture of the period from the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to Mao's death in 1976. Martin Ebon has collected representative examples of these model revolutionary works in his *Five Chinese Communist Plays.* Ebon urges the reader to treat these works with sympathy, for he claims that they are heirs to a great tradition. But to what tradition is he referring? Although these model works used some of the techniques of the traditional opera, they were for the most part cultural hybrids that incorporated the most banal and conventional devices of Soviet socialist realism. Indeed, the socialist realist emphasis of these model works was imposed on all areas of creative activity. Arnold Chang points out that all art sank to the low level of propaganda. The model productions were not an evolution of China's great tradition, but a rejection of it.

Kai-yu Hsu's *Literature of the People's Republic of China,* a selection of literary works of the Communist era and a description of their authors, also seeks to understand the new culture that the radicals were creating. Despite Hsu's effort, his approach is implicitly critical. He points out that the proletarian heroic culture which the radicals promoted in the guise of mass culture had little to do with the kind of folk literature the masses enjoyed—the picaresque, the supernatural, and even the erotic. Moreover, his discussions with his old teachers and classmates on a visit to the PRC in the early 1970's, reported in *The Chinese Literary Scene,* revealed that most of them were no longer creating. The famous May Fourth writer Shen Cungwen had gone into museum work because, as he explained, "A different kind of fiction is in demand now. I can't deliver."[2]

Another famous May Fourth writer, Lao She, had tried to write after 1949, but although he produced a few works, none measured up to his pre-1949 writings. Several of his best pre-1949 works appear in George Kao's *Two Writers and the Cultural Revolution: Lao She and Chen Jo-hsi.* Lao is an example of a writer who sought to conform to the party's dictates, but, as he himself explained during the Hundred Flowers movement, his conformity had destroyed his creativity: "My writing tends to be empty and thin—for I am writing about things with which I am not very familiar."[3] He poignantly described why he and his May Fourth colleagues were no longer able to create under the regime they helped bring to power:

[2] Kai-yu Hsu, *The Chinese Literary Scene: A Writer's Visit to the People's Republic,* p. 134.

[3] Hualing Nieh, Vol. I, p. 46.



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"A writer who is always scared stiff of overstepping set principles or doing damage to the revolution is certain to find himself bound hand and foot and incapable of writing boldly."[4]

Chen Jo-hsi, the other writer whose works are included in Kao's collection and the author of *The Execution of Mayor Lin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,* had to write her pieces about China from abroad. The fact that she was born and educated in Taiwan and spent only seven years in China, from 1966 to 1973, does not mean that she cannot be considered a genuine PRC writer. Her stories that implicitly expose, ridicule, and criticize the excesses and absurdities of the Cultural Revolution are biased against the regime. But they express the feelings of an intellectual who was immersed in the May Fourth culture and was subjected to persecution, the fate of most intellectuals in present-day China. Her characters, like those in May Fourth literature, despair over their situation and are alienated from certain aspects of the society, yet seek to support and play a part in that society. Some approved short stories written after Mao's death were even more condemnatory of the Cultural Revolution than Chen's pieces but lacked the sardonicism and subtlety of several of her stories.

A DIFFERENT type of dissent is expressed in David S. G. Goodman's *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China's Democracy Movement.* Goodman analyzes and reprints the poems used in the protests, unofficial journals, and wall posters of the Democracy Movement that surfaced from late 1978 until the spring of 1979.

These unofficial acts and the dissenters' contacts with foreign journalists during this period resemble the unofficial form of dissent in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there was also an element of semi-official approval involved. For a short time in 1979, Deng Xiaoping allowed these underground groups to function above ground, in order to use them in his factional struggle with the remnants of Mao's followers in the Politburo. The dissenting groups' condemnation of Mao's policies as detrimental to modernization overlapped with Deng's. But once the purge of the remaining Maoists had taken place and the Democracy Movement called for more democracy as a prerequisite for modernization, the dissenters were forced to go underground again.

Like Soviet dissident movements, the Democracy Movement was unorganized and diverse, although most dissenters accepted party leadership and Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, like Soviet dissidents, the dissenters wished to achieve greater cultural and political freedom, the same demands made officially in the Hundred Flowers movement. Specifically, they spoke out for human rights, attacked official privileges, and called for radical change of the political system.

The Democracy Movement also differed from previous dissent in that it was not led by intellectuals and students but by workers. However, these workers would have been intellectuals except for the Cultural Revolution. They were children of middle- and upper-level cadres and intellectuals, who had been deprived of a university education and sent to work in factories during the Cultural Revolution. Some had known one another as Red Guards; others met at their place of work. They had little expectation of education and were working in jobs not commensurate with their aspirations.

Most intellectuals in China disparage the protests of such individuals, probably because they fear that the protests will provoke the authorities into revoking the limited freedom they themselves have been granted. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the underground actions of these dissenters will do much to change the regime. Nevertheless, the politicization of youth in the Cultural Revolution and the organizational skills that they learned as Red Guards could be a catalyst for the organization of workers. A workers' movement in China similar to the one in Poland is not beyond the realm of possibility. China has a tradition of intellectuals and workers joining together in protest, as in the May Fourth movement of 1919 against warlords and in the Tiananmen protest of April 5, 1976, against the gang of four and in commemoration of Zhou Enlai. Goodman calls these youthful dissenters the "underprivileged privileged," an apt phrase to describe the potentially most revolutionary group in any system.

DESPITE THE PUBLICITY it has received, however, the underground movement is today marginal and limited. Though it has many sympathizers, the number of active participants is no more than 200. Many of these have been imprisoned.

As throughout Chinese history, then, change in the present Chinese system will probably be generated more by the traditional form of semi-official dissent than by underground dissent. For as long as the party needs to use the intellectuals for modernization, there will continue to be periods of relaxation as well as of repression.

To be sure, the party, as in the past, will encourage debate and criticism only within certain limits and under its direction. Yet once these forces are unleashed, they cannot

[4] Ibid., p. 47.



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be fully controlled. In the Hundred Flowers, what started out as an officially approved criticism of political practices turned into a demand for democratic rights which led to questioning of the party's role and even of communism. Again, in the relative relaxation of the early 1960's, officially sanctioned criticism of the Great Leap Forward and Mao's policies turned into demands for a more open society.

Since there are still no institutional or legal guarantees to protect those who express dissident ideas or seek intellectual or individual autonomy, the intellectuals who do so, unlike their counterparts in the West, risk their lives as well as their careers. Indeed, some of the people discussed in the books under review were persecuted and even killed in retaliation. Nevertheless, some of the ideas they articulated were adopted as party policy at a later time. For example, the demands made during the 1961–62 relaxation, for decision-making based more on economic and scientific than ideological criteria and for the rejection of charismatic leadership, have been incorporated into present-day policy.

As long as the party seeks to maintain its authority over most aspects of China's life—and its current emphasis on discipline and orderly administration does not suggest that it will abandon control—there is always the possibility that it will end relaxation if criticism from intellectuals threatens its authority. This is true whether the criticism comes from radicals or from Westernized intellectuals needed to modernize the country.

Yet history never repeats itself. Mao, with his particular animus toward intellectuals, is gone. Therefore, while the cyclical party policy toward intellectuals will continue, the shifts may be more moderate. Though the regime is now criticizing individual intellectuals, the relaxation period that began with Mao's death in September 1976 has been more open to the outside world and lasted longer than any previous relaxation. There has been an influx of Western learning and scholars and an efflux of Chinese to the West. It is unlikely that nationwide ideological campaigns will be carried out with the fervor and intensity of the past, because they are so disruptive to economic modernization.

Perhaps more important, the expression of official and unofficial dissent over the last decade makes it improbable that the party will again be able to impose the kind of monolithic ideological control that existed in the early years of the regime. The intermittent official relaxations, with their accompanying dissent, have undermined the ideological consensus that this regime, like every regime in Chinese history, has believed necessary in order to rule effectively.



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# China's Place in World Politics

## By Samuel S. Kim

MELVIN GURTOV and BYONG-MOO HWANG. *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy.* Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.

J. D. ARMSTRONG. *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.

JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER. *China's Global Role.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

A. DOAK BARNETT. *China's Economy in Global Perspective.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1981.

JOSEPH CAMILLERI. *Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath.* Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1980.

GREG O'LEARY. *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1980.

GRANT F. RHODE and REID E. WHITLOCK, Comps. *Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1978: An Annotated Compilation.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980.

IN THE 1970's, a series of dramatic events and developments signaled a significant transformation of China's place in the world. At the start of the decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) had diplomatic relations with only 47 countries; by the end of the decade, it had increased that number to 120. In the meantime, and most important, it had established friendlier ties with both Japan and the United States. In 1972, the PRC gained recognition from Japan as the "sole legal government of China," and in 1978, the two countries signed a treaty of peace and friendship. In 1972, the PRC and the United States established de facto diplomatic relations, and in 1979, formal diplomatic relations. As the Sino-American rapprochement moved from détente toward unofficial entente, the PRC became as much an integral part of the new cycle of Soviet-American political rivalry (Cold War II) as the Sino-American rupture of 1949 was an integral part of Cold War I.[1]

The PRC has also taken an increasingly active part in the various domains of the global system as a whole. It joined the United Nations in 1971, and since that time it has steadily increased its visibility not only in the UN but also in all the UN specialized agencies, in UN-sponsored global conferences, and in a variety of nongovernmental organizations. In 1980, it made a much-heralded entry into the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; clearly, its emerging reintegration into the global economic system will have profound implications for both its own modernization drive and the world economy.

Finally, it is by now apparent that the post-Mao Chinese leadership has significantly changed its image of China's place in the international system. It now employs a vocabulary in which terms like "global interests," "global perspective," and "global view" figure prominently. In his interview with American journalists in Beijing in January 1979, for example, Deng Xiaoping noted that both the United States and China saw the negotiations leading to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations from a "global viewpoint" and that there is "much in common between us on matters of global strategy and on political questions." China also used a globalist rhetoric in attempting to justify its invasion of Vietnam in early 1979.[2]

TO WHAT EXTENT has Western scholarship caught up with and captured this new "reality" of China's place in the world? That question can perhaps best be answered first

[1] For further analysis of this point, see Samuel S. Kim, "The Sino-American Collaboration and Cold War II," *The Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), No. 1, 1982.

[2] See *Beijing Review*, Jan. 12, 1979, pp. 17–18; and *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), June 19, 1980, p. 6.



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in general terms, and then more specifically, with reference to several recent works on Chinese foreign policy.

Unfortunately, neither the West in general, nor the United States in particular, has ever had a notably accurate perception of China. As Harold R. Isaacs has written in his classic account, American images of the Chinese have shifted from the imperial exoticism and splendor reported by Marco Polo to the resourceful and enduring peasantry of Pearl Buck, from the demonized Genghis Khan (a Mongol, after all) to the revolutionary Mao Zedong.[3] Presumably, of course, the real China lies somewhere between the extremes of America's "love-hate" encounter with China. Yet, few have been immune from emotional and perceptual swings. President Richard M. Nixon readily embraced one of the extremes—the cold war orthodoxy of the 1950's and 1960's—when he called "Communist China" "the greatest threat to the peace of the world" in his Guam Declaration of July 25, 1969 (the so-called Nixon Doctrine). But only a few years later, there he was inside the Forbidden City, opening a new chapter in the annals of Sino-American relations.

But neither has the scholar, any less than the statesman, been able to escape swings of emotion, perception, and even fashion. In purely quantitative terms, the result was until recently a rather modest scholarly output on Chinese foreign policy. As Allen S. Whiting put it in a report to the US Social Science Research Council: "Neglect begets neglect. . . . Thus, when President Nixon's historic 1972 visit to Peking suddenly reawakened American interest in China, only a handful of studies on Chinese foreign policy were on hand as compared with a burgeoning literature on various aspects of Chinese society and culture."[4] That the study of Chinese domestic politics enjoyed more generous financial support and made greater theoretical advances even during a period when the US government was preoccupied with putative Chinese expansionism is indeed a revealing commentary.

In qualitative terms, the study of Chinese foreign policy was held back by the persistence of methodological orthodoxy—by what one might call "Sinocentrism." The dominant Sinocentric approach was excessively parochial, and therefore unable to provide a clear perspective for making prudent judgments about developments in China. The Sinocentric approach was also too isolated from the methodological rigor of research on social science in general and research on international relations and comparative foreign policy in particular. Instead, it was descriptive, as if "social reality" could be captured merely through an accumulation of raw data and a narration of events.[5] Chalmers Johnson has rightly characterized such a method as "intelligence-collecting rather than social science research";[6] in itself, it can serve only as a low-level guide to social reality. Finally, the Sinocentric approach was too atheoretical, conceptually too disparate and fragmented. Theory, the bête noire of Sinology, provides an analytical device for selecting, categorizing, ordering, simplifying, and integrating the raw data of knowledge. As such, it is no more than a necessary instrument that will help us better describe, explain, and (one hopes) predict China's place in the world. But Sinocentrism paid little attention to general theoretical and normative problems.

However, with the emergence of China as a significant global actor in the 1970's, many of the constraints that used to plague Western scholarship on Chinese foreign policy have been removed. Now that China has become virtually a de facto ally of the United States, the center of normative gravity has shifted correspondingly. What was unsafe or unpopular to say during Cold War I may have become unsafe or unpopular not to say in the current cycle of Sino-American entente. Yesterday's penalty is today's payoff. The normative constraints of one era have been removed—if only to be replaced, to a significant extent, by newer and more subtle constraints.

It is now possible to liberate the study of Chinese foreign policy from its Sinocentric straitjacket. The Sinocentric approach has always tended to accept uncritically—and often to amplify positively or negatively—what the Chinese say. We would do well to heed China's own advice about Soviet foreign policy—that we should not only listen to what the Soviets say (socialism) but also, and more important, observe what they actually do (social imperialism).

[3] Harold R. Isaacs, *Images of Asia: American Views of China and India*, New York, NY, Capricorn Books, 1962.

[4] Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy: A Workshop Report," *SSRC Items*, No. 31, March-June 1977, p. 1.

[5] For more detailed and diverse criticisms from various normative and methodological persuasions, see Davis B. Bobrow, "Old Dragons in New Models," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), January 1967, pp. 306–19; Roger L. Dial, Ed., *Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy*, Halifax, Canada, Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1974; James C. Hsiung, "The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: An Essay on Methodology," in James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, Eds., *China in the Global Community*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1980, pp. 1–15; Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship," *World Politics*, January 1965, pp. 256–71; Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 3–15; Andres D. Onate, "The Case for the Integrity of Social Science Research in Chinese Studies," *Asian Forum* (Tempe, AZ), Spring 1976, pp. 50–72; Jonathan D. Pollack, "Interpreting China's Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1980, pp. 84–88; and Whiting, loc. cit., pp. 1–3.

[6] Johnson, loc. cit., p. 257.



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Given the discrepancies between pronouncements and performance in both traditional and Maoist Chinese foreign policy, the case for a *behavioral* analysis is all the more compelling.

The data for a more rigorous empirical and behavioral analysis of Chinese foreign policy are now available. Before 1971, no such analysis was possible (except, of course, by extrapolation from bilateral relations), since no patterns of behavior could be distilled from China's limited participation in the various domains of the global system. But there is now a large and ever increasing repertory of "empirical and behavioral referents" generated by the "target parties" of China's expanding diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, technological, and legal practices. The Chinese language is no barrier, for much of this repertory is available in English. Nor does the paucity of statistical data remain an insurmountable impediment. In mid-1979, for the first time in two decades, China began to release national statistics on key aspects of its political economy.

THE DRAMATIC increase in Western scholarly monographs on Chinese foreign policy in the 1970's attests to a renewed quest to redefine and reexplain China's place in world politics. The seven books under review, in particular, afford a point of departure for a disciplined inquiry into China's actual or perceived place in the world. They provide a sample of contending approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy, and they will certainly aid our search for a master road map (or paradigm) that will help us better understand the old and new China and better describe, explain, and predict China's changing role in global politics.

In terms of empirical and theoretical rigor, Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang's *China Under Threat* and J. D. Armstrong's *Revolutionary Diplomacy* stand out. The two books are similar in several ways. Both are remarkably free of traditional Sino-centric and anti-Communist biases. Both begin with an explicit formulation of theoretical models or operational hypotheses. Both subject their respective models or hypotheses to rigorous empirical testing in specific case studies. Both are concerned mainly with *explaining* Chinese foreign policy behavior. And both go a long way toward bridging the wide gap between research on Chinese foreign policy and research on international relations.

Gurtov and Hwang first formulate six operational propositions based on the assumption that Chinese foreign policy is the externalization of domestic politics. They then assess these propositions in light of China's behavior in five crises—the Korean war (1950), the Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the Sino-Indian border war (1962), Vietnam (1965), and the Sino-Soviet border clashes (1969).

Armstrong begins by conceptualizing two alternative explanatory models—the united front model and the alliance model. The united front model derives essentially from Mao's ideological notions. It thus stresses the influence of ideology (or Maoism) as the determinant of Chinese foreign policy behavior. This model carries with it the implicit assumption that the "internal" environment is the dominant foreign policy motivation. The alliance model is a "national security interests" model, or what some call a "reactive model." It is designed to explain the extent to which China's foreign policy behavior is determined by Beijing's security concerns and interests. This model, in short, assumes the dominance of the "external" environment in shaping China's foreign policy behavior. Having set forth these two models, Armstrong then proceeds to appraise their applicability through case studies of China's bilateral relations with Indonesia (1961–65), Pakistan (1954–71), Cambodia (the Sihanouk era, 1954–70), and Tanzania (1961–early 1970's).

Still, the two books differ in some ways. For one, each looks at a different side of the same coin. Gurtov and Hwang concentrate on the input side (the decision-making process in a crisis), and Armstrong focuses on the output side (observable behavior in a normal situation). Moreover, each reaches a different conclusion. For Gurtov and Hwang, each crisis was *defined* by the threatening behavior of the two superpowers, but China's *response* was determined largely by Chinese domestic politics. Armstrong's conclusion is a mixed one—that China's policies in Indonesia "were strongly influenced by the [united front] doctrine, its policies towards Cambodia and Tanzania rather less so, and its relations with Pakistan not at all" (p. 238).

While both studies make an important contribution, it is questionable whether their conceptual frameworks and conclusions are valid for Chinese foreign policy behavior in general (or China's role in world politics). Armstrong would probably agree, since he characterizes his study as "a detailed attempt to assess the *specific* impact of *specific* ideological principles on *specific* policies" (p. 239, emphasis in original). Gurtov and Hwang might agree too, since they add an "apologetic epilogue" to their concluding chapter, an epilogue that superbly and tantalizingly delineates some of the major changes and shifts in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. One might also challenge their approach even within its own frame of reference, however, for having overstated the impact of domestic politics and understated



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the impact of international politics. To be sure, the picture of a *rational* decision-making process under threat goes a long way toward dispelling the Genghis Khan image of Chinese expansionism during the period of cold war orthodoxy. But the authors seem to have overcompensated. The reader might do well to read this book together with another important study of Chinese decision-making, by Davis Bobrow, Steven Chan, and John Kringen.[7]

AS IMPLIED by the titles, John Franklin Copper's *China's Global Role* and A. Doak Barnett's *China's Economy in Global Perspective* promise to paint a larger picture of post-Mao China in global politics. Unfortunately, Copper has little to say about either global politics or China's changing global role. Instead, his basic objective is "to measure China's national power capabilities, using time-tested measures of national power together with the most widely accepted quantitative data available on China" (p. xiv). Thus, Copper assesses China's "muscle power" in terms of six categories—geography and population, natural resources, economic strength, military power, political system, and science and technology—providing no fewer than 77 tables in this slim volume.

The question of China's place in the contemporary international system seems deceptively simple and elementary, yet it has defied an easy answer. Copper's China is not even at the top of the second-rank powers (p. 133). But Jonathan D. Pollack's China is a "superpower candidate," and Ian Clark's China is already a great power in a tripolar international system.[8] Who is right?

I would argue that Copper's ranking of China's place in the world today is wide of the mark. The kinds of comparative measurements and assessments Copper presents in the book are not useful unless they are linked conceptually and analytically to the foreign policy objectives of a given actor and to the influence structures of world politics on a given issue. Copper seems unaware of the well-established principle that in global politics, perception defines reality. Gross quantities of capabilities cannot be equated with effective influence because of the discrepancies between an actor's objective capabilities and the subjective perceptions other global actors have of those capabilities. In a word, whether China is a power of the first rank, second rank, or third rank is a question that is partly empirical (objective) and partly perceptual (subjective).

Chinese global politics is the art of the possible. In the domain of global geopolitics, Chinese leaders constantly cultivate the perception that no other state possesses the will or capability that China does to recast the global strategic balance. Indeed, China seems to have succeeded in assuming such a role for the moment, for both superpowers act as if China had already become a key variable in their respective strategic thinking. In the domain of the global political economy, by contrast, post-Mao China made a sudden U-turn in late 1978—from giving aid and projecting its own model, it began to seek aid and search for other models.[9]

However, Copper does not attempt to follow all the twists and turns in Chinese global policy initiated by the post-Mao leadership in its "catching up" politics of modernization (drive for status). As a result, he conveys a false impression of continuity and stability in China's global role. While Copper's many statistical tables broaden the data base for our empirical inquiry, his study lags too far behind the actual evolution of China's role.

Fortunately, *China's Economy in Global Perspective* provides a more comprehensive and up-to-date (to mid-1980) picture of the political economy of post-Mao China. No other American scholar on Chinese affairs has displayed such intellectual growth as has Barnett in his more than 20 years of prodigious output, which covers virtually all aspects of the Chinese polity, both domestic and foreign. In his latest work, Barnett takes another giant step forward in providing an encyclopedic treatment of such key issues as trade, technology transfer, energy, and food. He superbly delineates the emerging reintegration of China into the world economic system and their reciprocal impact. More significant, he moves beyond the anachronistic Sinocentric framework to a "global" framework. Like a Picasso painting, Barnett's book captures all the changes and shifts—and their nuances and complexities—in the changing landscape of the post-Mao Chinese political economy. It is not possible to sum up this monumental book—actually five books in one and probably the largest volume yet written on recent Chinese politics. Suffice it to say that this is the one book to read on post-Mao China!

It can safely be said that Barnett has no particular academic or political axes to grind. He writes in the tradition of a philosopher-king for the larger "attentive public" of China scholars, intelligent laymen, jour-

[7] *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1979.

[8] See Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Potential as a World Power," Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, P-6524, July 1980; and Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 139–42.

[9] The normative and other changes in the global policy of post-Mao China are analyzed further in my "Normative Foreign Policy: The Chinese Case," *International Interactions* (Chapel Hill, NC), Nos. 1–2, 1981, pp. 51–77, and "Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy?" *International Organization* (Ithaca, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 433–65.



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nalists, and Washington policymakers. Consequently, he neither resorts to academic jargon nor casts his book in any explicit theoretical or conceptual framework. Much of his style is the "descriptive/analytical" style of first-class journalism. But I would argue that Barnett has taken a "political economy approach"—to be more precise, the Western liberal model of the global political economy, or the complex interdependence school à la Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.[10] Indeed, gone is his "cold war rhetoric" of the mid-1960's (recall his advocacy of "a policy of containment but not isolation" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966).

Nevertheless, Barnett still links himself too closely to the latest American standard version of China. The last part (Part V), where one would hope to find Barnett's main conclusions or theses, merely reviews the economic dimension of US-China relations. In a sense, the entire book is a thorough and comprehensive background brief for American corporate and geopolitical managers. That may make his book all the more influential among policymakers and all the more attractive to the mainstream of China scholars in the United States. But I doubt whether the book will have a global appeal. Its conceptual and normative framework is still too Western.

Because of this Western frame of reference, Barnett misses a crucial opportunity to use the development of the Chinese political economy as a test case to directly confront the assumptions and arguments of both the *dependencia* approach (Cardoso, Frank, Amin, Galtung, etc.)[11] and the world-system approach (Wallerstein)[12] or to systematically examine China's changing global role in the Third World's elusive quest for system transformation (New International Economic Order). Post-Mao China's normative shift from self-reliance and, implicitly, from the *dependencia* model to the Western model, with a capitalist Center, is paradoxical. China's open door to the trilateral countries and corporations seems to legitimize the Center model at the very moment the model is not only under attack from without but also experiencing a "legitimacy crisis" within the Center itself. That some significant elements within the capitalist world no longer regard the Center model as potent enough even to muddle through is clearly delineated in *The Global 2000 Report to the President,* the most comprehensive set of projections ever developed by US government agencies on "what will happen to population, resources, and environment if present policies continue."[13] The practical and normative implications of post-Mao China's approach to the global political economy deserve, I believe, more careful attention than Barnett has given in this monumental volume.

BOTH Joseph Camilleri and Greg O'Leary promise to apply an alternative and more "radical" normative framework in analyzing Chinese foreign policy. Those who have read Camilleri's excellent book *Civilization in Crisis: Human Prospects in a Changing World*[14] may find his *Chinese Foreign Policy* disappointing. Camilleri's main objective is to study "China's role in the world system." Yet he takes a historical and descriptive approach, giving a chronological narrative of China's changing relations with the two superpowers, much as if his were the first book on the subject. As a text for the introductory student, the book is superb. However, it offers nothing new or startling to specialists on Chinese foreign policy. Only in the epilogue (pp. 248–60) do we find a most stimulating, but all too brief, discussion of the global implications of the policy and normative changes initiated by the post-Mao leadership.

Some of Camilleri's main themes or arguments are worth noting. Camilleri conceptualizes China's national interest as a product of history, geography, and ideology. He explains China's foreign policy behavior in terms of "a subtle interaction of internal and external factors" (p. 121). He rebuts the central thesis of Gurtov and Hwang by arguing persuasively that "the periodic fluctuations between radicalism and moderation were determined not so much by turning points in domestic

[10] *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,* Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1977.

[11] For a sample of *dependencia* theory, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Towards Another Development," in Richard A. Falk et al., Eds., *Toward a Just World Order,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 343–58; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America,* trans. by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1979; Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" and "On the Mechanisms of Imperialism: The Case of Brazil," in Robert I. Rhodes, Ed., *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader,* New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1970, pp. 4–17, 89–100; idem, *Reflections on the World Economic Crisis,* New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1981; Samir Amin, *Unequal Development,* trans. by Brian Pearce, New York, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1976; Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research,* No. 2, 1971, pp. 81–117; and idem, "Conflict on a Global Scale: Social Imperialism and Sub-Imperialism," *World Development* (London), No. 3, March 1976, pp. 153–65.

[12] See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System,* New York, NY, Academic Press, 1976, and *The Capitalist World Economy,* New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1979. For a description and analysis of the world-system approach from the perspective of international relations research and theory, see W. Ladd Hollist and James N. Rosenau, Eds., *World System Debates,* special issue of *International Studies Quarterly* (Minneapolis, MN), March 1981.

[13] *The Global 2000 Report to the President,* Vol. 1, *Entering the Twenty-first Century,* Vol. 2, *The Technical Report,* Vol. 3, *Documentation on the Government's Global Sectoral Models: The Government's "Global Model,"* all Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980–81. The citation in the text is in Vol. 3, p. iii.

[14] J. A. Camilleri, *Civilization in Crisis: Human Prospects in a Changing World,* New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1976.



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politics as by changes in the international political situation" (p. 24). He also provides a tantalizing glimpse into the changing style of China's drive for status and into the shift in Chinese foreign policy from an emphasis on class relations to an emphasis on interstate relations. However, Camilleri's periodization of the history of the PRC's foreign policy into three phases—the revolutionary phase of 1949–68, the transitional phase of 1969–73, and the postrevolutionary phase since 1973—is puzzling. Why the postrevolutionary phase should begin in 1973, not in 1978, is not entirely clear.

In *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy,* O'Leary proposes to analyze the input (the formulation) rather than the output (the practice), on the assumption that Chinese foreign policy "is formulated in accordance with an ongoing analysis of the world predicated upon a set of Marxist-Leninist principles" (p. 8). His method is primarily an exegetic analysis of Chinese policy pronouncements, and his emphasis is on the changing Chinese definition of contradictions in the world. In his eyes, Beijing's perceptions of these contradictions at any given time determine its foreign policy.

"To the vast majority of authors who have written in the area of Chinese foreign policy," O'Leary declares at the outset, "I owe very little" (p. 10). We are also told that the author's knowledge of the Chinese language is limited but that this is not as important as a deficiency in Marxism-Leninism. At least the author makes his normative framework and conceptual challenge explicit.

O'Leary's central argument is that "the world's principal contradiction underlying the formulation of China's foreign policy during the period of the Cultural Revolution was formally abandoned at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and was abandoned in practice over the ensuing two and a half years" (p. 271). O'Leary cites Lin's 1965 programmatic essay on "People's War" as evidence that China saw the *principal (zhuyao)* contradiction as that "between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States." (p. 271).

This argument stands on shaky ground. It would be more accurate to say that China in the 1960's was in a state of conceptual and normative confusion as Mao groped for a definition of China's place in the rapidly changing international system. Mao's own thinking was in a state of flux, as a result of which he saw too many contradictions in the world without making any clear distinction between the principal and secondary ones. This ambiguity is revealed in his interview with a visiting French parliamentary delegation (January 1964) as well as in his interviews with M. M. Ali of Zanzibar (June 18, 1964) and a visiting Japanese Socialist delegation (July 10, 1964). More significant, Mao, in responding to Edgar Snow's question on precisely this issue (January 9, 1965), confessed that he had not reached a conclusion as to what constituted the principal contradiction in the contemporary world.[15]

In other respects, the O'Leary book, however well conceptualized, is a poorly executed piece of scholarship. Even to those who are committed to normative analysis of Chinese foreign policy, it may come as a source of embarrassment. As Lin Biao once said of U.S. "imperialism" (quoted in the book at p. 95), it is "a mad bull dashing from place to place," as the author seems most interested in picking out certain prominent specialists in Chinese foreign policy for target practice (Harold Hinton, Allen Whiting, and others). For a sensitive normative analysis of Mao's changing worldview, one has to rely on a study like John Gittings's *The World and China, 1922–1972*[16]—interestingly, O'Leary clearly places Gittings among "those few who have sought to drag the study of China's foreign relations from the mire of Cold War propaganda into which it was propelled by Western governments and their compliant academics" (p. 10).

Moreover, O'Leary's book has all the earmarks of an undisciplined and unedited doctoral dissertation. It is one of the most poorly written books on Chinese foreign policy I have encountered in many years. Many of its passages are simply undecipherable. The book also suffers from O'Leary's inability to use Chinese-language sources, which is a serious handicap for the textual analysis he undertakes. To cite one specific example, O'Leary could not use the two-volume *wansui* documents, perhaps the most important primary source for his contradictions analysis and a source of the strength of Gittings's book.[17]

Last but not least, the book suffers from anachronism. It makes little sense for a book published in June 1980 to cut off in 1973, with merely a brief "Postscript: 1973–78." In 1974, China's long journey to define and redefine its place in the world

[15] See Edgar Snow, "Interview With Mao," *New Republic* (Washington, DC), Feb. 27, 1965, p. 18; *L'Humanité* (Paris), Feb. 21, 1964, p. 3; *Renmin Ribao* editorial, Jan. 21, 1964, p. 1; *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought), n.p., August 1969, pp. 515, 535. For further elaboration and documentation of my argument here, see Samuel S. Kim, "Mao Zedong and China's Changing World View," in Hsiung and Kim, op. cit., pp. 16–39.

[16] John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922–1972,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1974.

[17] *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui,* 2 Vols., n.p., 1967, and August 1969. For a discussion of the authenticity of these documents, generally referred to as the *wansui* documents, see Stuart Schram, "Mao Tse-tung: A Self-Portrait," *China Quarterly* (London), January/March 1974, pp. 156–65.



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finally culminated with the pronouncement of Mao's "three worlds" theory at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. In 1977, the Chinese press was saturated with articles extolling Mao's "three worlds" theory, and on November 1, 1977, in the most elaborate and comprehensive foreign policy statement issued by China in recent years, the editorial department of *Renmin Ribao* devoted its entire issue (six pages) to an essay on "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism." In the last few years, however, Chinese press coverage of, or even reference to, Mao's "three worlds" theory has been greatly reduced. O'Leary has little to say about any of these developments. For O'Leary's chosen subject, approach, and period, Gittings's book remains the first, and perhaps the last, word.

FINALLY, let us turn to *Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1978,* compiled by Grant F. Rhode and Reid E. Whitlock. As any casual observer can see, "law and order" has returned to post-Mao China. A "Planning Conference on the Study of Law," which was convened in Beijing in March 1979, adopted an eight-year plan for the study of law. At the same time, a major "scholarly" article on international law appeared in *Renmin Ribao*—another novelty, for the paper had not published any "academic" articles on international law since the Cultural Revolution. This article argued that China's backwardness in international legal research is incongruent with "China's status in the world today."[18] Moreover, Chinese activism in the legal domain of world politics has become increasingly evident in the last few years.

Unfortunately, *Treaties of the People's Republic of China* has nothing to say about these recent developments. Instead, the editors provide us merely with the English texts of 33 treaties in five subject categories (friendship, boundary, commerce and navigation, consular, and dual nationality treaties), all signed between 1950 and 1965. As if to justify the lack of analysis and annotation, they argue that "the political, economic, and ideological currents that shape the course of international relations are reflected in treaties and other forms of international agreements" (p. 6). As if to rectify the obvious anachronism, they add (in Chapters 6 and 7) the English texts of the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship as well as the texts of the 1972 Shanghai Communique and 1979 Sino-American Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Even the editors' introductory essay is completely out of touch with current Chinese legal practice, for it relies essentially on Chinese publications of the 1950's.

Even for a historical study of China's evolving treaty practice, Rhode and Whitlock's compilation is a poor guide. For the documents themselves, we must still refer to *Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949–1967: A Calendar,* by Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu.[19] For analysis of the documents, we must still look to *People's China and International Law,* by Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu.[20] For China's legal practice in international forums, we have in English the official records of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN General Assembly and such important UN-sponsored global conferences as the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the annual volume *Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions,* and the UN *Treaty Series.*[21]

WHITHER post-Mao Chinese foreign policy? Whither Western research? How can we close the gap between the two?

In quantitative terms, there has been a rapid proliferation of scholarly monographs on Chinese foreign policy in recent years. Indeed, it can even be claimed that the study of Chinese foreign policy has reached another "advancing and contending" stage in its checkered history.

But post-Mao China has been changing with a speed—and in so many dimensions—few outside China specialists would have thought possible only a few years ago. How many books on Chinese foreign policy can be said to have survived these dramatic changes? Of the books under review, only Barnett's book—thanks in part to the remarkably expeditious production process at the Brookings Institution and thanks in part to its very recent publication date (June 22, 1981)—has managed, at least for the moment, to avoid being so quickly and mercilessly outdated by another unexpected turn in Chinese foreign policy. Thus, the burgeoning Western literature provides no reliable or consensual basis to say with confidence what place China occu-

[18] Wang Tieya and Wei Min, "International Law Research Must Be Strengthened," *Renmin Ribao,* Mar. 30, 1979, p. 3.

[19] Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu, *Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949–1967: A Calendar,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968.

[20] Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, *People's China and International Law,* 2 Vols., Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974.

[21] The UN *Treaty Series*—a collection of texts of treaties and international agreements—is published to satisfy a UN Charter (Article 102) obligation. There is a cumulative index, each volume of which covers 50 or 100 volumes of the *Treaty Series.*



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pies in world politics today or what kinds of interactions are taking place between China and the world at large.

In qualitative terms, the anomalies of the dominant Sinocentric paradigm are now fully exposed, if not completely rejected. That is, the dominant Sinocentric paradigm can no longer provide explanations for the changing reality of post-Mao China's foreign policy. Yet, no new or alternative paradigm seems to have gained general acceptance as the way to liberate the field from the maladies that have plagued current lines of inquiry.[22] Given the complexity, elusiveness, and volatility of Chinese politics, we should perhaps proceed on the assumption that many paths lead to Beijing.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the globalization of international relations and China's increasing involvement in global politics in the 1970's, the old dialogue of the deaf still persists between China scholars and world politics analysts. Judging from the recent books in the two fields, international relations research appears to have made some impact upon Chinese foreign policy research. But there is as yet no discernible evidence that the study of Chinese foreign policy has made any impact upon the study of international relations. The *exotica sinica* image dies hard.

In substantive terms, the current lines of inquiry have produced an uneven state of knowledge about China's role in world politics. China's bilateral relations with individual countries or regions, in particular with the two superpowers, have received thoroughgoing treatment. But China's changing relationship with the Third World as a whole (that is, as a collective global actor) constitutes a gaping hole in the literature. By and large, too, the "functional" domains of Chinese foreign policy remain unexplored. In this respect, Barnett's book, though somewhat restricted in its analytical and normative thrust, is a first major step in the right direction. But we still know little about the actual role China is playing in such realms of global politics as disarmament, human rights, information, ecology, science and technology, international law, and international regime change or construction. To suggest one specific and potentially fruitful line of research, China's participation in the protracted negotiations at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea—or its participation in the international monetary regime—could easily generate a variety of broad questions and general propositions capable of expanding the frontiers of our knowledge about China's changing role in world politics.

We live in an age of rapid change and disruption. Our normative assumptions, methodological tools, and theoretical concepts for the study of Chinese foreign policy therefore call for periodic reassessment and restructuring. Today more than ever, there is a compelling need for a more holistic conceptualization and a more comparative behavioral analysis of Chinese foreign policy. Without them, our search for China's place in the world cannot go too far. While great progress has been made in conceptually and empirically linking China's domestic and foreign policy, the same cannot be said about reciprocal interactions between Chinese foreign policy and global politics. The search for a theory that would help us better understand the elusive and changing nexus between China and the world presents a worthy challenge for future research on Chinese foreign policy.

[22] For a classic formulation of paradigm change (in the context of scientific revolutions), see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd enlarged ed., Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1970. For a thoroughgoing critique of the dominant realist paradigm in international relations research, see Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.



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# Notes & Views

# Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981

EDITORS' NOTE: As a service to scholarship, we present, by arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, a "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts." This Checklist continues the series presented in the Hoover *Yearbook on International Affairs* (hereafter *YICA*) since 1976, and jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1982 edition of the *YICA*. We also present, for the first time, a companion "Checklist of Elements in the National Liberation Movement," prepared by Wallace Spaulding, a long-time Washington-area specialist on international Communist affairs. These two lists together comprise the political parties and movements that Moscow views as the critical elements in the world revolutionary process. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

**By Richard F. Staar**

Soviet party and state leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, announced in his speech to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) early last year, that there were Communist parties operating in 94 countries of the world.[1] Since Moscow apparently recognizes two parties in Sweden, this would mean a total of 95 parties. The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, resurrected at a congress in May 1981, presumably became a 96th Communist party to be recognized by Moscow. The Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981, that follows below enumerates these 96 parties, listing them by "country,"[2] and indicating the initials of those parties which do not go by the name "Communist Party of . . ." To the maximum extent possible, the body of the Checklist is devoted solely to these 96 parties. In a number of countries, the Moscow-recognized "Communist party" is not necessarily the most significant Marxist-Leninist group on the scene. A number of these exceptions are mentioned in the footnotes to the Checklist.

The Checklist provides information on the population of the countries, membership of the Communist parties, the parties' fortunes in the most recent elections, their

*Mr. Staar is on leave of absence for public service as US Ambassador and head of delegation to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna, Austria, from his position as a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA). A fourth, revised edition of his book* Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe *has just appeared.*

[1] Brezhnev's Feb. 23, 1981, speech was published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[2] In five cases, Puerto Rico, West Berlin, and three overseas departments of France (Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion), the local Communist party does not represent a sovereign country, but is still treated as an independent party by Moscow.



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legal status, and their general orientation within the world Communist movement. The population estimates are as of mid-1981.[3] Communist party membership figures listed here are either numbers reported or claimed by the given party or—where no reported

[3] The estimates were provided to the author by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce.

## CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND FRONTS

| Africa and the Middle East | Mid-1981 population (est.) | Communist party membership | Percent of vote; seats in legislature[a] | Status | Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria (PAGS) | 19,422,000 | 450 est. | (1976) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Egypt | 43,300,000 | 500 est. | (1979) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Iran (Tudeh) | 39,958,000 | 1,500 est. | — (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Iraq | 13,575,000 | 2,000 est. | — (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Israel (RAKAH) | 3,948,000 | 1,500 est. | 3.4 (1981); 4 of 120 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Jordan | 3,443,000 | 500 est. | (No elections since 1967) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Lebanon | 3,097,000[b] | 2,500 est. | — (1972); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Lesotho | 1,365,000 | Negligible | (1970 elections nullified) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Morocco (PPS) | 21,590,000 | 2,750 est. | — (1977); 1 of 264 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Nigeria (SWPP) | 79,682,000 | Unknown | (1979) | Proscribed[c] | Pro-Moscow |
| Réunion | 518,000 | 2,000 est. | —(1981); none in Paris[d] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Saudi Arabia | 9,686,000 | Negligible | (No elections scheduled) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Senegal (PIT)[e] | 5,834,000 | 1,000 est. | 1978 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| South Africa | 29,313,000 | Unknown | (1977) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Sudan | 19,312,000 | 1,500 est. | (1980) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Syria | 9,107,000 | 5,000 est. | 3.0 (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Tunisia | 6,663,000 | 100 est. | 2.1 (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| TOTAL | 309,813,000 | 21,300 | | | |

| The Americas | Mid-1981 population (est.) | Communist party membership | Percent of vote; seats in legislature[a] | Status | Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 28,130,000 | 80,000 claim | (No elections scheduled) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Bolivia | 5,490,000 | 500 est.[f] | (1980 elections voided) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Brazil | 124,800,000 | 6,000 est. | (1978)[g] | Proscribed[c] | Pro-Moscow |
| Canada | 24,200,000 | 2,500 est.[h] | 0.05 (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Chile | 11,162,000 | 20,000 est. | (Elections promised) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Colombia | 25,217,000 | 12,000 est. | 1.9 (1978); 3 of 311 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Costa Rica (PVP) | 2,332,000 | 3,200 est. | 2.7 (1978); 3 of 57 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Cuba | 9,800,000 | 434,000 claim | — (1981); all of 499 | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Dominican Republic | 5,855,000 | 4,500 est.[i] | — (1978); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Ecuador | 8,275,000 | 1,000 est. | 3.2 (1979); none[j] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| El Salvador | 4,610,000 | 800 est.[k] | (1976) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Guadeloupe | 304,000 | 3,000 est. | 38.6 (1981); 1 of 3 In Paris[d] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Guatemala (PGT) | 7,310,000 | 750 est. | (1974) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Guyana (PPP) | 857,000 | Unknown | 20.4 (1980); 10 of 65 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Haiti (PUCH) | 5,923,000 | 350 est. | (1973) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Honduras | 3,940,000 | 1,500 est. | (1980) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Jamaica (WPJ) | 2,268,000 | Unknown | — (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Martinique | 302,000 | 1,000 est. | 6.4 (1981); none in Paris[d] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Mexico (PUSM) | 69,100,000 | 112,000 claim | 5.4 (1979); 18 of 400[l] | Legal | Independent |
| Nicaragua (PSN)[m] | 2,559,000 | 250 est. | (Election promised, 1985) | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Panama (PPP) | 1,928,000 | 550 est. | — (1978); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Paraguay | 3,268,000 | 3,500 est. | (1973) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Peru | 18,119,000 | 3,000 est.[n] | 2.8 (1980); 4 seats[o] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Puerto Rico[p] | 3,258,000 | 125 est. | — (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| United States | 229,700,000 | 11,000 est. | 0.01 (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Uruguay | 2,944,000 | 7,000 est. | (No elections since 1971) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Venezuela | 17,913,000 | 4,500 est. | 1.4 (1978); 1 of 195[q] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| TOTAL | 619,554,000 | 713,025 | | | |



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| Asia and the Pacific | Mid-1981 population (est.) | Communist party membership | Percentage of votes; seats in legislature[a] | Status | Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia (SPA)[r] | 14,800,000 | 1,500 est. | —(1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Bangladesh | 90,680,000 | 2,500 est. | — (1979); 1 of 300 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Burma (BCP—White Flag) | 35,289,000 | 3,000 claim | (1978) | Proscribed | Pro-Beijing |
| China | 1,041,500,000 | 39,000,000 claim | — (1981); all of 3,202 | In power | Pro-Beijing |
| India[s] | 692,400,000 | 150,000 est. | 2.6 (1980); 11 of 525 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Indonesia[t] | 154,300,000 | 50 est. | (1977) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Japan | 117,700,000 | 440,000 claim | 10.4 (1980); 29 of 511 | Legal | Independent |
| Kampuchea (KPRP)[u] | 5,774,000 | 5,000 est. | 99.0 (1981); all of 117 | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Laos (LPRP) | 3,518,000 | 15,000 claim | (No legislature) | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Malaysia | 14,330,000 | 3,000 est.[v] | (1978) | Proscribed | Pro-Beijing |
| Mongolia | 1,700,000 | 76,000 claim | 99.0 (1977); all 354 | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Nepal | 15,338,000 | 1,500 est.[w] | — (1981); none[x] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| New Zealand (SUP)[y] | 3,117,000 | 200 est. | 0.5 (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| North Korea (KWP) | 19,000,000 | 2,000,000 claim | 100.0 (1977); all of 579 | In power | Independent |
| Pakistan | 90,439,000 | 300 est. | (1979 elections postponed) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Philippines[z] | 50,100,000 | 200 est. | (1978) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| Sri Lanka | 15,172,000 | 6,000 est. | 1.9 (1977); none[aa] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Thailand | 48,787,000 | 1,000 est.[bb] | (1979) | Proscribed | Pro-Beijing[cc] |
| Vietnam | 55,100,000 | 1,480,000 est. | 97.9 (1981); all 538 | In power | Pro-Moscow[dd] |
| TOTAL | 2,469,226,000 | 43,185,250 | | | |

| Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union | Mid-1981 population (est.) | Communist party membership | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a] | Status | Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania (APL) | 2,700,000 | 122,600 claim | 99.9 (1978); all 250 to Democratic Front | In power | Independent |
| Bulgaria | 8,900,000 | 825,876 claim | 99.9 (1976); all 400 to Fatherland Front | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Czechoslovakia | 15,300,000 | 1,538,179 claim | 99.9 (1981); all 350 to National Front | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| East Germany (SED) | 16,800,000 | 2,172,110 claim | 99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Hungary (HSWP) | 10,700,000 | 812,000 claim | 99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Poland (PUWP) | 35,900,000 | 2,734,000 claim | 99.5 (1980); all 460 to National Unity Front | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Romania | 22,400,000 | 3,004,336 claim | 98.5 (1980); all 369 to Socialist Unity Front | In power | Independent[ee] |
| USSR | 267,900,000 | 17,480,000 claim | 99.9 (1979); all 1,500 | In power | Pro-Moscow |
| Yugoslavia (LCY) | 22,500,000 | 2,199,444 claim | — (1978); all 308 to Socialist Alliance | In power | Independent |
| TOTAL | 403,100,000 | 30,888,545 | | | |

| Western Europe | Mid-1981 population (est.) | Communist party membership | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a] | Status | Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 7,509,000 | 25,000 est. | 0.96 (1979); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Belgium | 9,900,000 | 10,000 est. | 2.3 (1981); 2 of 212 | Legal | Independent |
| Cyprus (AKEL) | 636,000 | 12,000 est. | 32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Denmark | 5,100,000 | 9,000 est. | 1.2 (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Finland | 4,798,000 | 47,000 est. | 17.9 (1979); 35 of 200 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| France | 54,000,000 | 500,000 est. | 16.2 (1981); 44 of 491 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Great Britain | 56,000,000 | 18,500 claim | 0.05 (1979); none | Legal | Independent |
| Greece[ff] | 9,671,000 | 33,500 est. | 10.9 (1981); 13 of 300 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Iceland (AB)[gg] | 231,000 | 2,200 est. | 19.7 (1979); 11 of 60 | Legal | Isolationist |



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| Western Europe (cont.) | Mid-1981 population (est.) | Communist party membership | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[a] | Status | Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ireland | 3,400,000 | 500 est. | — (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Italy | 57,200,000 | 1,715,890 claim | 30.4 (1979); 201 of 630 | Legal | Independent |
| Luxembourg | 400,000 | 600 est. | 5.0 (1979); 2 of 59[hh] | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Malta | 370,000 | 150 est. | — (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Netherlands | 14,200,000 | 13,000 est. | 2.1 (1981); 3 of 150 | Legal | Independent |
| Norway[ii] | 4,100,000 | 500 est. | — (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Portugal | 9,996,000 | 187,000 claim | 16.7 (1980); 41 of 250 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| San Marino | 22,000 | 300 est. | 25.0 (1978); 16 of 60[hh] | Legal | Independent |
| Spain | 37,700,000 | 140,000 est. | 10.6 (1979); 23 of 350[hh] | Legal | Independent |
| Sweden (VPK) | 8,324,000 | 18,000 claim | 5.6 (1979); 23 of 349[ii] | Legal | Independent |
| (APK) | | Unknown | — (1979); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Switzerland (PdA) | 6,390,000 | 5,000 est. | 1.5 (1979); 3 of 200 | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| Turkey | 46,700,000 | Negligible | (1977) | Proscribed | Pro-Moscow |
| West Germany | 61,666,000 | 48,856 claim | 0.2 (1980); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| West Berlin (SEW)[kk] | 1,894,000 | 7,000 est. | 0.7 (1981); none | Legal | Pro-Moscow |
| TOTAL | 400,207,000 | 2,793,996 | | | |
| **Grand Total** | **4,201,900,000** | **77,602,116** | | | |

| Soviet international front organizations | Year founded | Headquarters | Claimed membership | Number of affiliates | Countries[ll] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization | 1957 | Cairo | No data | 87 | |
| Christian Peace Conference | 1958 | Prague | No data | | At least 80 |
| International Association of Democratic Lawyers | 1946 | Brussels | Ca. 25,000 | | Nearly 80 |
| International Organization of Journalists | 1946 | Prague | Over 180,000 | | Over 120 |
| International Union of Students | 1946 | Prague | Over 10,000,000 | Ca. 118 | |
| Women's International Democratic Federation | 1945 | East Berlin | Over 200,000,000 | 129 | 114 |
| World Federation of Democratic Youth | 1945 | Budapest | Over 150,000,000 | Over 250 | Over 100 |
| World Federation of Scientific Workers | 1946 | Paris | Ca. 450,000 | Ca. 33 | |
| World Federation of Trade Unions | 1945 | Prague | Ca. 200,000,000 | Ca. 71 | |
| World Peace Council | 1949 | Helsinki | No data | Over 135 | |

[a] A dash "—" indicates that the vote percentage was not available. The date of the latest election (through December 1981) is indicated in parentheses.
[b] No allowance is made for the possible impact of civil war on the population.
[c] "Proscribed" is not an entirely satisfactory term; the local Communist party may more accurately be said to fail to meet constitutional requirements for participation in national elections.
[d] An overseas department of France, entitled to elect three deputies to the French National Assembly.
[e] The PIT is the renamed and legalized former clandestine branch of the PAI; it continues to enjoy Moscow's recognition.
[f] The PCB is only one of a number of leftist organizations; others include the PCB—Marxist-Leninist, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Revolutionary Party of Bolivian Workers, and various Trotskyist groupings.
[g] At least five Communists were elected under other party labels.
[h] Membership estimate is for all leftist groups, the pro-Beijing CPC—Marxist-Leninist being stronger than the CPC electorally, getting 0.13 percent of the vote in 1980.
[i] The membership estimate is for all of a dozen or so Marxist groups.
[j] The Maoist radical MPD won 4.8 percent of the vote and one seat.
[k] Membership estimate is for combined political and guerrilla strength of the PCES. This party is one of five leftist groupings comprising the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front conducting civil war against the El Salvadoran government.
[l] The 5.4 percent figure reflects more recent data than available last year. The Mexican CP won 18 of 400 (not 300) seats in 1979.
[m] This party restricts its activities to the domestic scene. The Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) represents Nicaragua at Communist meetings abroad. The pro-Beijing Communist Party of Nicaragua claims 1,200 members.
[n] Pro-Beijing groups total another 1,500 members. Also, there are other Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist parties.
[o] The data are for the United Left—an electoral coalition of the Peruvian Communist Party-Unidad and the Socialist Revolutionary Party—which won two seats in the Senate and two seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
[p] The Puerto Rican Socialist Party is also pro-Moscow and about the same size as the PCP.
[q] Overall, the Venezuelan Left garnered 9.0 percent of the vote in 1978. The Movement to Socialism (MAS) won 11 seats; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), 4; the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), 3; the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1; and the Communist Vanguard, 1. The slight change in the 1978 vote percentage for the Venezuelan CP from that reported last year reflects the interpretation by the *Yearbook* contributor of conflicting published data.
[r] The independent Communist Party of Australia has an estimated 2,000 members.
[s] The independent Communist Party (Marxist) has an estimated 100,000 members. In the 1980 elections, it won 6.2 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the Lok Sabha.
[t] A pro-Beijing faction numbers an estimated 250 members, mostly in exile.



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**Checklist footnotes (continued)**

[u] The KPRP, which at a "Fourth" Congress in May 1981 resurrected an organization forced underground in the early 1960's, is not to be confused with the pro-Beijing Kampuchean Communist Party and guerrilla forces associated with Pol Pot, which continue to fight a guerrilla war against the Hanoi-backed KPRP regime.

[v] The membership estimate is a combined total for party members and guerrilla forces in Malaya. There is also evidence of a 200-member pro-Beijing Communist Party of North Kalimantan in Northern Borneo.

[w] The membership estimate is a combined total for all Communist parties, including pro-Chinese.

[x] Under terms of December 1980 constitutional adjustments, the 1981 elections to the National Assembly were on a nonpartisan basis.

[y] The pro-Beijing Communist Party of New Zealand has an estimated 300 members and is legal.

[z] The pro-Beijing Communist Party of the Philippines—Marxist-Leninist has an estimated 3,000 members and is proscribed.

[aa] In a January 1981 by-election, the SLCP won one seat in the 168-member parliament.

[bb] There are also an estimated 10,000 insurgents in the pro-Beijing Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces.

[cc] There are indications student intellectuals and lower-level party officials are advocating a more pro-Vietnam, pro-Moscow orientation.

[dd] The VCP possibly showed a degree of independence from Moscow by attending the 8th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor in November 1981.

[ee] Romania's "independence" vis-à-vis Moscow within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is clearly relative and may be moderating under the impact of increasing economic dependence on the USSR.

[ff] The independent KKE-Interior claims some 4,800 members.

[gg] The People's Alliance (AB) is a coalition of leftist elements in which organized Communists are dominant.

[hh] Disparity between the vote percentage reported here and that reported last year reflects the interpretation by the *Yearbook* contributor regarding conflicting published data.

[ii] The Norwegian Communist Party is the weakest of Norway's three leftist parties. The Socialist Left Party, with an estimated 2,000 members, is the largest; in 1981, it polled 4.9 percent of the votes and won 4 of 155 seats. The third party is the pro-Beijing Workers' Communist Party.

[jj] Three of these seats were garnered in by-elections since the 1979 polling.

[kk] Western observers consider the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) to be a subsidiary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany.

[ll] In some cases, countries are represented by individuals rather than by affiliated associations.

SOURCES: Population estimates are from the Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce. Figures on membership claimed are from party newspapers, journals, or radio broadcasts. Membership estimates, vote percentages and seats in legislature, and information on party legal status and orientation are from the individual party profiles provided by contributors to Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982, and/or US Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook, 1982,* Washington, DC, 1982 (in draft). Figures for the Soviet front organizations are from last year's Checklist as updated by information in *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 27, 1981; *New Times* (Moscow), No. 51, 1980; World Peace Council, *List of Members 1980–1983,* Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., p. 2; and *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, pp. 121–22.

figures are available or where claims seem exaggerated—estimates by contributors to the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs.* In a few cases, the information on party membership is so sketchy that the best that can be provided is a rough estimate for *all* "Communist" groups, whether recognized by Moscow or not.

The total worldwide membership for all the Communist parties recognized by Moscow reportedly is "more than 77 million."[4] This figure obviously includes—despite the estrangement between Moscow and Beijing—the 39 million members claimed by the Chinese Communist Party.[5] It is interesting to compare this global figure with the total in the current Checklist, 77.6 million—itself an increase from the 76.7 million estimated in the 1980 checklist published last spring.

At the end of 1981, Communists ruled the same number of countries as at the end of 1980 (16, a figure which excludes Afghanistan). The Communist parties are proscribed or not certified for participation in elections in 25 countries (10 in Latin America, 8 in Africa and the Middle East, 6 in Asia and the Pacific, and 1 in Western Europe). The overwhelming majority of the parties remain pro-Moscow in orientation. Some 25 of these parties—plus a new Suriname party—held congresses during 1981 (see Table 1 on page 76).

Looking at trends by region, we find that the situation in Africa and the Middle East remains essentially unchanged. In the case of Senegal, membership estimates were decreased to reflect the fact that Moscow had recognized the smaller clandestine (rather than the less radical, legal) branch of the African Independence Party (PAI). The Moscow-recognized group has recently renamed itself the Party of Independent Labor (PIT) and now also enjoys legal status. In general, information on Communist parties in these regions is difficult to obtain.

In the Americas, the estimated total increased some 7,000 from the 1980 Checklist. Increases in estimates occurred for Argentina, Canada, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Decreases are noted in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (In a number of cases, the decline reflects not so much a change in Communist fortunes as a tightening of definitions to include, wherever possible, estimated memberships of Soviet-recognized movements only.)

Turning to Asia and the Pacific, it should be noted that Afghanistan has not been included in the 1981 Checklist. Although Moscow sees the country as being socialist in orientation, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has not yet been accorded the honor of acceptance among the parties recognized by Moscow as "Commu-

[4] See Boris Vesnin, "The Communists and Peace, Détente, Disarmament," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 49, December 1981.

[5] Reported by Hu Yaobang, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman, in a speech on July 1, 1981, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Broadcast in English by Beijing Xinhua on July 1, 1981, and transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), July 1, 1981, p. K/51.



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nist."[6] Similarly, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), not recognized by Moscow, has been excluded from the totals here. The Moscow-recognized Communist Party of India makes a highly inflated claim of 466,483 members,[7] but non-Communist estimates are about 150,000. The Chinese movement reportedly gained 1 million members over the past year. Estimates for the movements in Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam have been lowered. New figures released by North Korea show an increase. On balance, but for the increase in China, the total for the region as a whole would have remained relatively stable.

**Table 1. Communist Party Congresses in 1981**[a]

| Country[b] | Number of congress | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Albania (APL) | 8th | Nov. 1–7 |
| Argentina | 9th National Conference[c] | June |
| Australia (SPA) | 4th | Oct. 2 |
| Bulgaria | 12th | Mar. 31–Apr. 4 |
| Czechoslovakia | 16th | Apr. 6–10 |
| East Germany (SED) | 10th | Apr. 11–16 |
| Ecuador | 10th | Nov. 26–29 |
| Finland | 19th | May 22–24 |
| Great Britain | 37th | Nov. 14–17 |
| Iceland (AB) | Conference | Nov. 20–22 |
| Israel (RAKAH) | 19th | Feb. 11–14 |
| Jamaica (WPJ) | 2nd | Dec. 18–21 |
| Kampuchea (KPRP) | 4th[d] | May 26–29 |
| Mexico (CPM) | 19th | Mar. 9–14 |
| | 20th | Oct. 15 |
| (PUSM) | National Unification Assembly | Nov. 5–7 |
| Mongolia (MPRP) | 18th | May 26–31 |
| Nicaragua (PSN) | 12th | July 3 |
| Norway | 17th | Dec. 4–6 |
| Poland (PUWP) | 9th, Extraordinary | July 14–20 |
| Réunion | Special | Mar. 29 |
| Senegal (PIT) | Constituent | ca. Aug. 8 |
| Spain | 10th | July 28–31 |
| Suriname[e] | Founding | July 24 |
| Sweden (VPK) | 26th | Nov. 20–24 |
| USSR | 26th | Feb. 23–Mar. 3 |
| West Germany | 6th | May 29–31 |
| West Berlin (SEW) | 6th | May 15 |

[a] Five Communist party congresses held during 1980 were omitted from the listing of congresses in that year published in the March-April 1981 issue of *Problems of Communism*, because the information became available after that issue went to press. These were the CP of San Marino (10th Congress, Dec. 6–7, 1980), the CP of Sri Lanka (11th Congress, Mar. 26–30), the CP of Syria (5th Congress, May 29–31), the CP of Venezuela (6th Congress, Aug. 8–11), and the APK in Sweden (26th Congress, Apr. 4–7).

[b] Where the local party is not named "Communist Party of . . .," initials of the party name are provided in parentheses.

[c] This conference was "tantamount to a congress" according to *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, p. 27.

[d] The newly constituted KPRP, by calling this congress its "Fourth," laid claim to the heritage of a like-named organization that was driven underground in the early 1960's.

[e] This party was formed by a merger of a rudimentary Suriname Communist organization and the Revolutionary Liberation Movement of Suriname. See *De Ware Tijd* (Paramaribo), July 10, 1981, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Latin America Report* (Arlington, VA), No. 2363 (JPRS 78906), Sept. 3, 1981, p. 90. It is too early to determine the legal status or orientation of this party, and there has been no indication of whether or not it is recognized by the Soviet Communist Party.

All of the East European ruling parties except those in Czechoslovakia and Poland claimed slight membership gains. In December, the Polish United Workers' Party reported a decline of 415,000 members between June 30, 1980, and December 1, 1981—a drop of some 13 percent.[8] Imposition of martial law apparently has brought more resignations (and expulsions), although no comprehensive information has been published.

In Western Europe, the largest gains were claimed by the Portuguese Communist Party (plus 23,000 members). By contrast, the Italian party's claimed membership is down nearly 100,000, and the French party is estimated to have lost a similar number of members, despite the PCF's very recent claim to have increased its membership to 710,000.[9] The figures for the Spanish Communist party are probably inflated. For one, they do not allow for potential defections by the Catalan and Basque organizations; moreover, growing estrangement between Moscow and Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo may lead to formation of a significant pro-Moscow rump within the PCE. For all of Western Europe, there was an estimated net loss of about 160,000.

A final item in the Checklist is a listing of major international Communist front organizations. Only the 10 most important ones have been mentioned. Several fronts included in the 1980 list (the International Federation of Resistance Fighters, the International Institute for Peace, and the International Radio and TV Organization) have been excluded inasmuch as they are basically regional organizations.

[6] Although the 1982 *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs* includes profiles on Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Mozambique, and South Yemen, none of the ruling parties in these countries are recognized as "Communist" by Moscow, and hence they have been left off the Checklist.

These and a variety of other parties, fronts, and movements are listed in the Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement" that follows the Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts—Eds.

[7] See *World Marxist Review* (London), December 1981, p. 46.

[8] *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Dec. 10, 1981.

[9] Secretary General Georges Marchais's report to the 24th Congress of the French Communist Party on Feb. 4, 1982, as reported in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Feb. 4, 1982.



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# Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"

## By Wallace Spaulding

The "national liberation movement" comprises, in the eyes of Soviet theoreticians, the third most important component in the "world revolutionary process,"[1] exceeded in importance only by the "world socialist system"[2] (the 16 *countries* ruled by Communist parties) and the "revolutionary movement of the working class in capitalist countries"[3] (some 80 Communist *parties* recognized by the Soviets in non-Communist countries). These last two are treated in the preceding Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts.

The "national liberation movement" is clearly a more complex phenomenon from the Soviet standpoint. Indeed, Soviet terminology to deal with it has altered over time, and Soviet analysts do not always make explicit exactly which entities fall into specific categories at any given time. To discern the elements of the movement, one must plow through a mass of Soviet theoretical writings and also turn to such indicators as participation of various parties or movements in congresses of certain ruling Communist parties and in the activities of both *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the official Soviet-line theoretical monthly of 63 Communist parties) and Communist front organizations. The results of such an effort, which perforce cannot claim to be comprehensive, are offered in the Checklist below.

The national liberation movement includes, first of all, "revolutionary democratic parties" and the "countries of socialist orientation" which they rule. The latter are said to be the "vanguard" of the national liberation movement.[4] Such countries differ from Communist ones in that they have not definitively left the "world capitalist system," even though the *national* economy in the majority of them is dominated by the state sector.[5]

As is evident from the accompanying listing, the vast majority of the revolutionary democratic parties operate in Africa and the Middle East. Boris Ponomarëv, writing in 1971, by and large excluded Latin America when discussing the national liberation movement, on the grounds that (in contrast to Africa and non-Communist Asia) the region had "a relatively developed capitalism," a strong and experienced working class, a long history of revolutionary struggle, and Communist parties in all countries.[6] There are, however, as we shall note below, parties and movements in Latin America which do seem to be included under the broad umbrella of the world "national liberation movement."

Although Communist parties often exist in countries having revolutionary democratic parties, it is the latter that are treated by Soviet writers as the distinctive pro-

[1] K. Maydanik and G. Mirskiy, "The National Liberation Struggle: The Current Stage," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEMO*), No. 6, June 1981, as translated in US Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs* (Arlington, VA—hereafter, *JPRS/UPSA*), No. 1171 (JPRS 78972), Sept. 14, 1981, p. 18; N. N. Inozemtsev, "A Revolutionary Step for Millions," *Knizhnoye obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 8, Feb. 20, 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1126 (JPRS 77897), Apr. 22, 1981, p. 11; V. Zagladin, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnoye kommunisticheskoye dvizheniye: ocherk strategii i taktiki* (The International Communist Movement: Sketch of Strategy and Tactics), Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, as trans. by US Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 57044, Sept. 18, 1972; and M. Mitin, "A Doctrine Which Is Transforming the World," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 20, 1974, p. 4.

[2] Mitin, loc. cit., pp. 1, 4; Zagladin, op. cit., p. 47; and Moscow TASS, Jan. 23, 1982.

[3] Zagladin, op. cit., p. 59; Mitin, loc. cit., p. 4; Ye. Kuskov, "The Most Active and Influential Force," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 17, November 1972, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *Kommunist* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS/Kommunist*), JPRS 57988, Jan. 16, 1973, p. 107; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

[4] R. A. Ulyanovskiy, "Great October and Revolutionary Process in Asian and African Countries," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 2, 1977, trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Arlington, VA), JPRS 69699, Aug. 30, 1977, p. 15.

[5] A. Kiva, "Socialist Orientation: Some Problems of Theory and Practice," *MEMO*, No. 10, October 1976.

[6] B. Ponomarëv, "Topical Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Process," *Kommunist*, No. 15, October 1971, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 54571, Nov. 29, 1971, pp. 70, 75.

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## Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement": Indicators of Participation

| | Attendance | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia), Dec. 78 | Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Socialist Unity Party (E. Berlin), Oct. 80 | 26th Congress, Communist Party of Soviet Union (speaking order, main sessions), Feb.-Mar. 81 | 12th Congress, Bulgarian Communist Party, Mar. 81 | 10th Congress, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany), Apr. 81 | Work conference, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Nov. 81 | Last article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* | Has members on the World Peace Council[a] |
| **"REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES** | | | | | | | | |
| **Of which:** | | | | | | | | |
| **"Vanguard" revolutionary democratic parties:** | | | | | | | | |
| People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan | — | x | 15 | x | x | x | Sept. 81 | PC |
| Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party | — | x | 19 | x | x | x | June 76 | VP |
| Benin People's Revolutionary Party | — | — | x | x | x | x | — | (PC) |
| Congolese Labor Party | x | x | 36 | x | x | x | Apr. 81 | PC |
| Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia | x | x | 18 | x | x | x | Apr. 78[b] | VP |
| Mozambique Liberation Front | x | x | 26 | x | x | x | June 76 | PC |
| Yemen Socialist Party | x | x | 22 | x | x | — | Sept. 81 | PC |
| **Other revolutionary democratic parties:** | | | | | | | | |
| Algerian National Liberation Front | — | — | 27 | x | x | — | — | (PC) |
| Burmese Socialist Program Party | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Democratic Party of Guinea | — | — | x | x | x | x | Aug. 76 | VP |
| African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands[c] | — | x | x | x | x | — | May 76 | PC |
| Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee for the Malagasy Socialist Revolution (AKFM-KDRSM) | — | x | x | x | x | x | Jan. 81 | VP |
| Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe | — | — | x | x | x | — | — | (M) |
| Seychelles People's Progressive Front | — | x | x | — | — | — | — | (M) |
| Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Syria | — | x | 24 | x | x | — | — | VP |
| Revolutionary Party of Tanzania | — | — | x | x | x | — | May 78 | (M) |
| **Possible revolutionary democratic parties:** | | | | | | | | |
| New Jewel Movement of Grenada[d] | — | x | x | x | x | — | Sept. 80 | — |
| Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua | — | — | 32 | x | x | — | July 81 | PC |
| **LIBERATION MOVEMENTS PROPER** | | | | | | | | |
| **Of which:** | | | | | | | | |
| **Unitary:** | | | | | | | | |
| National Liberation Front of Bahrain | x | x | x | x | — | x | Oct. 78 | M |
| Southwest African People's Organization (Namibia) | — | x | x | x | x | — | July 81 | PC |
| Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman | — | x | — | — | — | — | — | M |
| African National Congress (South Africa) | — | x | x | x | x | — | Mar. 80 | VP |
| POLISARIO Front (Western Sahara) | — | x | — | — | — | — | — | M |



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| | Attendance | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Bulgarian Communist Party (Sofia), Dec. 78 | Conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*/Socialist Unity Party (E. Berlin), Oct. 80 | 26th Congress, Communist Party of Soviet Union (speaking order, main sessions), Feb.-Mar. 81 | 12th Congress, Bulgarian Communist Party, Mar. 81 | 10th Congress, Socialist Unity Party (East Germany), Apr. 81 | Work conference, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Nov. 81 | Last article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* | Has members on the World Peace Council[a] |
| **United front:** | | | | | | | | |
| Coordinating Body of Revolutionary Mass Organizations/Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador) | — | x | — | — | x | — | July 81 | (M) |
| Association of Revolutionary Organizations of Guatemala | — | x | — | — | — | — | Mar. 81 | (M) |
| Palestine Liberation Organization | — | x | x | x | x | — | July 76 | VP |
| **OTHER "SOCIALIST-ORIENTED" PARTIES** | | | | | | | | |
| **Of which:** | | | | | | | | |
| **Ruling:** | | | | | | | | |
| Unity and National Progress Party (Burundi) | — | x | x | — | x | — | — | — |
| People's National Congress (Guyana) | — | x | x | — | x | — | — | PC |
| Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Iraq | — | — | — | x | x | — | — | — |
| General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamhiriyah | — | x | x | x | x | — | — | PC |
| Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution[e] | — | x | — | — | — | — | — | (M?)[e] |
| Democratic Union of the Mali People | — | x | x | x | x | — | — | PC |
| All-People's Congress of Sierra Leone | — | x | x | — | x | — | — | PC |
| Uganda People's Congress | — | — | — | — | x | — | — | — |
| United National Independence Party (Zambia) | — | x | x | x | x | — | — | PC |
| Zimbabwe African National Union[f] | — | x | — | x | — | — | — | VP[f] |
| **Nonruling:** | | | | | | | | |
| National People's Party of Bangladesh | — | — | x | x | x | — | — | (PC) |
| MAPU Worker-Peasant Party of Chile | — | x | x | x | x | — | Jan. 76 | — |
| Chilean Socialist Party | — | x | x | x | x | — | — | PC |
| National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt | — | — | x | x | — | — | May 75 | VP |
| People's National Party of Jamaica[d] | — | — | x | — | — | — | — | (PC) |
| Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)[d] | — | — | x | x | x | — | — | PC |
| Socialist Revolutionary Party (Peru) | — | x | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Socialist Party of Puerto Rico | — | x | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Socialist Party of Uruguay | — | x | — | — | — | — | — | PC |

[a] Key to symbols: VP—Vice President and member of the WPC's Presidential Committee; PC—member of Presidential Committee; M—member of World Peace Council. Where symbol is in parentheses, the country is allocated the indicated position, but no incumbent is currently identified; it is only assumed that a member of the party in question will be named to the slot.

[b] At the time, COPWE had not been created; the organization represented was the Provisional Military Administrative Council, then and still the actual ruling body in Ethiopia.

[c] Since the overthrow of Guinea-Bissau's Luis Cabral in November 1980, it appears that two separate parties are emerging from PAIGC, one in the Cape Verde Islands, the other in Guinea-Bissau. It is not clear how Moscow views these developments.

[d] Is a member of the democratic Socialist International.

[e] The dominant group in Madagascar's ruling coalition. No slot is indicated for this party in the WPC, although the listing is said to be incomplete, leaving open the possibility that a representative from this party could be added to those from its junior coalition partner, the AKFM-KDRSM.

[f] Moscow long supported the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) over ZANU, and indeed ZAPU remains the country's representative on the WPC. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo was published in the February issue of *World Marxist Review*, and is a vice president of the WPC. It remains to be seen how Nkomo's removal from Zimbabwe's government in early 1982 will affect Moscow's attitudes toward ZANU.

SOURCES: For the 1978 meeting in Sofia, *World Marxist Review* (London), February 1979, p. 3. For the 1980 meeting in East Berlin, ibid., December 1980, pp. 23–24. For the 26th CPSU Congress, Moscow TASS, Feb. 20–21, 1980; Radio Moscow, Feb. 19 and 22, and Mar. 6, 1981; *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 20 and 23, and Mar. 5 and 7, 1981. For the Bulgarian party congress, *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Apr. 1, 1981. For the East German party congress, East Berlin, ADN, Apr. 11, 1981. For the November 1981 conference, *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1981. For the WPC, World Peace Council, *List of Members 1980–1983*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., and *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 3, 1981, p. 2.



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gressive elements of Africa and non-Communist Asia.[7] The revolutionary democratic parties are said to differ from Communist ones in that they reflect multiclass interests and fail to have a uniformly cohesive doctrine and discipline.[8] But, while these parties are generally regarded by Soviet writers to be dominated by "petit-bourgeois" and other non-working class elements,[9] virtually all have acquired at least some Marxists, according to Soviet Afro-Asian specialist A. Kiva.[10]

In discussions of revolutionary democratic parties, Soviet writers single out for special attention seven that come closer than the others to being "genuine" Communist parties.[11] These "vanguard" or "elite" revolutionary democratic parties—in Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen—have stricter class and ideological requirements for membership than do others and have openly declared their commitment to "scientific socialism" (as the Soviets term Moscow's brand of socialism).[12] According to one writer, this elite group, exercising "people's democratic" power, generally took the "noncapitalist" path of transition to socialism in the 1970's.[13]

The activities of these "vanguard" parties and the way they are treated by the CPSU highlight their special place in the national liberation movement. These seven (plus the Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee for the Malagasy Socialist Revolution—AKFM-KDRSM) were the only revolutionary democratic parties to attend a conference in November 1981 on the work of the magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.[14] Leaders from each of the seven, except the Benin People's Revolutionary Party, were accorded the privilege of addressing a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress in February-March 1981, an honor extended to leaders of only 26 of the 83 regular foreign Communist parties in attendance. Moreover, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen were the only non-Communist countries except Grenada to vote with the Soviet Union in the United Nations (UN) in January 1980 on the Afghanistan question. The same five attended the June 1980 and July 1981 sessions of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as observers, and they signed friendship treaties with the USSR between 1976 and 1979 (the Congo signed a similar treaty in May 1981).

Nine other parties are currently (as of mid-1981) stated by Soviet experts to be "revolutionary democratic" (see the Checklist).[15] These differ from the "vanguard" parties in this category in that the degree of organization of the ruling party is deemed less advanced. The nine parties vary in their closeness to Moscow. Syria's Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party appears the most pro-Soviet: the state it rules signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in October 1980; and the party, together with Algeria's FLN, was granted the distinction of having its representative address a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress. Similarly, the AKFM-KDRSM of Madagascar, while only a junior member of its country's ruling coalition, seems to lean strongly toward Moscow (as evidenced by the party's aforementioned involvement in the conference of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and by Madagascar's signing of a friendship treaty with Moscow in June 1979). At the other extreme is the largely isolationist Burmese Socialist Program Party.

There may be some basis for including two other ruling parties—the New Jewel Movement of Grenada and the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua—among the revolutionary democratic movements, although the Soviets have not publicly done so. As noted above, Grenada was the only other non-Communist country to join the "vanguard" revolutionary democracies in supporting the Soviet position in the January 1980 UN debate on Afghanistan. Also, in September 1980, a New Jewel spokesman was published in *World Marxist Review* (the London edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), a distinction enjoyed by each of the "vanguard" revolutionary democratic

[7] Zagladin, op. cit., pp. 199–205, 225–29; V. G. Solodovnikov et al., Eds., *Politicheskiye partii Afriki* (Political Parties of Africa), Moscow, n.p., 1970, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 52950, Apr. 23, 1971, pp. 169–70.

[8] A. Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation: Some Aspects of Their Political Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1973, p. 32; Zagladin, op. cit., p. 255; Solodovnikov et al., op. cit., p. 75; G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of Correlation of Forces in the World," *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1974, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 61776, Apr. 17, 1974, p. 100.

[9] A. Belskiy, "The National Liberation Movement: Laws and Prospects," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1975, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA—hereafter *JPRS/UMA*), No. 1137 (JPRS 64667), Apr. 30, 1975, p. 45; Zagladin, op. cit., pp. 79, 206; and Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation . . . ," pp. 33, 35–36.

[10] Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation . . . ," p. 37.

[11] Ye. Primakov, "The Law of Uneven Development and the Historical Fate of Liberated Countries," *MEMO*, No. 12, December 1980, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1129 (JPRS 77924), Apr. 24, 1981, p. 21; Y. N. Gavrilov, "Problems of the Formation of Vanguard Parties in Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1980, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1111 (JPRS 77660), Mar. 24, 1981, p. 2; and V. Li, "Social Revolution in Afro-Asian Countries and Scientific Socialism," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 3, March 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1150 (JPRS 78507), July 14, 1981, p. 12.

[12] Venyamin Chirkin, in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 4, July-August 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1180 (JPRS 79176), Oct. 8, 1981, pp. 4–5; V. Li, loc. cit.

[13] Ye. Primakov, "Countries of a Socialist Orientation: Difficult but Feasible Transition to Socialism," *MEMO*, No. 7, July 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1185 (JPRS 79272) Oct. 22, 1981, p. 12. Primakov draws a distinction between the contemporary "revolutionary democratic" parties and parties of a more conservative, less mass-based nature which in the 1960's were seen as having taken the road to scientific socialism. He refers to the latter as "national revolutionary" regimes.

[14] *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1981.

[15] See, for example, Chirkin, loc. cit., pp. 4–8; and N. D. Kosukhin, "Development Trends of the Countries of a Socialist Orientation," *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), No. 4, July-August 1981, as trans. in *JPRS/UPSA*, No. 1197 (JPRS 79561), Dec. 1, 1981, p. 65.



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parties except that of Benin, but by less than half of the "other" revolutionary democratic parties (see Checklist). As for the Sandinistas, "revolutionary democratic" status might be inferred from two things: (1) their representative was permitted to address a main session of the 26th CPSU Congress, a privilege otherwise reserved only for important Communist and revolutionary democratic parties, and (2) like Algeria's FLN, the Sandinistas have replaced the local national Communist party as Nicaragua's sole representative at foreign Communist party congresses (see Checklist). In August 1980, an authoritative Soviet-line source identified Nicaragua and Grenada as the sole countries, other than Cuba, to have "taken the road of building a new society in Latin America."[16]

The relatively high degree of organization of the revolutionary democratic parties is often evidenced through the institution of party congresses—although holding of "congresses" does not of itself indicate a well-developed party structure, as suggested by the very title of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). A listing of recent congresses is provided in Table 1.

There are no convenient Soviet listings of other ruling and nonruling groupings that Moscow considers to comprise part of the world "national liberation movement." Nevertheless, one can discern certain categories of parties or movements other than the revolutionary democratic parties which seem to figure in the movement as Moscow conceives it.

One such grouping consists of "liberation movements" proper. That the Soviets use this as a separate category was evidenced in the listing of groups attending an October 1980 conference cosponsored by *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.[17] As can be seen from the Checklist, these can be subdivided into those that are single (or unitary) and those that operate as "united fronts." The five unitary liberation movements listed in the Checklist participate in Communist-sponsored meetings, and four of them (all except the Bahrain National Liberation Front) serve as the organizational affiliate from their respective countries on the World Peace Council,[18] which is regarded by the Soviets as the most important of the international Communist

**Table 1. Congresses of Revolutionary Democratic Parties in 1980–81**

| | Number of congress | Dates |
|---|---|---|
| **In 1980:** | | |
| Ethiopia (COPWE) | Organizational | June 17–20 |
| Madagascar (AKFM–KDRSM) | 9th | Aug. 13–17 |
| South Yemen (YSP) | Extraordinary | Oct. 10–15 |
| Angola (MPLA) | Extraordinary | Dec. 18–23 |
| **In 1981:** | | |
| Ethiopia (COPWE) | 2nd | Feb. 9–13 |
| Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC) | 1st | Nov. 8–14 |

front organizations.[19] Leaders of the Bahrain, Namibian, and South African movements have been published in *World Marxist Review*. In closeness to the Soviets, these movements range from the Bahrain group, which habitually participates in meetings of Arab Communist parties (the sole officially non-Communist organization to do so),[20] to the POLISARIO Front, which appears to be out to gather support from any quarter whatsoever.

Like the unitary liberation movements, those of the united-front type also participate in meetings sponsored by Communist parties. Each of the fronts has had a spokesman published in *World Marxist Review*. Moreover, each of these fronts includes a Communist component.[21] Again, closeness to Moscow varies. Of the group, the Palestine Liberation Organization appears to have the least affinity for the USSR, its ties with the latter appearing to be based primarily on opportunism.

There is yet a third, more amorphous grouping of ruling[22] and nonruling political parties that, while not qualifying as revolutionary democratic parties or liberation movements per se, nevertheless seem to be (or may be inferred to be) viewed by Moscow as part of the worldwide "national liberation movement." It is difficult to arrive at a definitive listing of such "socialist-oriented" parties, because the Soviets themselves make no such listings and appear to shift their opinions regarding one or another party as developments unfold within the individual polities or in their external relations. While not claiming to be exhaustive, the present Checklist iden-

[16] "The Latin American Proletariat and Its Allies in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *World Marxist Review* (London), August 1980, p. 48.

[17] Pavel Auersperg (the Czech managing editor of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*), "International Meeting of the Forces of World Progress," *Trybuna* (Prague), No. 48, Nov. 26, 1980, as trans. in US Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report: Political, Social and Military Affairs* (Arlington, VA), No. 1843 (JPRS 77193), Jan. 16, 1981, p. 12.

[18] See World Peace Council, *List of Members, 1980–83*, Helsinki, WPC Information Center, n.d., pp. 97, 105, 128, and 155.

[19] Shakhnazarov, loc. cit., p. 101; Kuskov, loc. cit., p. 103. See also Brian Crozier, "Moscow's Efforts for 'Peace,'" *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey, England), Jan. 13, 1982, p. 3.

[20] *Information Bulletin* (Prague, published by Peace and Socialism International Publishers), No. 4, 1979, p. 12; and *Al Nida* (Beirut), May 10, 1981.

[21] On Palestine, see Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1975, p. 592; on Guatemala, see *World Marxist Review*, March 1981, p. 112; on El Salvador, see ibid., October 1980, p. 19.

[22] In the case of Madagascar, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution is the dominant partner in the ruling coalition.



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tifies such of these parties that appear to fall into the category by virtue of the "objective" criteria of participation in meetings sponsored by Communist parties. Almost invariably, they also participate in one or another international Communist front organization, most often the World Peace Council.

Among the ruling parties in this category, the majority chose not to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the UN debate (they either abstained or absented themselves). Four (Guyana, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania), however, voted with the UN majority in calling on the Soviet Union to cease its intervention in Afghanistan.[23] Among the nonruling parties on the fringe of the national liberation movement, some appear more pro-Soviet than the ruling parties just mentioned (e.g., the Chilean MAPU and the Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Party are the only two in this whole third category to have been published in *World Marxist Review*).

Finally, one should mention yet one additional category which Moscow now seems to employ when it views the worldwide "national liberation movement." This comprises states (not so much the ruling parties of these states) of "national capitalist" orientation. As described in the literature, national capitalist countries are those that have a basically capitalistic domestic structure but which are attempting to disengage from the international capitalist system and to free themselves from the influence of multinational corporations operating in that system, and whose domestic political scene shows some elements which suggest the potential for noncapitalist political development. Countries which at times seem to be considered in this category include India, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.[24] This category is new, and determination of which states fall into it is open to debate and shift in accordance with events. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to offer any sort of listing of states (or parties) that might be included.

[23] Interestingly, Iraq's Ba'ath Party was considered "revolutionary democratic" by Moscow in the 1970's until a downturn in bilateral relations between the two countries. Mali (in the 1960's) and Uganda (in the 1970's) also seemed to fall into the category of "revolutionary democracies," but subsequent political changes have brought to power ruling parties in those countries that are somewhat cooler toward Moscow and as a result appear to be accorded a less exalted status within the national liberation movement.

One can point to three other countries that "fell from grace," although as recent developments demonstrate, such changes need not be permanent in Moscow's eyes. These are Egypt, Ghana, and Somalia. In the first case, developments under Anwar Sadat (including expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972) left Moscow with little to work with except the National Progressive Unionist Party. However, since Sadat's assassination, the CPSU seems to be a bit more optimistic about relations with Egypt. The recent coup in Ghana, bringing to the fore the leftist forces around Jerry Rawlings, may change Moscow's perceptions of the political orientation of Ghana. And in Somalia, Moscow has not seen fit (specifically) to relegate the ruling party to the capitalist world and may be hoping to reorient it once again toward national liberation.

In the cases of Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, and Uganda, the downgrading from "revolutionary democratic" status was explicitly noted in the Soviet literature. See R. Ulyanovskiy, *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1979, as trans. in *JPRS/Kommunist*, JPRS 74317, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 132; and Kiva, "Countries of Socialist Orientation. . . ." Iraq's "departure" can only be inferred from omission of its Ba'ath party from lists of revolutionary democracies published in 1981. See the sources cited in fn. 15.

[24] Some sense of the Soviet approach to this matter may be gained from reading Chapter 2, entitled "Socioeconomic Shifts in the Liberated Countries," in K. N. Brutents, *Osvobodivshiyesya strany v 70-ye gody* (The Liberated Countries in the 70's), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, pp. 22–50. See also G. Kim, "The National Liberation Movement Today," *International Affairs*, April 1981, p. 30. Kim contrasts such countries, with their "mass 'democratic' capitalism 'from below'," to countries of "dependent capitalism," which rely heavily on international capital for their development. "Evaluating the role of [the former] in the national liberation movement," Kim writes, "it is necessary to proceed from the fact that on the whole they retain their considerable anti-imperialist sentiments."



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# Correspondence

*NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors,* Problems of Communism, *International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.*

## MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET UNION

TO THE EDITORS: William Hyland, in his article "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1982), speculates that General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev has stifled the Soviet military by "assaulting one of its sacred preserves: military doctrine" (p. 22, col. 2). In my view, Mr. Hyland has ignored an extremely important development predating any intrusion into military doctrine by Mr. Brezhnev. This was the noticeable shift, after 1973 or so, in Soviet *declaratory policy*, as opposed to actual military policy or strategy. Civilian leaders, including Brezhnev and other Politburo members, and a few "talking" generals in the military itself, began to take back a number of "hawkish" military strategic and doctrinal positions long established in military writings going back to the 1960's. But, and this is crucial, a number of military texts *continued* with the old line. First, some background.

At the 24th and 25th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (in early 1971 and early 1976 respectively), Soviet leaders vented the civilians' "Peace Program." In addition, officers such as Gen. M. A. Mil'shteyn, and not a few Soviet media spokesmen following orders from the Central Committee's Department of International Information, also came forward. To quote from Mil'shteyn's interview with *The New York Times* of August 25, 1980, their line was simply that Soviet military policy was strictly "defensive"; if some writings once hinted otherwise, this view had, nevertheless, changed from the former more militant, now "obsolete," view.

Had things really changed, however? Proof that they had *not* came from several military sources, despite declaratory statements by "talking" generals or figureheads who followed the tactical party line designed for foreign consumption.

One indication of continuity of the old, offensive line (perhaps including nuclear preemption), were some of the articles in the new edition of the *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia—hereafter, *SVE*), which went to press between 1976 and 1980 in eight volumes, published in Moscow by Voyenizdat. Particularly in articles written by hawkish authors remembered for their bold writings of the late 1960's and early 1970's, the *SVE* rattled with statements calling for military-technological "superiority over the enemy" (the very title of an entry on page 500 of Vol. 6, which went to press in 1978, or five years after the birth of détente, SALT I, and the CPSU's Peace Program); and for upgraded civil defense, described as having strategic importance (Vol. 3, pp. 23–25). There was obvious stress upon the factor of surprise and concealment, in both strategic and tactical warfare (Vol. 4, p. 610, and Vol. 7, p. 51); upon application of laser-beam weapons in what the Soviets in the *SVE* call "*kosmicheskaya voyna*," or space war (Vol. 4, p. 380—lasers get an extended treatment in Vol. 4, pp. 559–62). In several places, the *SVE* traditionalists (like the authors of a number of books cited in the *SVE*) describe a nuclear world war as "avoidable" but also point out that if it came, it could be both won and survived by the Soviet side, and for dessert (or is it "desert"?), that "eternal peace [could be] established" by liquidating "the profound causes of war"—read "capitalism" (see Vol. 2, pp. 308–09, and Vol. 7, pp. 81 and 457). Moreover, there are, of course, numerous bows to the most militant propositions of Marxism-Leninism, especially in the articles on "national-liberation war" (note: not "struggle") and "guerrilla warfare" (see Vol. 5, pp 536–38, and Vol. 6, p. 228).

Finally, if more evidence were needed, a number of books and articles came out in the mid-1970's that unqualifiedly repeated all the harshness of earlier years. These were not authored by the Mil'shteyns or other "politicos" whether in mufti or field green, but by well-known Soviet authorities on weapons, tactics, and strategy—all of them soldiers. For representative works, see Col. D. A. Volkogonov et al., *Voyna i armiya* (War and the Army), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977; Col. S. A. Tyushkevich et al., *Sovetskaya Vooruzhënnyye Sily* (The Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1978; and Col. Gen. A. S. Zhëltov et al., *V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhënnyye Sily* (V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1980. Interestingly, too, the new *SVE* continues to cite as "Required Reading" for officers and enlisted men these very books, books that Gen. Mil'shteyn told *The New York Times* were "obsolete."

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MR. HYLAND REPLIES: I appreciate Professor Weeks's comment: he is a well-recognized authority on these matters, and he makes some valid points. I think that he and I are in agreement. He stresses continuation in Soviet military writings of what might be called the orthodox position and cites a great deal of evidence.

My point was that the gap between this body of material and what the political leaders have been saying seems to have widened since around 1977, and in the last year has reached the point where Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolay Ogarkov seem to be in direct opposition to each other. Professor Weeks's evidence suggests to me that there is indeed a quarrel over military affairs, and a new pamphlet, *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland* by Marshal Ogarkov (reported in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1982), seems to be further evidence that this quarrel continues.



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Since these issues are at the heart of Soviet policy and cannot fail to be reflected in Soviet politics, I would repeat my general proposition that we need to go back to Kremlinology.

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## READING SOVIET STRATEGY

TO THE EDITOR: In their article "Empire and Soviet Power" (*POC,* November-December 1981), Rebecca Strode and Colin Gray discussed the Tsarist heritage evident in Moscow's current strategic posture. Readers who wish to pursue this theme should consult the recent writings of David R. Jones, Director of the Russian Research Centre of Nova Scotia (Cambridge Station and Halifax), and Peter Vigor, head of the Soviet research section at Britain's Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (somewhat immodestly, I might perhaps also suggest my own new work, *The Nuclear Era,* to appear this spring).

However, the point of this letter is to bemoan the fact that the footnote citing authorities for the extreme view of Moscow's strategic purpose lumps a scholar on 19th-century Russian history and authors who, although prolific commentators on Soviet policy, are not proficient in the Russian language. This leads me to question whether Western strategists are really adequately familiar with Soviet military writings. Second hand, maybe, but by and large through poor translations. We would do better to return to older ideals and insist that area studies expertise rest on a modicum of relevant linguistic knowledge and, if at all possible, some first-hand knowledge of consequence. For a society to be content with less while deliberating on matters of utmost gravity, is akin to setting sail with binoculars (to scan the surface) but without sea charts (to mark the shoals).

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MS. STRODE And MR. GRAY REPLY: We regret that Mr. Jacobsen did not address our argument on substantive grounds, but chose instead to impugn the competency of several authors cited in a footnote. Since our article is neither an endorsement nor a refutation of those author's views, Mr. Jacobsen ought perhaps to have addressed his assertions directly to them, not to us. But Mr. Jacobsen goes on to suggest that Western strategists as a whole are incompetent to deal with their subject, and since we consider ourselves to be strategic analysts, a response to his critique is in order.

A strong background in Russian area studies would certainly strengthen any military analyst's capabilities; indeed, it was to stress this very point that we wrote our article. But the fundamental problem is not one of linguistic ability. The quantity of Soviet military writings available in English translation is enormous, and Mr. Jacobsen's further implication that the resources of the entire US defense community are inadequate to obtain accurate translations is unsubstantiated. The problem rather is one of too narrow a focus on these sources. The debate over Soviet military doctrine has become sterile, and it is time for analysts of Soviet defense policy to cease trying to derive from professional military writings an indication of the Soviet political leadership's global intentions that they simply do not contain. Knowledge of the historical and political context within which Soviet military doctrine is formulated is essential to a fuller understanding of Soviet attitudes toward nuclear war. To the extent that fluency in Russian facilitates this end, it is certainly a valuable skill.

Nevertheless, if Mr. Jacobsen wishes to take issue with us, he must do so on substantive grounds. We could, of course, delineate our own credentials in military history, Russian history, Soviet area studies, military strategy, and—yes—the Russian language, but we decline to do so, in the belief that our argument should stand or fall on its intellectual merit, not on the curricula vitae of its authors.

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